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Near East/South Asia Report

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OZAL EXPECTED TO DISCUSS ARMENIAN QUESTION WITH SOVIETS

Istanbul MARMARA in Armenian 25 Jul 86 p 1

[Text] Sedad Ergin writes in CUMHURIYET:

Prime Minister Turgut Ozal will go to Moscow next Monday, and it is expected that he will express at the highest level Turkey's discomfort and sensitivity with regard to certain allegations made and activities held in the Soviet Union in connection with the Armenian genocide.

Allegations in the Soviet Union about the Armenian genocide appear in two forms. The first form is related to Soviet Armenia. It appears that allegations about the genocide have become an inseparable part of the official ideology of the Soviet Armenian republic. Every time Ankara has objected on this issue, the Soviets have replied that Soviet Armenia is an independent republic. Turkey does not find that response very persuasive.

But what is most disrturbing for Turkey is the stance of the government in Moscow. Moscow openly supports the leaders of Soviet Armenia and justifies their outbursts. This was clearly demonstrated when an Armenian week was organized in Moscow on the occasion of the anniversary of the establishment of the Soviet Armenian republic. At that time, the Armenian Deputy Foreign Minister held a press conference in the Foreign Ministry at the Kremlin and alleged that it is impossible to deny the reality of the genocide and made inimical remarks with regard to Turkey.

Ankara has been further disturbed because of the following developments:

1. On April 24 last year PRAVDA carried an article entitled "Humanity Condemns" which charged that the first genocide of imperialism was committed by the Ottomans against the Armenians and that 1.5 million Armenians were killed. The article criticized the Western governments which refute the genocide.

2. Last year, during the meeting of the UN Human Rights Commission, the Soviet delegate described the events of 1915 as a "satanic genocide."

Armenia's Role

3. Garlen Dallakian, member of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of Soviet Armenia and Chairman of the Committee for Cultural Relations with the Diaspora Armenians, visited the Greek sector of Cyprus last November and said during a press conference there that the heart of every Armenian burns with the desire to return to his homeland. He added that half the Armenian population was killed by the Turkish people.

4. Last June, Channel 2 of Moscow television featured a film about an Armenian family who lived in eastern Anatolia in the period 1900-1920. The film was shown in two parts. The film contained accusations against Turkey, and Bitlis, Erzurum and Van were shown as provinces within the borders of Armenia.

5. A group of foreign diplomats stationed in Moscow visited Soviet Armenia recently, and they were shown the "Genocide Memorial" with the allegation that the memorial symbolizes the division of Armenia.

What Does Ankara Say?

It is observed that thanks to steps taken by Ankara recently this campaign against Turkey has somewhat slowed down. But that is no reason for an end to Ankara's displeasure. Ankara believes that:

1. Any acts which threaten Turkey's territorial integrity harm good-neighborly relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union;

2. The said allegations have always served as pretexts for Armenian terrorists; such activities encourage the terrorists and affirm that there is a linkage between the two.

It is therefore expected that Turkey express these concerns at the highest level in the Kremlin.

9588
CSO: 4605/66

PETITION CALLS FOR CLOSURE OF ATOMIC PLANT IN ARMENIAN/SSR

Istanbul MARMARA in Armenian 14, 15 Jul 86

[14 Jul 86 pp 1,4]

[Text] In our 18 June edition we reported, on the basis of a statement by Garlen Dallakian, the newly elected Chairman of the [Soviet Armenian] Committee for Cultural Relations with the Diaspora, that a minor accident occurred at the Medzamor nuclear power plant near Yerevan. During the same interview, Dallakian stated that a new nuclear power plant, in addition to the Medzamor plant, will be built in Yerevan.

We learned from the ARMENIAN REPORTER that 350 Soviet Armenians have sent a letter to Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev demanding that plans for the new nuclear power plant be cancelled, that the existing Medzamor nuclear power plant be shut down and that steps be taken to prevent environmental pollution in Soviet Armenia. The contents of the letter sent to Gorbachev are extremely grave and disturbing, and we publish it with grief. The Beirut daily ZARTONK wrote in its 19 June 1986 edition that according to unofficial information it had obtained the Medzamor plant will be shut down for 2 years.

Below we publish a translation--with some omissions--of the English text of the letter sent to Gorbachev.

Nearly one-third of the population of the Soviet Armenian republic live in Yerevan, in an area of 2.98 square kilometers, where the air is 80 percent polluted. The city is blanketed with smog for 165 days a year. According to international pollution standards, the southern and eastern sectors of the city--where 1 million people live--should have been evacuated a long time ago. About 35 percent of the republic's green belt has been destroyed, and 45 percent of the rest is in jeopardy.

Some of Armenia's rivers, such as Tepet, Ogil and Kedar, are biologically dead; others, such as Razdan and Vorodan, have become nearly unusable.

Of the seven cities with the most polluted air in the Soviet Union, five are in Soviet Armenia. The chemical factories in Yerevan, Alaverdi, Kirovakan, Ghapan and Kacharan and the Razdan metalworks have depleted the surrounding forests and destroyed their animal populations. In these regions, concentrations of chemical compounds such as carbon monoxide, sulfuric anhydrides, heavy metals, mercury and chlorobenzenes are 10, 100 and sometimes 1,000 times higher than acceptable standards.

As a result of pollution caused by chemical substances produced in factories in and around Yerevan, digestive, coronary, pulmonary and lung diseases, abnormal births and sterility have begun to increase sharply in this small area and the Ararat Plain where two-thirds the population of Soviet Armenia lives. Although cases of lung, intestinal and other cancers have not yet reached abnormal proportions, there are concerns about the future.

Official statistics manifest that the rate of cancer per 10,000 people has quadrupled between 1965 and 1985. Research conducted in the Hokdemperian region shows that the cancer rate per 10,000 people was 190 in Yerevan, 170 in Echmiadzin and Bagramian and 13 in Ashdarak and Sevan.

The number of children born retarded has increased fivefold in the last 15 years. During the same period, the number of psychological diseases rose sixfold, leukemia rose fourfold, abnormal and premature births rose sevenfold and coronary strokes rose eightfold.

In Yerevan's industrialized regions and near the nuclear power plant, five out of every 10 children are born with handicaps and birth defects. Such children either die within forty days after birth or are condemned to live sickly and abnormal lives. This rate is 3 per 10 births around Sevan Lake and Kukark.

[15 Jul 86 pp 1,4]

[Text] Nearly half the population on the Ararat Plain (including Yerevan) suffers from various diseases, such as cancer, diabetes, severe or minor ulcers, intestinal or pulmonary problems, etcetera.

This is literally a biological crime. As a result, more than 20,000 Armenians moved away from the Ararat Plain between 1980 and 1985 and established residence in the northern Caucasus and southern Russia.

Despite knowing these facts, the 27th Congress of the CPSU has decided to build a second nuclear power plant bigger than the one at Medzamor 24 kilometers away from Yerevan within the next 5 years. This plant will increase the amount of chemical waste and pollution released into the environment by 50 percent.

In the last 10 years, more than 150 incidents involving the release of radioactive gases into the atmosphere and the pollution of water have been recorded in the Hokdemperian region. Between 1980 and 1985, three incidents occurred which could have turned into disasters for Armenia.

The decision to build the new nuclear power plant has been taken despite the fact that the entire region of Hokdemperian uses artesian wells for its water supply. Several fruit and vegetable growing orchards and fields show signs of pollution, and the people are asked not to consume certain vegetables and fruits, such as strawberries. Government authorities have kept these dangerous cases secret from the people, and as a result tens of thousands of people have been condemned to disease and suffering.

Radiation

The threat of radiation and related diseases prompted a group of Armenian scientists and academicians to write a letter to the Presidium of the [Soviet] Academy of Sciences on 14 May and 5 October 1985 stating that the building of a second nuclear power plant in Armenia would mean the turning of Armenia into a waste disposal dump within a short period of time.

The Ararat Plain, where the building of a second nuclear plant is planned, contains 70 percent of the republic's fertile lands thanks to an abundance of underground water. The plain, where two-thirds of Armenia's population lives, is frequently subjected to earthquakes of magnitude 5 to 9 and is also a volcanic region. The building of a nuclear power plant on such a land would be an unprecedented act in the history of nuclear energy and would constitute a heavy insult to the Armenian people.

In view of the seriousness of the situation and after examining the 1986-1990 five-year plan and the work to improve the Soviet economy, the republic's scientists and educational and cultural institutions called the attention of the party's Central Committee on this issue and proposed the removal from Soviet Armenian territory of certain chemical factories such as the aluminum factory and the fertilizer factory in Yerevan, the polyvinylchloride factory in Nayad, the metalworks in Razdan and chemical factories in Kirovakan, Alaverdi, Ghapan and Kacharan. These serious proposals were not considered. Not only were the factories causing pollution not removed, but it was decided to build, 24 kilometers away from Yerevan, a new and bigger nuclear power plant and a nuclear waste depository to serve all the nuclear power plants in the Caucasian region.

On the eve of the 27th CPSU Congress, thousands of individuals opposed to the extermination of biological life sent thousands of letters to you as well as members of the congress, scientists and teachers. No substantive results have been achieved so far.

The building of a new nuclear power plant is unnecessary not only for humanitarian reasons but also from an economic standpoint. The total electrical power generation capacity of the Soviet Armenian republic is 28 billion kilowatt-hours per year. The actual amount of electricity generated currently is 15 billion kilowatt-hours, of which 2.7 billion kilowatt-hours is exported to neighboring republics.

The raw materials of factories in Armenia are imported from abroad at great expense, and 60 percent of Armenia's electricity is used by these poisonous factories whose elimination would result in substantial savings in electricity.

There is another problem: 60 percent of Armenia's hydroelectric power potential remains unutilized. Today, it is possible to build 6 large or 30 small hydroelectric power plants which may also irrigate 40 percent of the arable land--a problem that has not been solved yet.

Solar and wind energy resources have also not been sufficiently utilized.

All these demonstrate that the party's motto of "everything for the good of man" is not put into practice in the case of Armenia.

In view of the reasons enumerated above, we suggest:

a) The shutdown of atomic reactors at the Medzamor nuclear power plant, the closure of the plant and the cancellation of plans to build a new plant;

b) The closure of chemical factories which release noxious substance into the environment in order to reduce the number fatalities among the residents of Yerevan, Kirovakan, Alaverdi and Ghapan;

c) The allocation in the next five-year plan of additional funds for hospitalization expenses and the tripling of hospital beds in Armenia in view of the fact that the occurrence of certain diseases has multiplied in Armenia;

d) The establishment of an international commission under the aegis of the CPSU Central Committee to investigate the ecological condition of Armenia's environment and to make appropriate recommendations;

e) Although there have always been fears about the dangers and incidents of radiation in Armenia, the officials have kept the facts secret and have lied to the people. Consequently, the Chairman of the State Committee for the Utilization of Atomic Energy, Andronik Petros'yants, the Health Minister of Soviet Armenia, Gabrielian, and Associate Member of the Soviet Armenian Academy of Sciences, Arslanian, must be tried in court.

9588
CSO: 4605/67

LIBYA

BRIEFS

MISURATA PORT CONTRACT AWARDED--Yugoslavia's Novogradnja has a $12.4 million contract for work on the second stage of Misurata port. The contract, let by main contractor Projekt Ivan Milutinovic (PIM), also of Yugoslavia, calls for construction of transit sheds, warehouses, air raid shelters, administration buildings, a bank, post office, lighthouse, canteen and minor buildings. Work, which will require 200 Yugoslav staff, is expected to start in September. PIM's contract, signed in 1983, calls for construction of quays. [Text] [London MEED in English 2 Aug 86 p 16] /9604

PER CAPITA INCOME FIGURE--Per capita income reached LD2,055 ($6,400) in 1985, compared with LD642 ($2,000) in 1970, the Tripoli daily AL-FAJR AL-JADID reports. This is considerably lower than the World Bank's 1984 income estimate of $8,520--the highest level in Africa. [Text] [London MEED in English 2 Aug 86 p 16] /9604

CSO: 4500/199

BANK OF MOROCCO FINANICAL REPORT ANALYZED

Rabat AL-'ALAM in Arabic 14 Jul 86 p 2

[Article: "In Connection With Bank of Morocco Report: Difficult Times; Resumed Development Has Not Served Fiscal Correction"]

[Text] It seems that finance men have a sense of humor. In the course of commenting on the Central Bank report, one of these men wondered if the bank technologists want to shift to diplomacy.

In addition to its private organization, the Bank of Morocco, which with the government and the treasury "contributes to the currency and fiscal policy," maintains enough independence to express its opinion on the administration. The bank does so in a relatively discrete way because it is not accountable before the parliament for this administration.

If anything should be known or read about the bank experts, then this is done only through the particulars of this position.

Mr Berrada, the minister of finance, has tacitly used in the interview conducted with him by LE MATIN AL-SAHRA' the same distinction between production and finance men without reaching the point of being stricter than the Central Bank in the fiscal area.

Recently, the problems of remittance to the outside world escalated anew after having been frozen for 2 weeks at the level of 70-75 days as a delay whereas the IMF guarantee remained suspended. In this situation, the observation of a British banker assumes a disconcerting meaning: "Morocco has taken a lot of liberty with its finances, and many are the European governments that have encouraged it in this regard. Therefore, one should hope that the strictness of their bankers will lead Morocco to a more realistic viewpoint."

In contrast to this viewpoint, we should note that the World Bank has nearl maintained its financial plan concerning the sectoral evaluation made nearly 1.5 years ago.

In their totality, the conflicting positions tell the Bank of Morocco that until 1985, "the results in their totality seem to be reassuring. But they are not equal and they include some less positive elements."

In their totality, these conflicting positions tell the Bank of Morocco that until 1985, "the results in their totality seem to be reassuring. But they are not equal and they include some less positive elements."

The Export Institute [ma'had al-isdar] notes that the distinction between economic and fiscal has only been made for the necessity of analysis:

"The economic has achieved the targets set for it whereas the fiscal has shown some weakness, thus underlining the limits of the transactions concluddd and the narrow maneuvering margin. Broadening this margin requires profound structural reforms."

Mr Berrada notes that reducing the treasury budget deficit is an essential prerequisite for reform. The 1985 results have shown a deficit of 6.2 percent over 1984. It is an open figure as long as the IMF guarantee, which permits the acquisition of additional money and loans, plays a partial role in this regard. But according to the program on which Rabat and the IMF agreed last September, it is expected that this share will be reduced rapidly. The program expects the presence of an effort similar to the effort made in 1984 in comparison with 1983 when the treasury deficit, compared with the gross domestic production, was reduced by one half. It seemed at the time that the drop in the dollar price and in the oil prices will help the domestic efforts. But nothing of the sort has happened. As the Central Bank points out, the reduction achieved in 1985 relied fundamentally on the modest general investments but was undermined by the efforts to settle overdue accounts. As for the industrialists, they relaxed last fall by virtue of the fact that they were able to reduce the time in which the state has to settle the accounts for public works and materials to less than 3 months. But since then, the situation has experienced inactivity and a delay of 4-8 months, which is a delay that punishes or rewards the major contract more than the small ones.

On the other hand, it is possible to ask about the suitability of the rate itself, considering that the failure to observe it has caused Morocco to confine its requests to non-binding aid.

This is what the minister of finance did by raising the issue of the presence of the collateral economy, which is not included in the calculations, but without referring to the results of the possibility of the external financial operation accompanying this rate.

It is difficult for us to blame those who deal with Morocco financially for not taking literally the figures presented by the administration. It seems that this administration must approximate the gross domestic product realistically. There is general thinking, even though this figure does not have the least official value, that the gross domestic product calculated in fixed dirhams must be increased by 30 percent in order to get a true picture of this gross domestic product, which is estimated at 120 billion dirhams.

The real growth is estimated at 4.3 percent (compared to 2.1 percent in 1984 in comparison with 1983).

This small leap comes fundamentally from agriculture (12.1 percent) whereas minerals, conversion industries, and commerce stayed below 1 percent.

It must be noted that the agricultural development was accompanied, as of the fall of 1985, by a revival, if we may use the word, in commerce and industry and that this leap was the reason for the presence of a surplus liquidity in the economy between the fall of 1985 and the spring of 1986.

It is evident that the conclusion of the Bank of Morocco report is close to the concepts employed last year and that the report calls for "following up on the long-term reform program with the aim of reducing consumption and the budget deficit which is considered a mirror of the success or failure of any policy." Putting it politely, the bank adds: "Economic reform and correction of the social deviation are within our reach."

8494/6662
CSO: 4519/145

BRIEFS

JUSTICE MINISTRY PARDONS PRISONERS--On the occasion of the anniversary of the revolution of the King and the people which falls tomorrow, the Ministry of Justice has issued the following statement: Our Master His Majesty, may God preserve his glory and triumph, has issued an order pardoning the remaining imprisonment or detention sentences in favor of 68 convicts, the pardoning of the whole imprisonment sentence while keeping the fine in favor of 5 persons, the reduction of the imprisonment or detention sentence of seven prisoners. [Excerpt] [Rabat Domestic Service in Arabic 1900 GMT 19 Aug 86] /9604

CSO: 4500/198

SUDAN

POLITICAL SITUATION, ECONOMY, ARAB RELATIONS DISCUSSED

London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic 25 Jun-1 Jul 86 p 11

[Interview with president of the Sudanese Sovereignty Council and member of the Political Bureau of the Democratic Federal Party, by Muhammad Ahmad Hisam: "I Have No Disagreement With al-Sadiq al-Mahdi, and Our Relations with Egypt Are Relations of Nile and Blood;" Khartoum, date not specified]

[Text] Today Ahmad 'Ali al-Mirghani, president of the first Sudanese Sovereignty Council and member of the Political Bureau of the Democratic Federal Party, heads the government of Sudan. Beofre assuming this post, he was board chairman of the Islamic Bank. Our colleague Muhammad Ahmad Hisham conducted the following interview with him in Khartoum.

[Question] Some people think that your assuming the position of president of the Sovereignty Council was a surprise, since the position is a political one which you, being deputy leader of the al-Khatmiyah [Qur'an Reciting] Group, might have refused. What do you think of such a question?

[Answer] The political role of al-Mirghani house and al-Khatmiyah has been obvious since the time of al-Sayyid 'Ali al-Mirghani. It is a home for every Sudanese and has always been a place of accord and agreement for all Sudanese. In this sense, my accepting the position of head of state has broader and more comprehensive dimensions than just this narrow viewpoint. It is not a power-seeking position but a position of consultation and attainment of Sudanese unanimity. Therefore, I don't think that the position is incompatible with the religious nature of al-Khatmiyah. We see no difference between religious and political work; they both are a single mission. The Prophet managed and guided affairs of state within the council, and provides us with the highest model and example.

[Question] There is talk among political circles about some disagreement between you and the prime minister over the appointment of a secretary general for the palace and other matters. Could you comment on this? What do you think of the relationship in light of you alliance and the particular policy of each party?

[Answer] There isn't the slightest disagreement between the prime minister and me; in fact, there is total agreement and understanding of what best serves the Sudan and its people. There is absolutely no substance to the matters which have been stirred up. Right now we intend to reorganize the Sudanese house and put it in order again from within. The two parties are in harmony and agreement over most issues, and there is no disagreement between us. In light of this, relations are strong and open. There is no divergence of opinion in any respect.

[Question] Pressing national concerns, such as the South, the economy, and eliminating the vestiges of the former regime, are taking up the cabinet's efforts during this phase. Do you foresee a specific role for the Sovereignty Council to play?

[Answer] As you know, under the current constitutional regime, the Sovereignty Council symbolizes the sovereignty of the entire Sudan. The executive body, represented by the cabinet, works in an integrated manner and in complete accord with the Sovereignty Council. We are all working in accordance with a clear conceptualization of all the country's major national issues, within a consultative framework, and we ask God to grant us success.

[Question] In your capacity as the Democratic Federal Party's Political Bureau official in charge of Arab relations, what role do you think Sudan might be expected to play in confronting splits within the Arab ranks?

[Answer] Beginning from a nationalist starting point, we are pursuing all tendencies which are in Sudan's interest and which will achieve the interests of the Arab and the Islamic world. I believe that Sudan is capable of playing an effective, positive role in achieving a modicum of Arab solidarity. We will do everything we can to achieve this end. By virtue of our excellent relations with all the warring Arab sides, we will do everything in our power to achieve a minimum degree of accord. I suppose that those issues which people have been working to pacify for years, such as the Iraq-Iran war, will also require some time, hopefully not too long, in order to spare Muslim boood and resources, which must be employed in confronting the Zionist enemy and liberating Jerusalem.

[Question] How would you describe the current situation, and the future, of Egyptian-Sudanese relations?

[Answer] Sudanese-Egyptian relations have deep historical and geographic roots. The relations are linked by the Nile, blood, and the common interests of the two fraternal peoples, and therefore they transcend any difficulties, no matter how great. There have been contacts on various levels between the two countries' officials in order to reconceptualize the relations which had existed during the May era, which involved from without substance and terminology without meaning.

[Question] Do you think that Numayri's presence in Cairo will affect Egyptian-Sudanese relations? How do you think this issue can be dealt with?

[Answer] No comment!

[Question] How do you think Sudan can get out of its economic crisis? Could you evaluate the Arab states' contributions in this regard?

[Answer] The deteriorating economic situation in Sudan is the legacy of the past era and the result of mistaken policies. I believe that when we started out on the road to reform, we made the assumption that we would be able to increase production so as to achieve a reasonable degree of self-sufficiency in the necessities we import which we could produce here in Sudan. The second assumption was that we would rely on our own abilities to overhaul stalled production projects and provide production revenues. I believe that the fraternal Arab countries will help us get out of this crisis.

[Question] It is rumored that the International Monetary Fund has expressed its readiness to reach an understanding with Sudan. Has the Sudanese government changed its mind about accepting the IMF's conditions?

[Answer] Right now the government is doing all it can to straighten out Sudan's relations with the IMF. I believe that Sudan's relations with the IMF are good and that the IMF understands Sudan's position very well. The government, through the Constituent Assembly, will announce an integrated policy very soon.

[Question] What steps must the government take to wipe out the vestiges of the former regime?

[Answer] I believe the government has formed committees to study this matter, but these committees have not yet presented their recommendations.

[Question] It is rumored that 120 death sentences dating from the transitional period--sentences passed according to the September 1983 laws--are still awaiting approval. What have you decided to do about them?

[Answer] No comment!

8559/9738
CSO: 4504/386

SOVEREIGNTY COUNCIL MEMBER DISCUSSES SOUTHERN ISSUES

Al-Shariqah AL-KHALIJ in Arabic 4 Jul 86 p 12

[Interview with Sudanese Sovereignty Council member Idris al-Banna by 'Abidin Samsa'ah: "The Problem of the South Can Be Solved Only Through Democratic Dialogue"; Khartoum, date not specified]

[Text] For the Sudanese government, the south in particular is a problem which has continued to be a constant headache for which lasting solutions must be found. The contacts now taking place with the Popular Army for the Liberation of Sudan [PALS]; the convening of the constitutional congress, the possibility of applying the Addis Ababa agreement, PALS' rejection of the present government, the deteriorating economic situation, balanced development, and foreign relations are the topics and questions which AL-KHALIJ posed to Idris al-Banna, member of Sudan's Sovereignty Council.

Choosing Democratic Rule

[Question] Sudan is a huge country, and governing it remains a problem to which a permanent solution must be found. What is your opinion?

[Answer] Under democratic rule, the system of government is being formed, as is happening now, according to the wishes of the Sudanese people. The three authorities are the legislative, the executive, and the independent judicial authorities.

The basic idea of democratic rule is that there should be no departure from these elements, as represented by the head of state, the cabinet, and the constitutional assembly, all of which rest on principles related to the democratic government desired and introduced by the Sudanese people who brought about the uprising and the miracle of April 1985. There is no disagreement over the system of government in Sudan. The liberal democratic option was chosen by the people through their participation in the recent elections.

[Question] Sudan is faced with the question of determining the government for southern Sudan. We would like to know how this problem can be overcome.

[Answer] The system of government for southern Sudan will not depart from the framework outlined for the system of government for Sudan as a whole. However, there must be a mutual understanding between North and South as to the type of government they want. Should it be a federal government or a regional one, like the one which followed the Addis Ababa agreement? All of these questions have been raised on the Sudanese political scene. I believe that the answers to these questions must come from the national constitutional congress. It should be left to the people of the South to decide whether they want a government over three provinces together, or one council looking after these three provinces. As for some people's speaking out on behalf of the people of Equatorial Province, saying that there should be a union in which each one stands alone, no decision has been made on this, or on the issue as a whole. It, along with all the other issues related to the system of government in Sudan, will be decided at the national constitutional congress.

Future of Dialog With Garang, and the Addis Ababa Agreement

[Question] At present, how suitable and useful is the Addis Ababa agreement as a framework for government in the South?

[Answer] The Addis Ababa agreement has been rejected in whole and in part by the southerners themselves, particularly the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Sudan [PMLS], which will not hear of any southern issues considered separately from issues concerning Sudan as a whole, or of anything which will bring to mind the Addis Ababa agreement. Their opinion of that agreement is that it is unsuitable as a framework for government in the south--that the present government will achieve the kind of government the PMLS want for the south.

[Question] There have been many contacts with the PMLS. How successful have they been, and are you optimistic?

[Answer] Yes, we are quite optimistic about the contacts, dialogs, and meetings which have been held. We feel that they will lead us to our goal, that they are the first step toward a peaceful solution for the ongoing conflict. On our part, we are still listening to all the PMLS opinions. As for the preparatory contacts with the PMLS, we are not pessimistic. What has been actually accomplished holds out hopes that the problem and the struggle are on their way to conclusion.

Garang and his movement are not refusing to talk, and we expect developments in the near future. We and the PMLS are still studying the various issues and questions brought up for study and debate. As soon as an agreement is reached, a date and place for the conference will be set. Our joint meeting for concluding the deliberations began earlier by the Ummah Party at the Koka-Dam conference was postponed to 21 June. That meeting was attended by a steering committee, or secretariat, and consisted of preparations for the constitutional congress.

Koka Dam Resolutions

[Question] Are the Koka-Dam resolutions pertaining to the Islamic laws and the system of government acceptable to all political forces?

[Answer] All the National Grouping groups and parties took part in drawing up and passing the Koka-Dam resolutions, and they all approved them. We believe that there will never be any disagreement over these resolutions, even from those political forces which did not take part in the joint meeting. There is no disagreement over the Koka-Dam resolutions between the parties and groups which come under the National Grouping banner and the PMLS.

I am sure that the constitutional congress will be held on its appointed date, which I expect will be very soon, as soon as the preparatory meeting I mentioned before is finished.

[Question] In spite of repeated calls for dialog, the PMLS has declared its rejection of the existing government, which was brought in through democratic means. We would like your comment on that.

[Answer] There is nothing new about these statements. We don't blame the PMLS for their stand, which they declared from the very start. They had their reservations about the current government even before it was formed and before the election results appeared. They rejected it because they had not participated in the country's recent elections, which they feel were minor elections. There is nothing new in what they are saying. Their statements will not affect the avowed stand which followed Koka-Dam, the Ummah Party delegation's visit, and the meeting with them. As I said earlier, there is nothing new in this matter, and the statements issued recently do not upset us.

National Accord Is the Only Way

[Question] The problem of the fighting in the southern Sudan is a long-standing one. What do you see as a lasting solution?

[Answer] The problem of the fighting in the southern Sudan can be resolved through national accord, which in turn can be achieved by restoring, between northerners and southerners, the confidence which had been shaken up by colonialism. Now, hidden hands planted by colonialism are working to wipe out the democracy which Sudan has achieved. Confidence must be spread among the Sudanese in general, not concentrating on essence alone but also on the true Sudanese spirit which believes in the homeland and unity and in preserving independence and pride in Sudanese honor. Once all of this, which we have been calling for and working to achieve for the people, is provided, we must preserve it among the people of the one homeland. Then there will be no reason for problems, including the southern problem, to persist. Starting with this confidence, we can build up the country economically, socially, and politically, work to develop the country and achieve growth, and solve our complicated national and regional problems.

I have served in the southern Sudan, and according to my long experience and relations with the people of the south, they are the best sort of people. However, foreign hands are working to separate the southern Sudan for reasons best understood by colonialism, so as to protect itself by protecting its interests, which it is doing by deepening non-fundamental differences created by colonialism. The Sudan is envied by the colonialists because of the goodness and intelligence of its people and their ability to solve their problems, which sets them apart from the rest of the African continent. This is what upsets many of the colonialists and leads them to create problems for the Sudan.

Yes to Abolition of the September Laws

[Question] Is it true that the September laws and their application have aggravated the fighting in the south?

[Answer] Yes, the September laws should be abolished. They are the creation of the deposed Ja'far Numayri, who introduced them to ensure the safety of his regime, which the people rejected. They should be abolished because of their connection with the Numayri regime's repression, corruption, demoralization, and the mistaken practices which occurred in the futile, reprehensible courts of justice. The people are capable of formulating acceptable laws for governing the country through the democracy practiced by the Ummah Party. The Ummah Party will never include anyone who would sin against the Islamic Shari'ah. The party will always act according to what the Muslim Sudanese people want, and will derive the laws from the Qur'an and the Sunnah and submit them to the people. The Sudanese people have no doubt of that; they do not shun the Islamic Shari'ah, and not one of them fears it. There must be no oppression or tyranny against others. The Sudanese people want to appeal to the law of God and His Prohpet. The laws must be derived from the Qur'an just as the imams did by using analogy and consensus. In general, Sudan is a democratic government, and it cannot be blemished without legal complications.

For Non-alignment

[Question] The Sudan has had foreign relations with many countries for a long time. What do you think of the relations which exist under the democratic system?

[Answer] The head of state has declared our foreign policy, which will be governed according to the standards of non-alignment. We have good relations with our neighbors, and special relations with Egypt, Libya and Ethiopia, with which we are bound with special relations in the precise sense of the word. During the coming phase, Sudan will construct its foreign relations according to the guidelines of the non-aligned bloc.

[Question] What about Sudan's relations with the two superpowers?

[Answer] During the coming phase, the Sudan will strive to be a friend to all, the superpowers and the others alike.

We Are Striving for Arab Solidarity

[Question] Will Sudan have a role to play in achieving Arab solidarity and clearing the air?

[Answer] We are striving for Arab solidarity all the time. In the coming phase, we will try to reconcile the feuding Arab countries. We will give this issue all our attention, and we will try to make it a fundamental issue during the coming phase. We will make every effort to clear the air among the Arabs and to present initiatives and make peace among the various Arab countries. We will conduct intensive contacts with our Arab brothers in order to put the Arab house in order, and to put the Arab movement and the Arab world on the right path, so that it can face foreign conspiracies strongly and resolutely and achieve economic development.

[Question] What are the latest developments in the case of the deposed Numayri and the order to hand him over to Sudan for trial?

[Answer] The Sudanese people have requested that the deposed Numayri be handed over. No one can be a true Sudanese unless he demands that Numayri be handed over; otherwise, he can only be described as a May supporter. We shall continue to ask for Numayri to be handed over, no matter what the obstacles, in order to achieve the people's demands.

Balanced Development Is Essential

[Question] The economic deterioration has affected all public utilities, but Sudan continues to depend on loans, gifts, and aid. How will the new government deal with the economic crisis and the problem of foreign loans and accumulated debts?

[Answer] Yes, Sudan is suffering from an economic recession and a critical economic problem. We still depend on foreign aid in the form of loans and gifts. Sudan needs foreign aid, but this aid must be so regulated that it will be spent on nothing but productive projects. All foreign aid should be put to use in its correct, proper place, and in the shortest time possible, so that the continuation of such aid does not result in a new commitment. In this way we can build up the country and help solve its economic problems. This requires devoted, committed, and capable people.

[Question] Many people still complain about the unfair distribution of development in Sudan, which might be the cause of some of the problems. What is your opinion?

[Answer] The Wad Madani conference examined these issues, and the head of the government himself insists on the need to build up the provinces. In the democratic era, there must be balanced development throughout Sudan, as the PMLS demands. I believe that there must be balanced development in Sudan, and that the provinces should get their fair share of development.

There Is No Power Struggle

[Question] It is rumored that there are disagreements between the Sovereignty Council (the head of state) and the cabinet and that the Sovereignty Council will have no part to play in the coming phase.

[Answer] Some people say that there is a struggle between the Sovereignty Council and the cabinet. All of this is a falsehood conjured up by the dreams of those who have found no path to power. The accusers say that the connection between the Democratic Federal Party and the Ummah Party is an unfortunate one which could be exploited in the interest of fragmentation. This is a dream, for the party connection between the two parties is a predestined one dating from the seventies, in the context of which Ja'far Numayri was expelled and in the context of which this nation will be rebuilt. Those who imagine that struggles will happen or will be fabricated, and that others will respond to them, are mistaken. As for ourselves, we stres that we will maintain these links, as a heart-felt commitment and duty, for the sake of rebuilding Sudan. The role of the Sovereignty Council shall be in accordance with the Sudanese constitution--a democratic council, as opposed to the military council imposed by circumstances. Decision making in the council shall be by consensus; the head of state will approve these decisions through the assembly; its powers shall derive from the constitution; and it shall act in coordination and complete accord with its counterparts.

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TUNISIA

RECENT CHANGES IN IMPORTANT POLITICAL POSITIONS

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[Article: "The Decision To Dismiss Mzail Was Made Secretly a Year Ago: Political Musical Chairs Renews the War of Succession"]

[Text] The game of political musical chairs in Tunisia has lasted longer than it should. Half the history of the country since its independence in 1956 is that of the confirmation of the gains of its independence within the framework of "democracy" and the other half is that of the search for a successor to the supreme combatant.

Since he suffered a heart attack in 1967, the musical chairs has taken place and obeys one law only, that his policy remain in place. As time has passed, the circle has shrunk and many great personalities have gone into voluntary supervised exile either within Tunisia or abroad. Some enjoy internal influence and some, Arab and international relations. Among them, let us mention Ahmed Ben Salah, the first to leave the game in 1969, then Bahi Ladgham, then Hedi Nouira, Ahmed Mestiri, Mohammed Masmoudi, and finally Mohamed Mzail.

The most important thing that happened in Mohamed Mzail's era is that the circle of musical chairs shrunk so much that it became the closest chairs directly to the right and to the left of the supreme combatant, the chairs of Mrs Wassila Bourguiba, his wife, and Habib Bourguiba, Jr. The political price of the shrinkage of this circle of the game was the destruction of party pluralism along with the increasing gravity of economic conditions. If the ruling elite possessed some power to confront the complex crisis that was expressed by the "bread revolution," the way in which it and its complications were treated drained that force to the degree that the results of the general secondary school "baccalaureate" were enough to bring it down.

Mazil's government got tangled in the trap of being drained when it began a confrontation with the Labor Union, which ended with the imprisonment of its leader, Habib Achour, his being handed over to the court, and the holding of new elections in the union, the legality and integrity of which many people challenged. What is important is that this confrontation was a double-edged sword. First, Mazil's government lost a base of popular support and the politicized "street" and was changed, in the domestic public's opinion, into an example of illegitimate rule. This led in turn to an increase in Mazil's association with President Bourguiba's decisions.

The results of these developments was an increase in the conflict within the ruling elite over the successor to Bourguiba, a conflict which forced Mzail to strengthen his alliance possibilities in the ministries and within the Dustur Party by installing his close friends. When the events of last year and the changes that President Bourguiba made in the ministries, in the central committee of the Dustur Party, and in the members of the political bureau at the last conference are reviewed, it appears that the truth of the matter is that there was a search underway for a successor to Mzali, not a successor to Bourguiba. It appears that Bourguiba made the decision to remove Mzali almost a year ago when he made Mansour Skhiri a minister in the office of the president last September. Since that date the process of removing those close to both the president and Mzali began. Adad Awisi, head of the private secretariat of the president and his friend since childhood, was dismissed. Then Habib Bourguiba, Jr., was dismissed from the post of special counsellor to the president on the pretext that some of those close to him were linked to corruption in the administration and abuse of their positions. Then Wassila Bourguiba was dismissed publicly and it was revealed that he had decided to announce that he was going to divorce her. This would contradict an earlier law that Bourguiba had issued forbidding divorce. The lady chose to live in Paris far from the atmosphere of Carthage Palace.

Despite the fact that observers considered the removal of Habib Bourguiba, Jr., and his wife Wassilah a success for Mzali, nevertheless the latter alone knew that his wings would also be cropped, since President Bourguiba interferred three times by making ministerial changes in Mzali's cabinet and tied his hands with daily orders which prevented him from taking any administrative steps against the continuing crises, to such a degree that observers accused him more than once of dilly-dallying and being incapable of initiative.

In the void that was left by the removal of Madame Wassilah and Habib Bourguiba, Jr., the importance of five people close to the president increased. They are Mansour Skhiri, who became minister of public office and administrative reform and director of the presidential council, Dr Maor Chedli, minister of the higher education and former private physician to the president, Minister of the Interior Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, who was formerly an ambassador of Tunisia in Poland and who gained the confidence of the president when he succeeded in restoring order after the "bread revolution." Within Carthage Palace, the names of Mrs Saidi Sassi, the president's niece, and the director of his office, Mrs Khantoush, have surfaced.

The importance of these five is that they formed a presidential center of balance within the conflict of the various wings and at the same time a ready-made alternative to the outcasts both from Mzali's wing and from Wassila's, although observers consider that this group leans more toward Wassila's wing, especially Minister of the Interior Zine El Abidine.

The dominance of this rising Bourguiba faction was assured during the preparation period for the 12th convention of the Socialist Dustur Party, inasmuch as Zine el Abidine Ben Ali, Chedli, and Skhiri were appointed assistant secretaries to the secretary general of the party, Mohammed Mzali, in what considered at the time an operation to weaken Mzail's power. However, the whole process of consolidation was completed by President Bourguiba's overstepping the traditional rules of the Dustur Party concerning the election of central committee members by choosing a list that he had prepared and describing it as "party members who are distinguished by their cleanness." He linked this choice with his goals when he said: "The state is lying in wait for those who toy with its gains."

With regard to Mzali's power, those close to him were removed from the central committee after the number of its members was increased to 91. The clearest instance of this was the removal of his wife, Fathia Mzali, from the political bureau of the party, which was followed 2 days later by her dismissal from the Ministry of Families and Women, of which she had been in charge.

The thing that confused observers was the inconsistency between the actual stripping of Mzail's power in the central committee of the party, the political bureau, and within the cabinet through the many changes that President Bourguiba Bourguiba made and the coincidence of this with the president's statement conforming Mzail's position as prime minister, secretary general of the party, and the "future hadir" which he made at the last party convention and which had been preceded by other affirmations during the visit of Jacques Chirac, the French prime minister, to Tunisia.

Now, all the predictions have stopped at one reality: Mzali's departure from the cabinet and from the game of musical chairs in the government by a constitutional precedent, inasmuch as he was the first minister to be dismissed by a letter from the president. The dismissal comes as the crowning event in a clear hardening of the Tunisian movement during the past year by which the weighty legacy in its various forms, which the new "first minister," Rachid Sfar, has now inherited, has also been solidified. The most important aspect of this legacy is, first of all, the economic crisis. Since the bread revolution, no improvement that might prevent the possibility of its happening again has occurred in the Tunisian economy, especially since the flourishing growth caused by the oil windfall that affected Tunisia as it did other countries has begun to die out and there is no alternative on the economic horizon except the revival that international balances of power and alliances suggest by economic injections at the expense of political independence. There is no better proof of this than the condition that the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank impose on the countries of the Third World that face increasing indebtedness, a drop in productivity, unemployment, and inflation in addition to the increase social isolation, the concentration of wealth, and the generalization of poverty that the nature of international capitalist development has caused in recent times. Tunisia does not differ in this from other countries. There are 3 million Tunisians living below the poverty line and this is reflected in the increase in slums around urban centers. This issue was the first priority of the discussion of the general convention of the Dustur Party and President Bourguiba discussed it again on more than one occasion.

The political legacy that the new first minister faces is no less sensitive than the economic problem and it is being expanded on two sides: an Arab side, which includes the nature of the Arab political alliances in North Africa and the Arab East, especially the Arab-Libyan Jamahiriyah, Tunisia's most revolutionary neighbor, then relations with Algeria, which the policy of the new minister suggests will be developed, since the first day he was in power he took the initiative by sending a telegram to Chedli Benjedid wishing him well. This violates "protocol," which requires that first Algeria send a telgram congratulating him on his new position.

There is no doubt that the future of the existence of the offices of the Palestinian Liberation Organization in Tunisia will be the measure that will determine the interest of the Arab East in the New Tunisian policy.

The other issue in the Arab sphere touches the heart of cultural belonging and national identity that the battle over arabization will settle. Despite the fact that observers point to the supremacy of the sectors of the educated and the intelligentsia with a French background and likewise the declining percentage of those passing the secondary school "baccalaureate" (13 percent in 1986 and 41 percent in 1985), which can be attributed to the use of Arabic and which incited the Tunisian president to burst into the convention to discuss the problem and present it as one of the most important objections to Mohamed Mzali's policy, nevertheless the new first minister has affirmed the necessity of arabicizing. The new cabinet in its first meeting prepared a plan to reform primary education based on not undoing the previous accomplishments of arabization and at the same time a committee was formed to study the results of this year's baccalaureate and to make suggestions to increase the percentage of those who pass it.

The other side in the treatment of the political heritage is the international side, inasmuch as there are a number of choices, pulling Tunisia in different directions, on the horizon. The big question will concern the repeated American suggestions that Tunisia enter into strategic agreements that began to be discussed when Mzali took charge of the cabinet in 1980. These American proposals face French competition, which ic concerned with the same choices on the European level and what this means in the way of extending Tunisia's ties with agreements to expand the European Common Market. Arab circles say that France is making concerted efforts to cut America off, beginning with the visit of Jacques Chirac, the French prime minister, and ending with the visit of the French chief of staff to Tunisia, which took place while the Dustur Party convention was being organized and during the time it convened.

The interest of France and the United States in Tunisia is not less than that of the Soviets. Observers have noticed an increase in the number of meetings of the supreme combatant with the Soviet ambassador during the last month. Observers linke the extensive relations that Minister of the Interior Zine El Abidine Ben Ali had with diplomatic circles in the Eastern bloc during his diplomatic work in Poland with the possibility that the shape of Tunisian foreign policy will be neutrality and not entering into any sphere of influence. This would be a continuation of Bourguiba's policy since independence. In this context, observers mention that the Tunisian president adroitly excused himself from accepting the proposal that President Reagan made in a personal letter that Tunisia be included in American strategic agreements.

With regard to domestic policy, the priority challenges that First Minister Rachid Sfar faces are the issue of extending the democratic framework, granting the political parties freedom of movement, the issue of the release of Habib Achour, president of the labor union, and making the seventh development plan succeed.

Observers note that the new minister has named the coming year "the year of dialogue" based on the belief that the motto of steadfastness under the banner of which the Dustur Party convention was convened will not become reality "without dialogue with all sides and without the participation of all Tunisia's energies." The first minister issued an order requiring that the council of ministers meet twice a week, and not only once as the custom had been, to face the many problems on the agenda.

Informed sources in Tunisia do not think it unlikely that Wassila Bourguiba and Habib Bourguiba, Jr., will be reconsidered, inasmuch as they enjoy the respect of Rachid Sfar and Minister of the Interior Ben Ali. It is expected that they will return soon to the political arena and that this return will be associated with the release of Habib Achour. These sources say that the return and release will be preceded by an amendment in Article 51 of the constitution, which stipulates that the first minister is the successor to the president, in such a way that the successor becomes an appointee of the president, and that the position of prime minister will be separated from the presidency in order to put an end to the vagueness surrounding the succession at the source in the Tunisian constitution. All of these measures will have been completed before the general elections next November. The most important thing that observers have noticed in the appointment of Rachid Sfar as first minister is the ministerial preparations that preceded his arrival and the execution of which President Bourguiba carefully verified in order to ensure the success of his task and so that he become the leading personality of the coming phase. In this regard, they point to the new composition of the central committee of the Dustur Party and the political bureau since it includes a large percentage of technocrats from the same school of thought to which Sfar belongs, in addition to the ministerial changes expected shortly that will include a shrinking of the number of ministries by merging them.

The true measure of the success of the new minister will be his ability to transform "Bourguiba's succession" from a "mental state" which has determined the fate of Tunisian politicians since Bourguiba's first heart attack in 1967 into an agenda to determine the fate of Tunisia, especially since the president's health is... as well as one could possibly wish, and this fact bets from the Tunisians that they understand the vagueness of his succession.

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REASONS FOR MZALI'S DISMISSAL DISCUSSED

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[Article by Fu'ad Matar: "Mzali's Experience in the School of Bourguibism: the Forbidden Inheritance in Tunisia"]

[Text] We know who lost in Tunisia with the dismissal of Mr Mohamed Mzali from a position of political power.

Was it President Habib Bourguiba who lost a successor of the kind who could not attack Bourguibism after Bourbuiba in the same way that President al-Sadat attacked Nasserism and Gamal Abd-al-Nasir or the way that Boumedianism was attacked for simply or the way that the legacy of Mao Zedong to the historic leadership of China was attacked?

The answer to the statement that Mohamed Mzali could not attack his political benefactor--if it is possible to say this--is that the man was able to build for himself in a few years a stock of credit that lessens many of the complexes that were created in those who worked under the wing of the historic leader. Besides, the man is not a fan of attacks.

When the student is not the kind who attacks the teacher, this naturally creates feelings of security in the professor while he is still alive and because of this, it is assumed that the teacher will surround the student with every kind of care, and disregard the hidden feelings that he might reflect spontaneously, which no one has better described than the poet who said:

I taught him how to cast off every day,
Woe when he became strong, he cast me away.

The teacher here is President Habib Bourguiba who, as he got older--May God preserve him--showed people inside and outside of Tunisia how much he was perplexed about the question of a successor, perhaps because he knew of the complexities of the situation resulting from the succession and perhaps because Bourguiba's halo extends far beyond the party's halo to the degree that it has appeared that it is a halo on something distinct, inasmuch as the founder of the party, or, let us say for the sake of accuracy, one of the founders of the New Dustur Party, is more important than the party itself.

Perhaps it is because, and Bourguiba has something to do with this, that historic leadership cannot concede that there is someone who is worthy of carrying on the leadership after him and in the face of this, instead of spreading a halo of stability in the party that rules the country in his name and that will decide the question of succession, he is leaving the door open before winds that will come from every direction and as a result of these winds trees of the kind that bear fruit will fall. The excuse for this abstract metaphor is that delving into details, names, and practices naturally causes a certain amount of embarassment.

As for the student, he is Mohamed Mzali, who was always careful not to put himself in the position of the student who outdoes his teacher and who has continued to take into consideration the first principle on the list of principles of participation in a government that is run by a historic leader. The essence of this principle is that if one of those who share power succeeds in something, this success must be endorsed by the historic leader, but if the historic leader stumbles, those who share the power must take responsibility for this stumbling, so that the halo of the leader remains in place to radiate over the unsuspecting people.

I remember, in this regard, a gentle reprimand from the student Mohammed Mzali, which he made to us because we used the expression "the little combatant" to describe him and we put it as a headline on a cover of AL-TADAMUN that carried his picture. Our clarification that the meaning of "the little combatant" was that there was no one who could be a combatant like President Bourguiba did not satisfy him and he said: "He is only one combatant and he is Mr Habib and we are happy with this political heritage." As soon as Mzali said this at the time of the reprimand, we at AL-TADAMUN heard indirectly from someone else who told us that there were people who were ready to use the title we mentioned against Mzali, God forgive them.

Is it the inauguration of the pluralist experiment in Tunisia, which is linked to the name of Mohamed Mzali? If it were not for pluralsim, Tunisia would be an expression of a regime run by one party, a party that banishes other parties and treats them with an iron fist and is constantly putting opposition leaders, as well as other opponents, in prison or under house arrest.

It is true that pluralism has not crystallized enough, although over 10 years, it has been transformed into a reality. The regime, in accordance with it, was going to become a mixture of Bourguibism and other tendencies. Most probably Mohamed Mzali was in the process of working to achieve the national unity that was difficult to make become a reality in the shadow of Bourguiba's leadership, because the condition of this leadership before the beginning of any dialogue is allegiance to it, whereas for Mohamed Mzali it is a different matter inasmuch as the man strives to have people rally around him and this is the maximum that a man in government can wish for. Furthermore, Mzali believes that allegiance ended with the caliphs or that it continues in some peoples' edifices at the current time as a tradition, not as a method of rule.

With pluralism, a gradual revival of democracy was going to occur and this was going to lead to an economic flourishing, not to mention that many political forces were going to come out from underground and work in the open within earshot and eyeshot of the regime.

Is it democracy, despite some of the undemocratic practices that have occurred in the past 5 years and the fact that the reason for which Mzali resorted to these practices is unclear: were they a result of his having to share his position with others or were they the result of his longing for iron rule after the increase in the number of Dustur hawks that circled the sky of Tunisian political life with the aim of attacking the man and his experiment, which had begun to be welcomed among the common people?

Is it the Arab nationalist movement, thanks to which the Arab League has been able to remain in Tunisia? Mohamed Mzali has bravely led this movement, but the man was unable to go even halfway with it. If he had remained in the regime, he would have continued the task for the sake of bringing this movement within the political mainstream of Tunisia or at least he would have endeavored to preserve what he had accomplished so that the movement would not be defeated before the two other movements, the religious movement and the European movement. Each of these has adherents and followers from the suburbs of al-Qusbah area, where the first group assembles, to the beaches and hills of the Qamrat area, where the houses of the Tunisian bourgeoisie are scattered, a bourgeoisie that is pulled by an illicit longing to the affectionate mother France or the affectionate aunt Italy or--and this is a recent longing--to aunts scattered throughout northern Europe and to the United States.

Is it the Palestinian Liberation Organization that knocked on Tunisia's door, which was opened to its fighters for many reasons, perhaps the most important of which is that Bourguiba is a leader of the cause of liberation and for this reason, he understands the feelings of those who have causes like the Palestinian cause? Furthermore, Mohamed Mzali, with a regard to nationalism, which forms the focal point of his thinking, found that the best way to remove the effects of the feelings of bitterness that the Arabs have for certain old Tunisian positions is to support the Palistinians politically. In these circumstances in particular, it is taken into consideration that the support is for Palestinian legitimacy and not for all the resistance groups, for Tunisia has not escaped Israeli attack.

In Mzali's absence, it is difficult to continue to host Palestinian political work by fixing on the symbols of Palestinian legitimacy, and perhaps this is what explains the direction of Mr Yasir 'Arafat toward Sudan after his proximity to the Arab League achieved more steadfastness for him, just as it gave more importance to Tunisia.

Is it Tunisia's reputation, based on the fact that the approval of people both inside and outside of Tunisia must have an effect? There will be many who wonder from time to tome, each time they remember what happened to Mohamed Mzali, in the course of a discussion on the method of governing in the Arab world: How does what happened in Tunisia happen? After unparalleled praise of the prime minister and secretary general of the party, i.e., Mohamed Mzali, from President Bourguiba, how was the main transformed into merely a news item of a few words announcing his dismissal from his posts, in the way summarized by the poet's line:

In the twinkling of an eye, the time changes from situation to situation.

Many people will wonder: Does the experiment of 5 years of rule end thus by a decision formulated in the accents of military leaders in time of war when they make decisions to strip leaders of their ranks, medals ar posts?

Those people benevolently assume that what was expected of President Bourguiba was that he would announce at the end of the party convention, which he called the "convention of steadfastness," that for the sake of renewing the blood in the veins of the party, he had chosen one of the technocrats of the party to head the first ministry and to become secretary general of the party, after the experiment of the man of thought and policy (Mohamed Mzali) had accpmplished its desired purpose.

Such an assumption would have been true if leaders of President Bourguiba's type preferred the natural finish to the men of the second rung and in particular to those who have a chance at the succession. However, those leaders usually tend to give tragic endings to these men, to begrudge them an expression of tribute, and prefer to use the word "pardon," "dismissal," or at most "acceptance of resignation." As for the word "resignation" by itself, it is not acceptable, except in very rare cases.

Who is the loser or who are the losers by Mohamed Mzali's removal and the way in which his removal took place along with everything that happened in Tunisia? It appeared as if it was a toppling more than a conventional change in regime. There are some side issues or issues at the heart of the subject that for the sake of the clarification of which more specific answers about what happened might be given.

First of all, it is important to mention that those who observe President Bourguiba's thought process do not consider, as others do, that what happened was a surprise. If they believed that Bourguiba behaved toward Mohamed Mzali in a way that his customary thought dictated to him and did not risk an act that might provoke surprise, it is not the basis of the fact that Bourguiba has been the maestro of topplings since the 1950's or even before he took power, that is, in the 1940's, when he was at the head of the party.

The following are examples of this:

Bourguiba toppled Habib Thameur who was one of the revolutionary youths rising with him and who died in a plane accident in India.

He toppled Salah Ben Youssef.

He toppled all the party conventions that preceded liberation.

He toppled Habib Achour.

Bourguiba was in perpetual conflict with the leadership groups of the Dustur Party. His method of dealing with them was based on the Clemenceau school, or let us say that he was a superior student of this school which was based on bargaining with the parties of the conflict, then a truce, after which, when they had been soothed, they were toppled.

Bourguiba was perpetually using the street against the institution then the institution against the street. In clearer terms, he resorted to the street when the party apparatus got stronger on him and resorted to the party to rule the street or to control its rhythm.

When we mention these things, we use as a basis President Bourguiba's speeches and memoirs, especially during the period from 1973 to 1974, which was a fruitful period, and the president unsuspectingly indicates its fruitfulness in these speeches and memoirs.

Those who read these speeches and memoirs and who carefully examine the measures and decisions that the president used or made come away an impression of the features of a theory peculiar to Bourguiba and work to guide it in the right direction. The basis of this theory lies in convincing the people that his permanence (that is, Bourguiba's permanence) in power is a blessing for the people. Those who believe this are practicing, because of a passion or for the sake of applying difficult ideas, a method that tends toward dictatorship. But Bourguiba is not a dictator as much as he is the type of ruler who falls into the category of the "just despot."

In this context, it may be said that Bourguiba, who has all the elements of a dictator, did not fall into the trap of Third World dictatorship, because he was educated and chose to be like historic leaders and heroes. He succeeded in combining some of the characteristics of this leader and that hero (DeGaulle, Clemenceau, and others). However, he failed at making Tunisia in the image of the institutions of America, which he had a passion for, and France, and thus Tunisia ended as one of his images and not as an image from his dreams. Bourguiba may be one of the few leaders whose historic halo prevails over their popularity. If we take into consideration the fact that 70 percent of the Tunisian population is under 20 years old, we discover a strange incongruity, which is that the overwhelming majority of the Tunisian population knows Bourguiba only through television, and through the party and daily problems. Indeed, it may be said that if it were not for television and the daily viewing of the president on a special program of his sayings, there would be a very large percentage of Tunisians who would not know their president. This popularity, based solely on legitimacy, does not fulfill its purpose. Perhaps, this point in particular, of which Mohamed Mzali was aware, played a role in destroying the dreams of the man who dreamed of succeeding the historic leader, basing his chances of this on the fact that he, Mzali, was closer to 70 percent of the Tunisians who do not know Bourguiba, except as the legitimate ruler, whereas they know Mzali as being always present as the man of state.

Mzali may be the best of the supreme combatant's "companions," but he faced circumstances that he was unable to withstand because of the age difference between the father and son or between the teacher and the student. Because of these circumstances and contradictions, he took positions that adversaries considered mistakes and, at times, sins, although they were also nevertheless efforts on the part of a man of state, which--especially if he had democratic beginnings--do not necessarily have to be unanimously agreed upon. These opponents attributed these mistakes to President Bourguiba in order to make cracks in the formula which for some time seemed appropriate, if President Bourguiba was truly bent on the continuation of his experiment.

Perhaps the most prominent of these mistakes was to behave as if he were the last of those placed by President Bourguiba in his chemical laboratory which aimed, if it may be said in the language of chemistry and biology, at extracting the potion for ruling. This was because the man reached an age where he was recalcitrant and because in the face of this his political tactics were no longer acceptable to the people, inasmuch as Tunisians have come to favor stability. Such an assumption on Mzali's part could have been taken for granted, if the Dustur Party had been a party in the traditional sense, and not unique, as it is, since Bourguiba created in the form that it is in order to be a tool in the hand of the state and not the opposite, in such a way that it does not isolate classes and cadres in the government, but perfects the art of doing what the regime wants and takes care of marketing the leader of the people. Here we note that all Bourguiba's topplings of others were within the party and were carried out in the way in which films and plays with good and exciting plots are produced, productions that cause the hearts of the audience to bleed, especially if they are of the kind who have not delved deeply into politics and its arts and have not lost the free dispotition of opinions in spontaneity and innocence.

Thus, Mzali, who no longer has any positions of responsibility, except membership in the central committee of the party, composed of 91 members, membership in the political bureau, composed of 20 members, and chairmanship of the Tunisian Olympic Committee, a surprise, is unlucky in that he began to make plans for the sucession and for a long stay in power without taking into consideration the fact that dealing with a historic leader who has all the legitimacy in the country is not an easy thing, especially when this leader has come to cling more and more to power simply because he imagines that the others are waiting for his death and because he has an obstinate desire to prove that he is capable of making a decision at any time whether there is a need for the decision or whether only for experimental reasons.

When we mention this issue, we take into consideration the impressive phenomenon of the school of Bourguibist rule and that is that the king of the Dustur Party, and here we mean Bourguiba, removes the second man when this man gains any noticeable popularity or beings to act as if he is the first man after a time. What happened to Mohamed Mzali happened before to Hedi Nouira, to Bahi Ladgham, and to Ahmed Ben Salah. One notices, as he reviews the developments of the last quarter century of Tunisian history, that the average stay of the second man in power with Bourguiba is 10 years maximum as happened with Bahi Ladgham, who afterwards shone as a personal envoy during the events in September 1970 in Jordan, and 6 years minimum, as happened with Mohamed Mzali.

It is true that Mzali needed the last 2 years just to make sure that the arabization plans were proceeding satisfactorily and not capriciously--this was Mzali's first battle--and to tighten the rivets of the regime and to stabilize himself. However, he is not the only one who has been toppled by the leader at a moment inappropriate to him and very appropriate to the leader. There was Hadi Nouira who appeared for a time the right man for the succession and he was helped in this by the fact that the Tunisians had confidence in him and had faith in his good management of financial and economic matters--and the loyalty of the Tunisian to whoever succeeds in this area exceeds his loyalty to the person who is successful in the political field. However, President Bourguiba aimed a shot at him that he could not withstand and he fell into oblivion, dividing with Mzali the effect that the conflict with Colonel Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi left on the regime in Tunisia.

Although President Bourguiba plays the political game very skillfully, nevertheless the luck that was required for the toppling of Ahmed Ben Salah and his socialist experiment and the toppling of Hedi Nouira and the people rallied around him, then the toppling of Mohamed Mzali and the conviction that he was a successor who would unify Arab Tunisia and European Tunisia, this luck is not necessarily always his ally. It is certain that if the clean-handed, disciplined, and very modest Mohamed Mzali had not encouraged the paralysis beyond a reasonable point; had not acted with such firmness with the Union of Syndicates--and he realized that all the opposition was enthusiastically applauding the duel between him and Habib Achour, whom Mzali had earlier moved from prison to his empire, which established a headquarters in Mohamed Ali Square and combatted they enemy empire at Carthage--had not burned bridges, like a person of principle, and he is not the political tactician with Libya; had not been betrayed by the sharp drop in the prices of primary products, such as oil and phosphates, the other sharp drop in Arab investmenis, and the even sharper drop in tourist income, which was pumping money into the state and began to erode the national capita; and had not disdained more than was necessary the influence that the religious movements have in Tunisia, movements that are spread with every bloated step of the Dustur Party from student circles and the poor to important institutions in Tunisia and that are encouraged in this direction by the fact that they do not have any link to external forces and that they are close to the emotional life of the Tunisian citizen, unlike the religious movements in Egypt and Lebanon... it is certain that if Mohamed Mzali had kept all these things in mind when President Bourguiba, fascinated with moving chess pieces on the Tunisian chessboard, wanted to move him easily and to ridiculous degree, he would have at least had the chance to be dismissed quietly, especially since Mzali did not even break the sound barrier in the Bourguibist environment. It also should be taken into consideration that Mzali, when measured against the current local, Arab, and international situation, would have been able to rebel against Bourguiba as a son who had decided to change his manner of obedience to his father, if Mzali had been a politician, strategist, and maneuverer, like Hedi Nouira. His rebellion would have seemed like a necessary step in the achievement of stability. However, Mzali is a man of letters and thought, not a technocrat, maneuverer, and plotter. He favors isolation and distances himself from ostentation, although he has a popular following that protected him for a while from those who encircled him then stopped to watch the father of the Dustur family deprive the dutiful son of the inheritance, after he had promised him better.

Mohamed Mzali's problem may be that he took the promise seriously and forgot that the father of the family is confused about this inheritance. He announced repeatedly, from the time that the wrinkles of old age began to appear of his face and in his steps, that he had confidence in Mohamed Mzali and that he would succeed him. Then he went back on his promise. He is the same person who repeatedly announced in the first years of the second life that he had confidence in Ahmed Ben Salah and that he would succeed him.

There is a question: Doesn't Mohamed Mzali have the right to take the promise seriously as long as President Bourguiba is at an age that requires that he choose a successor?

The answer to this is that Bourguiba cannot possibly choose a successor because Bourguibism is not a possession or a vocation; it is an exceptional method of the art of ruling which it does not seem will be repeated after Bourguiba for an obvious reason and that is that Tunisia is having labor pains and that Bourguibism after Bourguiba will be a part of a formula and not the whole formula. This means that Bourguibism will be no better off than Nasserism and may become just as Nasserism has become in Egypt today.

The answer to this is also that Bourguiba, at the moment in which he announced his successor, was also choosing a successor to the successor. This is because Bourguibism is a forbidden inheritance and because the curse of Bourguibism is like the curse of the pharoahs: it harms everyone who considers himself competent and capable or wishes to be qualified to continue this difficult legacy. We return to what we started to say: Tunisia's reputation suffered a great deal by Mzali's dismissal, because it tries to give the impression that its development in political practices is European, but it confirmed in the space of a few moments that it is still a country of the Third World, where the ruler is permitted to do things that others are not and where the ruler allows himself to place his trust for a moment in a person from under whose feet he has already determined the moment he will pull out the rug of power.

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TUNISIA

QUESTIONABLE LOANS BY FORMER BANK PRESIDENT INVESTIGATED

Tunis AL-ANWAR AL-TUNISIYAH in Arabic 18 May 86 p 24

[Article by Sabir Khalil Sabir: "International Federation of Banks Billions Evaporated in Suspect Projects"]

[Text] The accused Taoufik Torjmane headed the International Federation of Banks (UIB) from 1968 to the end of February 1986, when an internal committee was commissioned to review its financial dealings during his presidency.

Following the review, the committee drafted a report which revealed a deterioration of the financial status of the institution. One of the main reasons for this deterioration was the large number of loans granted by the chief executive officer to his friends. When those loans were made, they did not comply with or conform to measures in force. The most important of these include seeking the advice of a special loan committee and having to submit the request to the board before the loan is granted. An internal committee must study the loan portfolio if the loan requested does not exceed 600,000 dinars.

If the request exceeds this amount, it must be submitted to the board, as stipulated by internal bank regulations.

However, the accused overstepped the bounds of these regulations. He used his influence and did not comply with provisions for granting loans.

He gave out 90 million dinars in loans in the above-mentioned manner to companies and individuals without adequate collateral and in some cases with no collateral at all.

The evil intent of the accused in the acts he committed is revealed by the fact that he granted most of the loans to companies in which he was a shareholders or for which he was directly responsible.

The requirements of basic internal regulations were not observed for all the loans in excess of 600,000 dinars. Seven companies with varying amounts of capital received these loans, and he was a shareholder in all of them. The first was the Taoufik Clinic. The accused was chairman of the board and a stockholder.

Since its founding, the company received loans totaling 20 million dinars without the concurrence of the bank board because there was insufficient collateral.

Without Collateral!

The second was a real estate company. Since it was founded, it too received numerous loans totaling more than 50 million dinars without providing sufficient collateral. The accused granted these loans because he owned 7,820 shares in it.

The third company was involved in selling foodstuffs. The accused and members of his family owned 52,000 dinars of its stock. This company received a loan of 2,778,000 dinars without board approval.

The four other companies each received loans of less than 600,000 dinars. In addition, the accused granted loans to companies in which he owned stock. He made numerous loans to companies and people without consulting the board.

Twenty-seven Institutions

Twenty-seven institutions received loans totaling more than 80 million dinars.

They include the Film Production Company, which alone received more than 5 million dinars. During the first 2 months of 1986, the accused made loans amounting to more than 13 million dinars to institutions belonging to him.

One may conclude from the above that the accused, in his capacity as chief executive officer and board chairman of UIB, made loans of considerable size without complying with sound administrative procedures and rules by first submitting loan portfolios to the bank board for approval.

In addition, the accused acted improperly with regard to a piece of land owned by the bank, for the benefit of the company which he headed and in which he owned stock.

On this basis, the accused was arrested and brought before the examining magistrate. It was established that through these actions, he had hurt the banking institution which he headed. He had not asked the borrowing institutions for adequate collateral. The investigation revelaed that there had been practically no collateral.

Day After Tomorrow

The court department of indictments decided to press charges of mis-management of company funds, using them for purposes contrary to the interests of the company in order to make a profit, giving preference to other companies with which he was linked by the profit motive, committing treachery as described above, and illegitimately disposing of assets, both private and public, which came to him through his position and which belonged to institutions in which there was some indirect state participation, according to the regulations of Paragraphs 3 and 4 of Chapter 86 of the Commercial Code and Chapters 99 (new) and 297 of the Criminal Code. The court department of indictments decided to hand him over to the criminal court for trial.

The session of last Thursday was chaired by Abderrahman Bourghida. Members present at the session were Counselors Abderrahman Zamit, Abdelatif Waslati, Yousef Zakri, and Siham Soussi. The resresentative of the Office of the Prosecutor General, Najib Haj Mansour, was also present. They were assisted by First Secretary Mukhtar Gharsallah. At this session the court criminal department examined the case involving the accused.

Before the case was decided, the spokesman for the defense requrested a postponement in order to study the dossier. The court agreed and decided to postpone the case until the session to be held the day after tomorrow, Tuesday, 20 May 1986.

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ISRAEL

IDF GENERAL STAFF DISCUSSED

Tel Aviv BAMAHANE in Hebrew No 37, 21 May 86 p 7

[Photo by Mikhael Tzarfati: "Forum 1986"]

[Text] Members of the IDF general staff, "General Staff Forum," met this week for a ceremonial session in connection with Independence Day 1986. In the course of the session, the IDF commanders and the chief of staff were presented with the book "Come Wander Around the Land" as a holiday tribute. In the photo from the right: Shmuel Goren, coordinator of activities in the occupied territories; Brigadier General Efraim Lapid, IDF spokesman; Major General Avihu Ben Nun, head of the planning department; Major General Amir Drori, commander of field forces headquarters; Major General Avraham Ben Shoshan, naval commander; Brigadier General Reuven Hershqo, financial advisor to the chief of staff; Major General Haim Erez, head of the quartermaster department; Major General Matan Vilnay, head of manpower; Major General Amnon Shahaq, head of intelligence; Shlomo Arel, comptroller of the defense system; and Major General (Reserves) Menahem Meron, former director general of the defense ministry. In the center: Lieutenant Colonel Giora 'Anbar, head of the office of the chief of staff; Lieutenant General Moshe Levy, chief of staff; and Major Mia Drofel, secretary of the superior command. From the left: Major General Dan Shomron, assistant chief of staff and head of the staff department; Major General Amos Lapidot, commander of the navy; Ori Or, head of the northern command: Ehud Baraq, head of the central command; Ori Sagi, head of the southern command; Major General Yitzhaq Mordekhai, head of the training division; Major General Avi'ezer Ya'ari, head of the national security college; Major General 'Amram Mitzna, assistant head of operations; and Colonel 'Azriel Nevo, military secretary of the prime minister.

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DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN 20 PERCENT OF HOMES

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 29 Jul 86 p 4

[Article by Bernard Josephs]

[Text]

A disturbing picture of violence in the home has been revealed by a university research team who say that members of at least one in five Israeli families suffer serious physical assault every year.

The researchers, from Haifa University's School of Social Work, say that their figures could be too optimistic and admit that some experts believe the true situation is even worse.

Dr. Zvi Eisikovitz said he and his team had carried out a complicated set of actuarial calculations to come to their conclusions, but were satisfied they had not exaggerated the seriousness of the situation.

He was speaking as hundreds of social workers prepared to gather at Migdal Ha'emek today to mark the *shloshim* (30-day mourning period) of Amalia Levine, a young local social worker who was stabbed to death by the husband of one of her clients.

Levine's death sparked off a nation-wide protest against what her colleagues described as the growing number of assaults in society – especially against them.

Eisikovitz is to be one of the main speakers at the event, which is dedicated to discussing the causes of violence.

He said: "Our figures don't cover minor incidents but real acts of violence which take place with the intent of causing harm. We have no way of knowing whether the situation is worse than it was in the past, because violence within the family is a subject that has only just come 'out of the closet.'

"In the past, people kept such matters very quiet. There were many incidents of wife beating, child beating and incest without anyone daring to breathe a word. Today people are prepared to speak out."

Eisikovitz said what was happening in the family was only a reflection of what was happening in society. Increasingly, he said, people were discovering that through violence they could get what they wanted.

Levine's death, he went on, was not just a "work accident" but an important symptom of what was happening.

"There is no question that we are becoming more violent and we must take action now to prevent things from getting worse," he said.

He, like the leaders of the social workers, was in favour of tougher action by the police and the courts. But, he warned, this alone would not solve matters and could even make them worse.

"We have to deal with the frustrations that turn people into violent criminals. It doesn't just happen. We must also be very careful about allowing greater intervention by the state into family disputes. This may stop an assault from taking place, but it will also be a grave threat to privacy."

The leaders of the social workers are today expected to repeat calls for greater spending on the welfare services, which, they say, have been so reduced that they are unable to help hard-pressed clients.

They are also likely to again demand more stringent security precautions at welfare centres, including the provision of tear gas to ward off assailants.

/12828
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SHALHEVET SETTLEMENT NUCLEUS FORMING

'Ofra NEQUDA in Hebrew No 98, 23 Apr 86 pp 18-19, 38

[Article by Uri Orbakh: "Ho, Shalhevet-Ya"]

[Text] Friends from the yeshiva and from the army went to study economics and computers. They set up a nucleus to reconstruct the cooperative settlement at Qatif. The nucleus, composed of graduates of settlement yeshivas, paratroopers, and university graduates, is undergoing a year of training at Bnei Darom before settling on the Gaza coast. They will be taking on an almost bare moshav with lots of debts.

Please meet Shalhevet, a settlement nucleus. Additional data: age--1 and 1/2 years; temporary residence--the cooperative settlement of Bnei Darom; permanent location--the Qatif settlement in the Gaza region; date of the move to Qatif--July 1986 or thereabouts.

At the end of the month of Adar 1986, we went on a trip to meet a few dozen young folks who have organized to form an agricultural settlement. This is not a popular idea. "Three-four to work" is a popular song. Work is less popular, physical labor even less so. The period of settlement nuclei has long since been changed to nuclei for going out Friday nights. Just here and there the old land of Israel, the beautiful and the forgotten, the one which stretches out its hand to give rather than take, shows up. Ho, Shalhevet-ya (mighty flame), the eyes of the youth.

Yaqi Yizraeli of Jerusalem already knew in the seventh grade that he would someday live in a settlement. At the yeshiva of Merkaz Harav, some of the people decided that this would be their path in life. Later they parted ways. The idea went with Yaqi to Qiryat-Shmona. With him at the regular yeshiva were David Abramovitz from Bnei Braq and 'Oded Etan, who studied with him at the yeshiva for young people. They spoke of establishing a cooperative settlement on the Golan Heights or in the Jordan Valley. Meanwhile, it was time for military service, then came the Lebanon War, and then back to the yeshiva. Nuclei--not too many--rose and fell. The headline of NEQUDA, April 1985, was on the subject "Settlement Yeshivas: From Vision to Reality." It said: "Some will be lawyers. Some will study computers; a few will continue to study the Tora. Perhaps one will join a settlement." For some of the heads of these yeshivas, this truthful headline was very painful.

The nucleus had already begun to form. One came from here, one from there. Word traveled and a group of members formed. Some were about to complete their military service or were completing their studies at the yeshiva. Some of the women were completing their national service. One member brought another.

It is relatively easy to set up a small settlement nucleus composed of nationalist/religious youth. The attraction for what is called the "generation of crocheted yarmulkas" to the idea of settlement needs no proof. Every initial meeting of a nucleus draws several dozen of these people. "We will listen and look. Perhaps something will come of it." Not everyone knows exactly what he wants to do when he grows up. There is a desire to be a member of some sort of social framework of like-minded people. Apart from this, it never hurts to have tucked away in your emergency drawer an answer to the classical question: "And what have you done for your country?"

Another interesting point: Everyone knows everyone in the young nationalist/religious circle. For every pair who do not know each other, there is a third who knows both. The circles, after all, are not very wide. They know each other from a branch of the movement, from the yeshiva, or from the army. This fact makes organizing easier, at least at the outset.

The problem is in sustaining the nucleus over a long period of time. Suddenly it seems to you that time is beginning to drag a little, and you realize you had always thought of a communal settlement and not an agricultural one, or the opposite. Or you wanted a more scholarly group or a less scholarly group. Your friends from the army, from the yeshiva, have already registered to study law, economics, and accounting. And your mother is asking you why you need all this and why you can't just be like everyone else.

Formula for Success

And then begin the dropouts. Until something develops, it is a shame to waste the time. Some announce that they will join when the nucleus moves to the land. Others say that it does not seem to be the right time or that forces beyond their control prevent them. And when the main activist who was wild or crazy about the idea marries his sweetheart whom he knew from the nucleus and decides that "as long as his wife is studying, it is not the best time to join," the beautiful idea dies and leaves behind in the wedding album a cheerful photograph of the group who were in the nucleus.

In Shalhevet, they understood this point well. Perhaps because of this, their fate was better. Eli Shalmon married Bilha about a month ago, right after his discharge as a paratroop officer, and now they live in Bnei Darom, their adopted moshav. The method: "The trick is to grab people when they are leaving one framework--the army or yeshiva. This is the formula for success. Before they enter another framework, just when they are going out on their own, one must propose achievable goals. 'You can accomplish this.' 'We will be going to the permanent settlement on such and such a date.' Nuclei whose members' involvement lay outside the framework have broken up."

to the fact that Rabbi Vizhunsky fits into the group, which is coalescing very well. They also admit that it is difficult, especially in a new place, to maintain the framework of classes, prayers on time, and religious activity. Asher Langerman, the Bnei Darom representative, cautions and advises: "On the moshav, the religious side can go by the wayside because people get involved in work quickly but often do not immediately relate to the social and religious side. It is the first thing that people give up when they are tired. Already now, they ought to be putting more energy into the subject of classes." The religious subject bothers the members of Shalhevet. Between work in Bnei Darom's olive grove and rushing around among the palm trees they try to attend a class and learn something.

It turns out that this is not so simple. One needs a great deal of self-discipline. It does not always work. Haya Yehieli hopes that Qatif will rise above the religious standard of the religious cooperative settlements. It will undoubtedly be one of the important tests of the nucleus. They are also thinking about recruiting other families. The average age in the nucleus is 22-23 years old, but they admit that recruiting members who are a bit older is likely to be beneficial.

Meanwhile, the nucleus is planning for the future. Tzviqa Veinstein, who recently left the army where he served as medical officer, was sent to study agricultural mechanics at Rupin Academy. In his room are pictures of machines. No, he is not sick, but he is willing to admit that the subject of "how an engine works" definitely gets him excited. And what else is important to him? "Tolerance. The issues of tolerance and openness are very important. If in the nucleus, and later on the settlement, we learn how to let everyone live and breathe, how to listen to a different viewpoint and understand that all the right in the world is not always on our side, we will be able to live very well together." How do you assure that the composition of the people recruited satisfies the requirement for tolerance about which there is general agreement? Eli: "We are very careful about recruiting and try to recruit people like ourselves. If, God forbid, we bring in inappropriate people in this early stage of the settlement, it could be a critical error. Every individual is very important, and although it may sound a bit 'elitist,' I fully believe that every nucleus must be very careful to recruit people who really fit and not parade a large number of members before the institutions and compromise on quality."

David Ahipaz, coordinator of the Bnei Darom settlement, said that the first and most important rule for a nucleus like this is not to let the course of daily life determine things. "Unfortunately, many things are set up today in settlements because someone began to do something in a certain way and established an inappropriate norm. One must know how to go backwards when necessary, be organized from day one, and go along with rules but not be ashamed of changing them." In Shalhevet they try to be organized. One can see their progress even in the way that decisions are presented for deliberation to the secretariat.

Shalhevet nucleus to Qatif, an update report: 'Oded is studying about planting, Yo'ezer is studying mechanics, 4 families are in Bnei Darom along with another 10 single people, and 10 other families are "warming the bench" getting ready to enter the game directly on the field at Qatif. A few other single people will come with them.

Yaqi: "When we were in the fourth class in the yeshiva, we felt that we could begin to implement the idea. We heard that Gidi Netzer of Bnei-Aqiva was beginning to handle nuclei of graduates and we turned to him. We told him how many people we were and that we wanted to establish a new settlement and get on the land within 6 months. He cured us of our naivete. He took the wind out of our sails, but not really. Gidi suggested that we begin regular meetings of the nucleus, that we organize a retreat at least once a month. 'If you can keep that up for at least 6 months, that will be a good sign.' That is what he told us."

They persisted. They held their retreats at many cooperative settlements: Alonei-Habashan, Masuot-Yitzhaq, and others. They worked in an organized manner, set up an absorption committee, secretariat, and treasury. In the course of their frequent contacts with settlement institutions, it became clear that there was no chance in the near future of establishing a new settlement on the Golan Heights, and they gave up the idea. Yo'ezer Kohen said that he wanted very much to live in the Jordan Valley where he had served in the army. They thought they might go to Nequdat Brosh near Mehula, but they found out that it might take too much time and it was not certain that it would even be possible. They let that idea go too. The Union of Settlements of the Po'el Hamizrahi, under whose aegis they had come, proposed that they strengthen an existing settlement--Moshav Qatif on the Gaza Strip. The moshav had developed social and economic problems. Families had left, and the settlement was on the verge of collapse. Amnon Rosenberg: "We went to Qatif. Believe me. My eyes welled up with tears. Almost everyone was gone. Garbage was rolling around in the streets. It was almost a ghost town. We understood that we had to reestablish Qatif from scratch despite our disappointment about giving up the idea of setting up a completely new settlement."

At this point, once the decision about Qatif had been made, not without struggles, things began to move along more quickly. The group, composed of about 20 or 30 young men and women, already began to feel comfortable with one another. The orientation was religious but not oppressive. Live and let live. This year in the month of Heshvan, at the beginning of the winter, 10 members came to Bnei Darom for training. Almost all are city-bred; they hold a hoe like a fork. Seven more joined. Amatzya Yihieli from Sdei-Ya'aqov married Haya from Kfar-Adumim. She is also from the nucleus. Amnon and Drit Rosenberg found each other in the nucleus. The cynic says in a smart tone: "Ah, a matchmaking bureau." The two couples live in Bnei Darom for now. They have not spread their wings and flown away. In addition to them, 'Oded and Tami Eytan and their two children, Ofrat and Ohad, the first children in the group, have gone to Bnei Darom. As we said earlier, Eli and Bilha are also here. Other families will join at the end of July for the move to Qatif. The married women keep their heads covered, not because of a decision by the secretariat or by some committee on religion but by personal choice.

Daily Communal Meal

The houses of the married couples function as the center of activity for the nucleus. But that is certainly not all. Every evening, the 17 who live in Bnei Darom, married and single, get together for a communal dinner and exchange experiences from their work day. It is another coalescing activity. Apart from housing, at Bnei Darom they have at their disposal a communal kitchen where they cook for themselves under the watchful eye of Miryam Shauli, the house mother, an old-timer at Bnei Darom. "They are really nice. It is a pleasure to work with them. They take everything in a good spirit. For example, at first it bothered me that they do not eat together. After a while, they accepted my view." It is a tricky business trying to be a house mother for young people. You have to walk on tiptoes to avoid interfering and to avoid sounding patronizing. They agree unanimously that Miryam does that job with skill and confidence. In general, the people of Bnei Darom deserve a vote of confidence. They spare no effort in helping Shalhevet with its first steps. Most of the settlement, the organizers of the various branches, the members, and Asher Langerman, who is the settlement's representatives, help the nucleus in many areas. Asher: "We have to convey to them how to manage life on a cooperative farm, to teach them what a moshav is. In my opinion they should be bothering us a lot more with all kinds of questions. Sometimes they think they have it all solved. But the real difficulties will come when they are in Qatif."

In Shalhevet they are actually going into an already existing settlement. This means that a substantial share of the joy of another not inconsequential problem. They are inheriting the debts of the existing settlement. At the moment they are trying to square things with the institutions. They want to begin, and rightly so, with a clean slate in this renewed settlement.

Every 3 weeks, all the members of the nucleus come to Bnei Darom, including those who are still studying in yeshivas, those who are about to finish their army service, and those who are studying at institutions of higher learning. Most are young men. Young single women are generally not in a hurry to join the nuclei of yeshiva graduates. Nava Daniel, Kineret Hadad, and Karmit Tzadoq came to Bnei Darom anyway. They travel twice a week to study in Jerusalem and to Efrat Institute at Gush-Etzion. Nava always dreamed of a moshav. She does not like the tumult of city life. For Kineret, the social issues which come up especially in a small settlement are important. "After my national service in Ashqelon, I began to think more about social concerns and considered a development town...but I am fairly certain that within a few years, we can establish a youth group or help people from broken homes. In any case, the social issues of the country will some day gain our attention."

Six months in Bnei Darom, 3 more months until they move to Qatif. They will go there with a rabbi, Rabbi Noah Vizhunsky from Merkaz Harav, currently at Makhmesh. Old and new settlements alike argue endlessly about whether or not to bring a rabbi to a settlement. This argument often splits settlements into two camps: the religious and the non-religious. It is definitely a separate subject for examination and deliberation. At Shalhevet they decided unanimously. David Plezinshtein, nicknamed Plez: "One of the problems settlements have is that they only think of a rabbi after they are already established, and then all the problems begin. They ask: 'Who are you?' and 'someone came to live...' and so forth. Here everyone knows that the rabbi decides many things, assuming that everything is done wisely and in good taste. A rabbi ought to know what to say and what not to say." In Shalhevet, people attest

One can almost not find such a phenomenon these days. Ever since the settlement movements close to the labor movement began expressing opposition to settlements in the occupied territories, legitimized opposition to settlements in general has developed. The fact that there are those with their feet on the earth and skullcaps on their heads is a reason neither for rejoicing nor for mourning. In any case, Shalhevet is a religious nucleus, and it is getting ready to face its future. Plez is telling a joke, and Amnon and Amatzya, on the drums and clarinet, are practicing wedding music in their spare time for the wedding of another member of the nucleus. ("We decided we would not charge members of the nucleus." It would be a way to attract young people before their weddings to join the nucleus.) David Abramovitz is going to sort olives, Haimqe Geniram is studying at Meir Institute and will come this summer, and the members of Bnei Darom are happy with the dose of youthful energy which they have suddenly received.

Shalhevet, already not such a little flame.

Bnei Darom: Avoid Getting Into a Rut

For Bnei Darom, a religious cooperative moshav near the Ashdod junction, this is almost their first try at taking in a nucleus of people planning a new settlement. Other groups have been accepted over the years into the settlement itself--American nuclei, Nahal groups (pre-military pioneering youth), and others. Bnei Darom is named after Kfar-Darom, a kibbutz established in the Negev in 1946. On the night of Yom Kippur, along with 10 other spots, it was seized by the Egyptians. Bnei Darom was reestablished as a kibbutz in 1949, and in 1961 it became a cooperative farm. David Ahipaz, one of the old-timers from the settlement, said: "Our primary objective is to take in the younger generation. To accomplish this, we are trying to expand and develop sources of employment for men and women."

At present, the settlement of 250 people has as its economic base a chicken coop for reproduction, field crops--annual and seasonal crops, orchards, and an olive grove--a plant for olives and for canning vegetables, and near it a plant for spices. David: "We are trying to improve in all areas. Spiritually and materially, we are trying not to get into a rut."

The effort in relation to the Shalhevet nucleus is part of an attempt to avoid sticking to the old routines. Other older settlements will probably follow in the footsteps of Bnei Darom.

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ISRAEL

NEGEV WASTE DUMP THREATENS ECOLOGICAL DISASTER

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 29 Jul 86 pp 1, 9

[Article by Bernard Josephs and Menachem Shalev]

[Text]

A stream of poison liquid, pouring out of the country's toxic waste dump in the Negev, is threatening to cause a health and ecological disaster.

The dark, bubbling chemicals are coming from the Ramat Hovav industrial park, just 12 kilometres south of Beersheba. "It's a real witches' brew," said one expert.

Deputy Health Minister Shoshana Arbell-Almozlino said yesterday: "We're facing an extremely dangerous situation. It can cause untold damage."

The head of the Interior Ministry's Environmental Protection Service, Dr. Uri Marinov, warned: "This stuff is absolutely deadly. Nobody knows exactly what it contains."

The chemical torrent is pouring into Wadi Besor near the Ramat Hovav toxic waste disposal plant – the only one in the country – where evaporation ponds are overflowing.

The dump has a history of problems and was closed between 1982 and 1984 following a fire which caused the release of toxic fumes.

Arbell-Almozlino warned that, unless a way was found to solve the problem, the Health Ministry would be forced to close the industrial park, sending home 1,800 workers, mainly from Negev development towns.

"This will cause an unprecedented public outcry. We don't want to reach that situation," she said.

The waste is dumped at Ramat Hovav by industrial companies, including chemical manufacturers.

Marinov described the situation as disastrous. The main concern, he said, was that the waste would seep into the underground water supplies, poisoning them.

He continued: "We have been warning for some time that the evaporation ponds would overflow. Since August 1984, we've been trying to get the ponds expanded by 250 dunams.

"However, the army objected because of nearby bases. They delayed the decision by two years and the expansion was only approved last month. It will take six to nine months to expand the ponds and we don't have that much time if we are to avoid a catastrophe."

However, at an emergency meeting held at the Health Ministry on Sunday, army representatives refused to commit themselves on allowing work to go ahead. They expressed concern for the safety of soldiers in the area.

A Health Ministry official who visited the site last week confirmed that only preliminary work had begun on the additional evaporation ponds, pending final army approval.

The owners of the industrial park, Mivnei Ta'asiya, said yesterday they would conduct a six-month survey to check possible adverse effects on soldiers.

Another emergency meeting is to be held on Thursday between Interior and Health Ministry officials, water officials and factory owners to decide on further action.

Meanwhile, the deputy health minister has called on the transport and housing ministers to build a by-pass around Beersheba to Ramat Hovav.

She complained that lorry loads of dangerous chemical wastes from all over the country were being driven through the centre of the city to the dump.

"I wouldn't like to think what would happen if one of those trucks ever caught fire and blew up," she said. "It would be an unimaginable disaster."

The municipality has already threatened to close Beersheba's main through road to the waste-laden trucks.

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ABU IYAD COMMENTS ON COVERT ACTION, FRENCH, USSR RELATIONS

Abu Dhabi AL-ITTIHAD in Arabic 27 Jul 86 p 9

[Interview with Abu Iyad by Basimah Nafadi: "When Comprehensive Solution is Found in Lebanon We will Turn Over Camps' Security to Legitimate Authority"; in Tunis, date not specified]

[Text] Abu Iyad is the number two man in the Palestinian national movement. He is one of the founders of Fatah as well as a prominent member of the central committee. Furthermore, he runs the special agencies of the PLO.

We continue our talk with Abu Iyad concerning the current Palestinian reality, including the obstacles, dissention, and differences that have afflicted this reality all the way to the central committee of Fatah, "the backbone of the Palestinian national movement."

Whereas certain parties outside the area are betting on these internal differences in anticipation of struggles breaking out, Palestinian revolution leaders close to the scene realize that such differences at certain stages are a mark of revolutionary action in its democratic framework and is the framework of Palestinain legitimacy as well.

Abu Iyad says that the issue when raised is a choice between capitulation, siege, persecution, torture, worry, and inaction or noncapitulation: "The issue in my view cannot be optional. It is a choice between two ways. For after a 24-year revolution and after martyrs gave up their lives for it, the choice is not between saying too much or too little about this revolution with its leaders and cadres and between man going down in history as a traitor.

"Hence, there is no contemplation of two options because there is only one with regard to human beings. A human being must not shy away from confrontation because confrontation, difficult and harsh as it is, is much easier than going down in history as a traitor."

The following is the interview with Abu Iyad:

[Question] Are there any developments at the Palestinian national unity level?

[Answer] I think there are positive developments which are best kept undisclosed to keep them out of reach of foreign sabotage. We have made great headway in our dialogue with some organizations that we respect. It is a serious and positive dialogue.

[Question] You have visited Bucharest as did Shaykh 'Abd-al-Hamid al-Sayih, the chairman of the PNC. Does Rumania intend to put forth a new peace initiative in the Middle East?

[Answer] I do not think that Rumania has what it takes to put forth peace initiatives. The USSR, which has political weight and international clout, put forth an initiative which is still ink on paper. The important thing in my opinion is that Rumania's role is to build bridges between the conflicting sides. It has the ability to restore and build bridges in Arab international relations of various orientations. President Ceausescu enjoys considerable political savvy and sophistication that permits him to play a role in reaching a solution even though his endeavors have not yet reached the point to which he and all of us aspire. However, I think that this role is needed at the current stage--the role of opening doors and windows before all forces and conflicting sides.

[Question] Did your talks in Rumania deal with these matters?

[Answer] They were one of the points we discussed as we also discussed the situation in the Arab arena, bilateral relations with Syria, and the relationship with Egypt.

[Question] We move now to the situation in Lebanon. President Amin al-Jumayyil said that the Cairo Agreement (1969) was dropped when Lebanon and the Arab countries accepted in 1978 Security Council Resolution 425 regarding UN forces in South Lebanon and also when the PLO and Syria accepted Phillip Habib's agreement in 1982 (10 June 1982).

[Answer] My agreement with President al-Jumayyil during my meeting with him in Tunis pertained to travel documents only. As for the Cairo Agreement, this can only be determined by the balances of power on Lebanese soil. The powers in Lebanon are the ones that determine whether or not an agreement actually exists. Talk about abrogating or preserving the agreement has nothing to do with political language because it is a language removed from the balance of power in the Lebanes arena. Nonetheless, we are with any solution that meets with the approval of the Lebanese people and guarantees their stability, independence, and sovereignty. We as Palestinians will never stand in the way.

With regard to the camps, they were disarmed following the exodus from Beirut in 1982. Less than 2 weeks after the fighters' departure from Beirut, the Sabra and Shatilla massacre that shocked the entire occurred. It was a mark of Israeli and Phalange barbarism and we will never, so long as we can help it, allow outselves to be massacred in the camps. Consequently, the resistance we have put up in the last 2 years and the heroism of fighters defending these camps underscore our determination never to allow a repeat of such massacres in these camps. However, when a comprehensive solution for

Lebanon comes about, we will be ready to turn over the camps' security to the legitimate government and to the security authorities. The Palestinian camps will not stand in the way of pushing such steps forward.

[Question] What in your opinion are the future tendencies of the PLO in the absence of coordination with Jordan and in the shade of the current Arab situation?

[Answer] I believe in the next stage we will not be faced with any political or diplomatic action because such an action will not achieve anything in the coming phase with regard to the cause. This does not mean that I reject political or diplomatic action. On the contrary, I am a believer in the Palestinian leadership investing the fruits of its actions in political and diplomatic action because it carries the rifle of the people and not of guerillas, but it is a politicized rifle, and this is because political action must go hand in hand with commando action since this is a cause of a people. At the same time, however, the coming phase will be one of dead-end streets and stalemates and we need to stop and take a look at ourselves. This is what we call discussing the internal question and confronting dangers coming from the outside through self-examination which allows us to go beyond the bureaucrcy we have experienced for quite some time and will provide us with the kind of revolutionary decisiveness our youth and revolutionaries need to guard against illusions and a life tied to offices, flats, and any kind of overtness.

This does not mean that I am calling for a return to underground action. No. I say however that, beside overt action, we must be ready to move in the face of any problems without becoming susceptible to basic concessions at the expense of our cause and our people. This is what self-examination is all about: To be ready, if expelled from any place, to adopt to any new situation without any real repercussions.

[Question] Does this mean a return to stepped-up armed struggle at home?

[Answer] Armed struggle has not stopped. I am saying a return to fundamentals in the sense that our movement has not bound itself, in its life and existence, to a purely overt presence tied to offices.

[Question] But it always had a launching point.

[Answer] This launching point did not exist in 1965 nor in 1966 or 1967. This kind of point did not exist. In 1968, it was not safe and in 1969 it was somewhat safe. However, in 1970, King Husayn pounced upon it and, in 1971 and 1972, it was not safe. But from 1972 until our departure from Beirut in 1982, the launching point was safe and secure.

We have been through two experiences. I always say that the revolution is like a prisoner. The revolution is a prisoner destined to be the captive of Arab reality. A prisoner has to eat whatever food is sent his way, so if he is offered something new, it is a good thing, but if he is not, then that is the end of that. I am speaking here from personal experience. When we were students, we were jailed with a dim-witted prisoner. When food was sent us, we did not want to eat, but this prisoner advised us to eat as much as we could so long as there was food available for we might not have anything to eat later on. Indeed, it was good advice.

Accordingly, our internal situation must be strong enough to endure all shocks so that we will not be surprised by anything because I personally believe that a person who has been driven out of Palestine, the most beloved place, cannot feel sad about being driven out of any other place.

[Question] You mentioned that Palestinian forces have no presence to speak of in Aden and Khartoum and that al-Zarqa' camp in Tunis was closed a year ago and the Palestinian revolutionary forces have turned to action on Palestinian land. Does this mean that these forces have been regrouped in Lebanon?

[Answer] No, I did not say they have regrouped in Beirut. As of the beginning of 1983, however, a few months after the departure from Beirut and following a retraining and fitness program, any fighter able to go to any place close to the occupied territory to fight may be given orders to go. Consequently, this plan has been in effect since 1983 and has been carried out very well. The number of fighters on the outside is very small, comprising administrators and senior members. We are a 20-year old revolution and those who were 10 years old at the time are now 30 years old. Those who do not want to fight have stayed behind, thus making it easier on fighters and certain host countries.

[Question] Let us move to Soviet-Palestinian relations. How are these relations assessed at present in light of the strategic relations between Moscow and Damascus?

[Answer] I do not believe nor do I imagine that our relations with the USSR have ever been affected by Moscow's relations with Damascus. The USSR is a superpower that does not build its relations on opportunism. It is true that Syria is important to the Soviet Union and that USSR relations with Syria are basic. However, the Soviet Union has never disagreed with us because of its relations with Syria because such relations for the past 15 years have never been a stumbling block. Naturally, there has been disagreement and minor average and major differences, even before the departure from Beirut.

In 1976, even though we entered into battles with Syria, the Soviet Union did not side with it. The nature of differences with the Soviet Union focused on some of our tactics which the Soviet Union failed to understand and grasp. Take, for example, the Amman Agreement. The Soviet Union did not accept it or comprehend it. Consequently it felt that some of us or all of us had illusions of an American solution.

The Soviet Union has the right to feel uneasy when it senses any kind of threat to its security. If the American administration in this important part of the Middle East, Palestine, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria particularly, is seeking to impose another solution similar to the Camp David Accords that took Egypt out of the Arab arena and the Arab-Israeli conflict and undermined relations between Egypt and the USSR as well--this cannot be easy for the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union understood our position following the lengthy talks that hit a snag in March 1985 due to our rejection of Richard Murphy's plans or theses regarding Palestinian representation or Resolution 242 that eradicates Palestinian presence. The Soviet Union understood that the Jordanian-Palestinian agreement was not so much a strategic action as one aimed at coordinating relations with Jordan by an initiative based on our understanding of our national rights rather than a concession to Israel and Jordan. Today, I do not claim that relations have returned to their 1982 status. No. I will say, however, that they have made tangible progress on the ground and the USSR is now convinced that all the reports it has received or all illusions about our relations with the U.S. have been dispelled. Our relationship with the Soviet Union is proceeding on a sound path toward establishing firm relations with it.

[Question] Has Yasir 'Arafat's meeting with Soviet President Gorbachev in East Berlin contributed to the restoration of relations between the PLO and the USSR?

[Answer] I think this meeting was the result of improved relations between Abu 'Ammar and Gorbachev in Berlin.

[Question] What about your visit to France and the discussions you held with French officials? Is there a shift in the French position toward the PLO following Shamir's demand that France change its stance?

[Answer] I believe that France adopts a somewhat reasonable policy, relatively speaking, compared to that of other European countries. Of course, it is not the policy we covet but what I mean to say is that France's position is kind of moderate toward the Palestinian cause and is relatively better than the European stance in general. Hence, what we had between us were political contacts and not relations of security as has been reported. What is sure is that we are not information peddlers.

Discussions between me and French officials were political and dealt with certain operations of a terrorist nature in which Palestinian names are exploited. We explained to French officials that the PLO, like any system in the world, has people working against its will and, therefore, these operations do not in any way formulate PLO foreign policy.

We have always tried to elucidate this point because some organizations such as Abu Nidal and his group used to undertake operations and, as of 1974 at least, 60 percent of them has been against Arabs for blackmail or to implant certain state policies. The rest are absurd operations, not a single one of which is directed against imprialism or Zionism.

Abu Nidal is a man for hire by any Arab intelligence service. Therefore, we are not responsible for his actions. This is what we try to explain in all our encounters, be they with socialist countries, European countries, or the non-aligned countries.

As for discussing security matters and the allegation that we transferred and carried dossiers and so forth, this is nothing but slander against the organization and a distortion of the nature of our contacts.

We are proud of France's friendship, but this does not preclude the existence of many differences between us.

[Question] Do you believe that there is a change of mind about the Venice communique (June 1980) issued by the Common Market?

[Answer] The Venice communique, from the standpoint of its officially-declared principles, is ahead of other proposals. However, even the Venice communique is a declaration of principles without any practical steps and void of any mechanism for action. Consequently, the situation is ossified because the European countries cannot initiate any solutions without the U.S. They are in disagreement with the U.S., but at the same time cannot undertake any initiative on their own. I think that Security Council preparations for an international conference are a good idea and we believe that this is practically the only way in the history of political action for finding a solution to the Middle East problem. Naturally the U.S. and Britain have rejected this idea even though it may be a useful step in the search for a political solution to the Middle East problem.

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REPORT ON FIGHTERS' CAMP NEAR ADEN

Abu Dhabi AL-ITTIHAD AL-USBU'I in Arabic 19 Jun 86 p 11

[Article by Basimah Nafadi: "AL-ITTIHAD AL-USBU'I Enters Camp of Palestinian Fighters and Village of Martyr Fahd al-Qawasimah Near Aden"]

[Text] How do Palestinian fighters live in their village near Aden after their departure from Beirut in 1982? What kind of life have they made for themselves? Has their feeling of security dampened their yearning to return to fighting or are they longing to return to their "land and plantations?" Have Palestinian-Palestinian differences reflected on the Palestinian presence in Yemen and how do Yemenis view their Palestinian borthers who have turned their village in the desert into a green paradise? And what role did the PLO office play during the 13 January bloody events in Aden? This is what we set out to explore in the Palestinian village of "Martyr Fahd al-Qawasimah" somewhere near Aden.

When Israeli forces invaded Lebanon in June 1982, tightening their siege of Beirut for 80 days, during that summer that witnessed the fall of the first Arab capital before enemy troops, the goal was to get the head of the PLO and to fragment and eliminate the organization by dispersing 12,000 fighters over eight Arab countries that agreed to receive them.

Yemen's share of those fighters was 1,200 individuals who arrived in September 1982 in three groups. Everyone in Aden went out to meet them in a throng described by Yemeni officials as unequalled save for Independence Day in 1967.

That is why during our stay in Aden we were intent on visiting the Palestinian fighters' camp and village.

When we got to the camp somewhere outside the Yemeni capital with an escort from the PLO, we were received by "Abu 'Ali," the camp leader, in his field office which was set up through personal effort. Abu 'Ali apologized for not being able to spend much time with us due to deployment orders the camp had received, prompted by information the Palestinian leadership had recieved, that Israel was preparing for a strike against a Paslestinian base and against Syria.

This was in the last week of last April. Indeed, it was later confirmed that Israel was deterred only by Soviet leader Gorbachev's clear warning during the Syrian vice-president's visit to Moscow that the USSR would not stand idly by in the event of an Israeli aggression against Syria or PLO bases.

In the Martyr's Village

Thereafter we visited the village of "Martyr Fahd al-Qawasimah," or the Palestinian village as the Yemenis here call it, several kilometers out of Aden. When we approached the village, we saw green trees in the middle of the desert extending around the village which some Yemenis told us was a miracle made by the Palestinians who turned that arid piece of land into desert green, notwithstanding their limited resources. The village has about 50 houses built by the fighters for their families. They are the pre-fabricated type that can be moved to other locations and imported from Bulgaria by the PLO, according to our escort. Each house has a vegetable garden about it for personal consumption and the center of the village has a main square for celebrations and social and political functions and was used in 1984 as a rostrum when the "old man," Abu 'Ammar, visited the village. Indeed, we saw how these fighters have set up a field medical center that includes three doctors, two of whom are females: a gynecologist, a pediatrician, and a general practitioner. This modest medical team has been able to extend its contribution to various Yemeni villages in the area.

Naturally, a popular committee, similar to popular committees in Palestinian camps, has been formed in the village to take care of everything via sub-committees. These committees provide most of the inhabitants' needs.

Our escort told us that these sub-committees have four to five members each, thus eanbling the largest number of village residents to serve their village and their people.

The Palestinian official added: These trees you see in the village are the result of good and successful work, as evidenced by the fact that the village has been turned into a paradise in the middle of the desert.

Umm al-Futuh, the women's affairs officer of the popular committee which oversees the nursery school, said: "We are trying to make a normal life for these children who are all children of fighters. We have set up for them, through personal efforts, a play area and we are trying to instill in them a love for the homeland, the land of Palestine, and Palestinian honor in returning someday to this land."

When we went inside the nursery, a truly modest setup in a mobile vehicle, we were greeted by innocent faces, faces of 4 and 5-year old children raising victory signs and chanting:

"On the day of honor

The Fedayeen shall triumph

With courage and boldness

The Fedayeen were victorious

We taught them real fighting

We taught them the art of war

We taught them the value of land

Land that belongs to its owners alone

With your victory, Oh Honor

We heard the most beautiful songs."

This yearning for the return to Palestine was manifest in every house in the village we visited.

The map of Palestine with Jerusalem in its center and the picture of al-Aqsa Mosque decorated the walls of every home and a photo of Abu 'Ammar was in the center of the main room in these homes, as a symbol of a people who are dispersed and living for the dream of returning to the land of oranges.

They Yearn to Return

However, if the situation of the fighters and their families in the village, from the standpoint of housing and other aspects of everyday life, is considered good, how about their frame of mind?

When we presented this question to the village official, he acknowledged that the fighters are suffering a lot becaue they are far from their struggle positions in areas close to Palestine and also because they are away from their families in Syria, Jordan, and the occupied territory.

He added that the fighters are anticipating their return to their true fighting positions where they can feel that they are in their proper place near the borders of their country, Palestine.

Whereas Democratic Yemen has embraced the Palestinian fighters, it has as well embraced the PLO representation which enjoys embassy status. Indeed, the head of the representation, brother 'Abbas Zaki, is dean of the diplomatic corps in Aden for he is the senior ambassador in the Yemeni capital--he arrived in 1974--although he has assumed as well the position of foreign relations officer in Fatah.

A Palestinian representation member proudly told us: "Our embassy here is the largest after the Soviet embassy. If anything, this points out PLO standing in Democratic Yemen."

Palestinian-Palestinian differences have not reflected on Palestinian unity here in Yemen, although all Palestinian factions are represented in Aden. This was typified by the elections of the Palestinian Women's Federation, and the Palestinian Teachers' Federation or that of the Students Federation held a few days prior to our arrival in Aden when the General Federation of Palestinian Students in Democratic Yemen convened its 5th conference on 17 and 18 April 1986.

Brother Fakhir Isma'il, elected to a 5th term as federation president and a 7th year medical student at the medical school in Aden, says: "Our conference was in agreement and our general orientation in the chapter as in Fatah in general was the preservation of student unity that includes all Palestinian organizations and factions present in the arena. We have been intent on building relations and bridges with the rest of the organizations, the Popular Front, the Democratic Front, and the Palestinian Liberation Front in particular.

"For a while prior to the conference, we went to great lengths to safeguard our national unity within the federation's framework."

Brother Fakhir Isma'il added: "Meetings were held in Aden at the faction level. The four factions that used to compromise the national coalition within the federation, which enabled us to arrive at the format of the political report of the conference put out by unanimous approval. We went into the conference with this principle in mind, and we were able, through democratic dialogue inside the conference--the dialogue to which we adhere an ideal on the Palestinian political action arena--to hold on to the federation's constitution and by-laws.

"There were 22 candidates representing the various organizations. However, the national unity ticket, with 4 representatives from Fatah and one each from the Popular Front, the Democratic Front, and the PLF, was approved and the other candidates withderew in the interest of national unity. The ticket was unopposed and won the unanimous vote of the conference which included 271 students of both sexes."

"As for the political report put out by the conference, Fakhir Isma'il mentioned that it included three items about the international situation, the Arab situation, and the Palestinian situation. Regarding the latter, the report emphasized the matter of holding onto the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of our people. Furthermore, we took up the matter of Zionist enemy practices against our people and ways to support the struggle of our students and our youth in the occupied territory and of our people's steadfastness in the face of massacres at Palestinian camps in Lebanon, Sabra, Shatilla, and Burj al-Barajinah in particular, and ways to support them

"At the national unity level, we laid some key points, such as calling all Palestinian factions to a general unconditional national dialogue, taking advantage of Chedli Bendjedid's invitation to hold a meeting in Algiers, and the call for convening the 18th session of the PNC. The political report pointed out as well the importance of escalating armed struggle in the occupied territory in particular and we demanded, in an appeal to the Arab countries, adherence to Arab summit resolutions providing that borders be open to our fighters.

"We reaffirmed our rejection of the Jordanian-Palestinian agreement, the 'Amman Accord," which last year we asked that it be abrogated due to its incompatibility with our Palestinian constants and our aspirations as a Palestinian people."

Yemeni Scholarships for Palestinian Students

About facilities offered by Democratic Yemen (the Yemeni Socialist Youth Federation in particular) to the Palestinian Student Federation, brother Fakhir Isma'il said that the nature of relations between Democratic Yemen and the PLO reflects on the relationship between the youth of the two countries and that Yemen's modest capabilities notwithstanding, it has opened its universities to Palestinian students and has offered scholarships at the expense of its development plan. He drew attention to the fact that the Yemeni government offers a total of 50 to 60 full scholarships a year for Palestinian students, including, besides tuition, board, clothes, food, and a monthly allowance. He said that this number of scholarships, compared to other scholarships offered by other Arab countries that give only one-tenth this number, illustrates the extent of assistance Aden offers our Palestinian students and our Palestinian people.

He said, moreover, that the University of Aden helps the students' federation by enabling the students to leave the occupied territory since the occupation authorities do not allow Palestinian students to leave the occupied territory unless they are enrolled in a university. In this area, the University of Aden enrolls them to facilitate their departure.

Regarding financial help the PLO offers the Students Federation to help it meet its obligations to its membership, he said that the organization has built subsidized housing for the students. As for brother 'Abbas Zaki, the PLO ambassador to Democratic Yemen, he stressed to us that the power of Palestinian action lies in the unity of Palestinian factions and represents a strong boost to Fatah's leading role.

About the situation of our fighters in PDRY in the wake of their departure from Beirut, 'Abbas Zaki said that the exodus from Beirut was one of the acute problems in the life of the Palestinian revolution, but they received a warm welcome in PDRY and their reception in September 1982 was similar to the celebration of the PDRY's independence in November 1967.

He added: "The fighters felt they were facing new tasks. We did not let them forget their basic duties, hence the training, the readiness, and the deployment in areas where fighters can fulfill their blood tax."

13 January Events

About the PLO's role during the January events in Aden, brother 'Abbas Zaki emphasized that the PLO tried to play the role of mediator between the brothers in the PDRY in an attempt to spare life and preserve this honorable country.

He stressed that Palestinian fighters did not take part in those events, notwithstanding rumors about Palestinian involvement on the side of 'Ali Nasir followers that aroused some sensitivities within the new leadership. However, Yemeni officials were quick to realize the purpose behind such rumors that were aimed primarily at causing a schism between the Palestinian and Yemeni revolutions. He praised the new leadership's understanding of the PLO's role during the events which was primarily a humanitarian one.

'Abbas Zaki added that the PLO office in Aden offered all facilities to various foreign communities in the Yemeni capital during the 2-week battles in Aden.

He said that Palestinian fighters drilled water wells to supply the city with drinking water and the PLO office helped in evacuating Arab and foreign communities and provided shelter and medical care for the wounded from both sides. This role by the PLO has been acknowledged.

12502
CSO: 4404/467

SAUDI ARABIA

INTERVIEW WITH 'ABDALLAH IBN FAYSAL IBN TURKI

Riyadh AL-YAMAMAH in Arabic 16 Jul 86 pp 27-31

[Interview with Prince 'Abdallah ibn Faysal ibn Turki by Salih al-'Azzaz; date and place not specified]

[Text] In the company of my friend Muhammad al-Tanusi, an information officer with the Royal Commission, on the way to the home of the secretary general, al-Tanusi told me that being 10 minutes late with this man is a very serious matter. While trying to shorten the distance, I kept thinking about the appropriate way to interview a person whom I had met only once or twice on information matters without directly talking to him. A good interview with him requires a great deal of professional skill. When we arrived, he was waiting for us. He did not keep us waiting in the reception room and then come in, as many do. Perhaps this small event was the key to the interview, although it was expected to be about the concerns of the Royal Commision for Jubayl and Yanbu'. It was about the world and its political, information, economic, industrial, and intellectual concerns in general in many places because it reflected the personality of 'Abdallah ibn Faysal ibn Turki, secretary general of the Royal Commission for Jubayl and Yanbu'. Here is the text of the interview without any significant intrusions on my part.

[Question] I should like to go back a little to become familiar with the time you spent in Britain as a secondary school and university student. This experience abroad away from your homeland and people--what did it give you and what did you take from it? What changed in you and what did it take from you.

[Answer] To begin with, surely you must know what it means to be away from one's people and homeland. When you are far away, you have to live under a variety of conditions that give you an opportunity to become acquainted with many things, where you look upon your country and society from a distant place and under different circumstances and backgrounds. You have to deal with things with new objectivity. It was especially in that time period or at the end of the 1960's and beginning of the 1970's that the presence of Saudis was rare and they were few in number, particularly outside of London. So I was the only one in the university. All these circumstances taught me a lot of things in life and I experienced difficulties as a foreigner, belonging, as I did, to a minority in a society that is not sympathetic to foreigners. Then there was the absence of moral support for an individual coming from an emotional society and large family in which the family plays an important role in supporting the individual and his success and alleviating his concerns and lack of friends. All these things were a spur to learning how to shape my life and rely on myself. The experience was undoubtedly beneficial in that it enhanced my ability to make decisions and widened my horison. And don't forget too that the time I spent abroad was filled with the problems of young people, rapid political and social changes, and successive intellectual waves which, though they did not have historical and cultural roots, nevertheless directly affected the European younger generation. I was an observer who contemplates but does not become overenthusiastic, although zeal at such an age and under such circumstances does not grip you. I acquired this ability from my residence abroad.

There is no doubt that language is one of the most important benefits of life away from home because it involves mixing with new people and gaining new knowledge. Some friends accuse me of being English in my choice of clothing while others think that punctiliousness in keeping promises suggests that I am tied to the English way of doing things.

[Question] Will you tell us how you dealt with the political and social changes, which were not only European phenomena but Arab ones as well?

[Answer] I dealt with them in an individual and traditional way, but my attitude was that you have your religion and I have mine. Don't forget the principle on which the modern Saudi experience has rested, namely, something that does not arise from deep historical roots cannot be a solution or model suitable for any country. When I returned home, I was convinced of this fact because the laws of experience cannot be mixed with others. Every country has its own experience and every society its essence, desires, roots, and way of life. I believe that the man who claims the right to characterize and define things as white or black with no grays does not exist as yet. I am of the opinion that many Saudi youths who lived abroad managed to discover this fact and resist many phenomena and transient influences. Then too these changes did not always have only political dimensions because the standards of Western materialism and some traditions and rituals of life there also have clear effects on the people. You see how such phenomena have dominated the thinking of many individuals in the developing countries and what is called the work ethic. These things are not only political but also social, yet they have made an impact on many people.

[Question] To what extent did the fact that you are a member of a large family and a prince affect your life in Britain? Did you live there the familiar "student" life or did you live like a prince?

[Answer] I was not conspicuous. Rather, I was always eager to live like the other people. I lived as they did in order not to appear strange to them, even though it was difficult to conceal who I was in many situations. However, I was determined to benefit from this experience. I had the opportunity to live a completely normal life in a foreign society and foreign country, and I got used to it.

[Question] You shifted from the experience of living as a student to a new place involving a different experience where being a leader requires making decisions and taking initiatives. What thing or things have changed as far as you are concerned?

[Answer] The challenge facing a person in a new situation like the one I'm in now creates different feelings because it increases responsibility and leaves one with no choice but to work, benefit from it, and produce. The effect of the expectations of the people around you is the greatest challenge you face because they expect from any individual who occupies a new position much success and much innovation since it assures them that he is worthy of his status and new position. This challenge has greatly enhanced for me the sense of the importance and value of work. It is the responsibility and sense of its existence because many youths who aspire to new positions or offices expect that their mere appointment to these positions simply means having more prerogatives and influence, but in my opinion it entails many new responsibilities.

The expectations of colleagues, the expectations of interviewers, of the people--this is the reality of the choice of excellent professional positions in life. This is what I want to establish and make clear to my ambitious brethren so that they do not expect that the issue is only a matter of holding a certain position or certain office and that through this important position one can with one stroke of the pen do everything and please everybody. Work means feeling the importance of responsibility and it is the first step toward success.

[Question] Do you follow the media in order to keep up with the news on a daily basis? Do you read the newspapers and keep up with what is written and going on?

[Answer] To a certain extent I do keep up with some things; I am particularly interested in foreign newspapers and magazines. However, this does not mean that I am well informed about information affairs in the way that some may think. I the past we tried with some of our brothers to make an effort to explain some of the many things about the kingdom and its development and about some newsmen and through television programs. Perhaps this personal activity is what makes this matter so prominent for me with any newsman and on any similar occasion when some persons thought I was an information officer. This is incorrect in the precise sense of the term. What I do does not go behond my national and Arab responsibilities. I am not even eager to read every article by a well-known writer, for example, or a headline to read and analyze. But I am greatly interested in what is written about the kingdom in particular and about the region and Arab homeland in general. In short, I am a person who is interested in these things and follows them up but not necessarily in depth.

[Question] Regarding your interest in keeping up with the news, do you choose a particular source? What I really mean is when you feel the need to follow an event or some news item, what sources do you use to do so?

[Answer] Any available source that provides the information. But I believe in the need to know and choose the source because you must be aware that any source of information or organization has certain objectives and a strategy that may be political or commercial. Every information agency, including that of a government or institution, or persons--all of them have their views, ideas, methods, intentions, and aims. It is essential, therefore, to know the source and its structure. So when dealing with foreign information, one must be thoughtful, analytical, and knowledgeable about the dimensions and background of every pulpit and article.

[Question] Some believe in the ability and superiority of the Western media over other foreign sources compared with the Arab media. Do you?

[Answer] There are, of course, differences of opinion about this question. It is true that the Western media are more developed than the Arab, which are still maturing and taking shape, but I don't believe we should credit them with being more important than the Arab media and causes. They undoubtedly play a large and important role in influencing the policies of the Western countries, but this does not mean that they have an indisputable ligitmacy before the world and that we give them more legitimacy because of what they call freedom of the press, for while the Western press may appear to be a bloc enjoying broad freedom in the midst of these institutions, the fact is freedom of speech and debate is controlled much more tightly than one might expect. There are examples and evidence of it every day--Thomson's magazine, which was bought by the well-known businessman Murdock, Tony Ronald, and his influence over and control of the newspaper THE OBSERVER. Then too there is the DAILY MIRROR, which is controlled by its new owner Robert Maxwell. And there are other examples and solid continuing evidence that the happiness with which we have accepted it clearly make it a given. I am familiar with the British newspapers because I had daily access to them, but the situation is the same in France, the United States, and Germany. It is only a problem for many intellectuals in the Third World. This does not mean ultimately that the views of the Western media are not important as far as the issues of the developing countries and especially Arab issues are concerned. We must play the information role required to reach Western public opinion to explain these issues to them. The field for this is very big. Until the Arab media can wrest its true role, a studied, systematic, concentrated action is the basic matter. This is the main thing because many developing countries are not interested in having information offices abroad. There is, regrettably, mistreatment of the Arab media that make it necessary to to correct. Israel exploits freedom of information to strengthen its grip and control while creating a popular base to help it in the Western world. In spite of all this, if it were not for the domestic American information media and their concern with the Vietnam war, there would not have been the great popular campaign against the war. And if it were not for the same media, there would not have been the daily demonstrations against racial discrimination in South Africa. Our Arab issues are just and important, but the Western media are indifferent to them because of the absence of the Arab media.

[Question] But, I wonder, where is our Arab media to obtain its presence and capability? Who will give them this power--government agencies--or true freedom and privileges?

[Answer] I was speaking about the domestic Arab media in the Arab countries. This is something else. I don't know much about it. Rather, I am talking about the foreign media role. They are supported by governments, concerned agencies, institutions, and individuals. Suitable elements must be chosen and the task performed courageously.

Look at Israel, for example, not to mention the support given by the Israeli propaganda organizations and the activities carried on by the Jews and their helpers and friends in many countries. Look at the work done by the Israelis in their information offices and embassies. And look at the activity of the Israeli diplomats, not from the standpoint of diplomatic work or from the standpoint of propaganda. The Israelis, for example--any one of them is able to contact his embassy in any country, announce his desire for a lecture or seminar, and ask for a speaker. Soon, sometimes even without asking, the person is present, prepared, and able. He speaks the language of the country and has the appropriate background. In the Arab countries, on the other hand, the people chosen are often unsuitable. Many officials do not want to go unless it is to one of the well-known large universities or there is an information cover. Many speak for local consumption and many do not come on time. Failure to show up is, unfortunately, another Arab phenomenon. This gives an idea of some of the simple things that may have an effect. I recall a Western diplomat who after graduating from college and entering the diplomatic service was asked to specialize in Middle Easter affairs. He took a trip to Arab countries and Israel. In Israel he met with the foreign minister, defense minister, head of military information, prime minister, and presidents of all the universities specializing in political and diplomatic affairs--all the persons whom he had not dreamed of meeting because of the positions they held. But when his delegation went to some of the Arab countries, no one met with him, no one was interested in him.

This shows the difference between Israeli behavior and Arab behavior. The absence and lack of initiative have become an Arab phenomenon that eventually led, unfortunately, to a situation where terrorism has become an Arab activity, and the wave of revulsion against the Arabs strengthened and widened and became contagious and quick to spread.

Yesterday, I read about two Israelis who were able to organize a movie company from nothing and achieve unrivaled success at a time when comparable Arab action is not to be expected.

These two Israelis managed to buy a movie company as well as the right to make many films. Within 2 years they made three or four films of high quality--in terms of technique, story, and script.

But of course it was all a lie that they were successful. Reports from the Cannes Film Festival confirmed that they had a powerful effect on the festival.

A year ago they were expelled from the festival. This is something that should teach us a lesson. But do we have an opportunity to learn from our mistakes and lost opportunities?

I believe that for us Arabs some things are matters of life or death. We are now in a battle and facing a sharp challenge, and we cannot be negligent in these things. On the contrary, we must make great sacrifices to avoid losing this opportunity to correct many of the errors we have made.

I have been expecting the Arab media to do something. Since 1967, what have we been able to do and what are the lost opportunities that passed us by and provided us with no benefits? Sometimes a person says that things can't be worse than this and sometimes a person remembers lost opportunities and sees before us things that we have to do and didn't do. One says that there is no hope. Of course, there must be hope and it must always be present in one's thoughts. We must never lose hope.

[Question] In light of the circumstances now prevailing in the world as new values--economic, political, military--how do you see the future of the Arab world?

[Answer] I am not in a position to speak about the future of the Arab world or to judge the importance and significance of a question like this. I am not a specialist in world or Arab economic history nor am I a representative of the developing countries. However, my personal view is that we must remember the lesson and learn from it since we have now discovered that the influence of any economic group or even country depends on its ability to exploit its economic potential and resources and apply them in its dealings with other countries in order to make the paper resources always profitable in our hands, for the influence of economic power in political dealings between countries is very clear. It is responsible for the importance of the productive power of oil in the Arab states where this power gave the oil-producing nations, especially in the 1970's, a greater capacity for more or less strong dealings with other countries. The loss of this ability by any country will undoubtedly have a direct effect, but this does not diminish the economic and strategic importance of the Arab world. Oil, like no other raw material or commodity, is affected by economic factors that are virtually worldwide phenomena due to the law of supply and demand. However, we must learn from these changes and benefit from the lessons that have taught us.

[Question] There is an economic view to the effect that when the OPEC countries, including Saudi Arabia, try to create a commercial alternative, they use mainly petroleum derivatives. This will lead us into the same predicament as that which resulted from reliance on the oil industry...it was caused by price fluctuations and marketing problems.

[Answer] I believe the opposite. It is true that the existence of or reliance on a raw material sold as a commodity may have a direct and significant effect on the world market. However, industrialization and the effort to diversify this material and make a comprehensive and sound study of the industry do not mean reliance on the material. We must attempt to widen and diversify the industrial and economic base. To control it in this simple way would be a mistake, as we demonstrated in Saudi Arabia. For example, some countries with educational experience and a suitable cultural base were able to start up the manufacture of electronics and other industries that require a high level of experience or skills, thereby developing and exploiting their resources correctly and successfully.

[Question] The petrochemical industry is still facing obstacles because of the attitude of the European Common Market and other countries. Is there a new step that can be taken to counter this attitude?

[Answer] What happened with respect to new industries in the initial marketing stages, for example, petrochemicals, was not new, something invented at the last minute. There are established and well-known methods and principles in international trade relations, but to us they appear to be new because we are now facing them for the first time. There are, by way of compensation, a number of ways of confronting and treating them. I believe that negotiations are now underway between the Arab and the developing countries in general that involve many economic organizations in Europe, America, and South Asia. We must not feel that these negotiations will frustrate our hopes and expectations. This is natural. We must be able to deal with such attitudes, which are new to us, and always be ready to negotiate and to create new markets. We must be flexible in coping with circumstances and be constantly prepared to create substitute markets which will put us in a stronger position as an economic power.

[Question] Regarding the plan for economic and industrial integration of the GCC countries and coordination between the countries in this vital matter, where do they stand today?

[Answer] I am not sufficiently familiar with the subject to be able to talk about it in any useful way. I believe the most appropriate agency for providing details is the general secretariat of the GCC. I don't have the background knowledge of the negotiations underway on integration or industrial homogeneity between the Gulf States.

Don't forget that the Royal Commission does not build or operate industrial plants. It only does the basic preparatory work and sets the policy for them. Private institutions do the planning, build the plants, and market the products. Our role is more or less limited.

[Question] This quick summary leads us to another matter--rumors of the private sector hesitating to share in industrial investment. It is said that the years of rapid economic growth spoiled this sector and accustomed it to investments with a promise of quick profits so that it relied on them and no other projects on which the industrial and economic activity of the country concentrates.

[Answer] There is no doubt that the private sector has to participate in many of these things and play its proper role so that the benefits flow throughout the country. Praise be to God that its flow is present and increasing. The state has encouraged many of the industrial investment areas, but in the end the private sector decides the extent to which it wishes to participate. We want a wider presence and greater concentration. But if there is any shortcoming, it is due to us officials.

[Question] We spoke about publicity and economic issues that involve the Royal Commission. I should like here to ask about the lack of publicity of the kind that accompanied the establishment of the commission. Which of them backed off, the commission or public relations?

[Answer] I don't think that the commission backed off nor do I think public relations did either, especially in connection with a project of such importance for the country and the economy, but it is like what I said a little while ago when we talked about the importance of information marketing for the potential of the commission. We are now busily preparing programs of this kind aimed at the private sector. We may be able to begin soon and in cooperation with many agencies. We always welcome publicity initiatives and are always ready to facilitate them.

[Question] About the training programs prepared by the commission, what is the strategy you are striving for in this connection?

[Answer] Right at the beginning, the Royal Commission created two training institutes. We are steadily working up programs generally tailored to the country's needs and perhaps to the available manpower as well. We are currently studying some ideas for expanding the two institutes in Jubayl and Yanbu' to meet the needs of the existing industries. Many ideas and studies are under discussion. Briefly, the experience of the institutes to date is considered good and at a level to achieve the goals for which they were founded, namely, the development of good administrative and industrial personnel. This is the strategy we are planning.

[Question] Newspaper editorials are very critical of the economic upswing period, saying that it has had many adverse effects on the industrial and training projects. What do you think?

[Answer] To begin with, I believe use of the term "economic upswing period" is incorrect. I prefer to call it the rapid development period. If there were a society desirous of going from point A to point B in the shortest time possible and possessing the resources and capabilities required under the existing circumstances and it resembles us as a growing society lacking experience, adverse effects would naturally be expected. For example, if you have an automobile and want to travel from one city to another as quickly as possible, you'll do it without thinking in detail about possible accidents and damage to the car. This is what happened with the economy. It is the tax paid to obtain certain previously unavailable services as quickly as possible. As far as we are concerned, I believe we exaggerate too much if we see in the years of the upswing nothing but the negative aspects associated with a rise marked by positive features. What happened in Saudi Arabia would not have been achieved in many societies and countries that preceded us in their experiences and existence with comparable abilities. Indeed, in some cases their human resources, educational level, and occupation skills were greater than ours. There are countries with fewer inhabitants and smaller oil wealth and a smaller economy than Saudi Arabia and have many negative features from the main economic base to the simplest of things. This is at a time when Saudi Arabia is enjoying a basic infrastructure that is already in place and does not have the problems from which those countries are suffering as a result of the accumulation of tens of millions of dollars of debt. Many countries dream of achieving what we have already achieved. Despite all this, I believe we must not compare ourselves and our experience with the examples of failure, for our experience has been successful by all measures, even the difficult ones. Rather, we should compare our experience with that of our successful rivals. We are a country with a long history and we have had many independent experiences. Everything done here is based on solid foundations and indigenous factors originating from the roots of our religion, traditions, and experience. Saudi Arabia was not discovered by chance along with oil or with the rise and fall of oil prices. This unfortunately is the impression created gratuitously by some of the Western media in the interest of a logic hostile to the Arab nation. Saudi Arabia, as I said, has a deep-rooted history and it has enjoyed complete independence since it was founded. This history rests on the foundations and efforts of the country's individual citizens. They are an extension of its cultural roots and are supported by the strong popular base. Hence, we are a mature country because of our past experiences and difficult circumstances which have become just a memory in the file of history and civilizations. We faced challenges that were not simple or easy. In the course of its history Saudi Arabia confronted a great power and big alliances that tried to interfere in the affairs of the region. It was able to cope with all of these changes by its own methods. We, the government and the people, are marching ahead with good intentions. This is the basis of our trade relations. There is no success except by God's hand. In this sense talk of experience with rapid development is simply a minor experience that we should not dwell on. We should, instead, move on to other experiences.

[Question] You are about to end the main stages of establishing and equipping the two industrial cities. What will be the position of the Royal Commission and what role will it play after this step is completed?

[Answer] The role of the Royal Commission is still one of planning, building, putting into operation, maintenance, and providing coordination for what the industrial sector needs. We have now actually completed the first stage of equipping the industries. Much remains to be done in regard to housing. As for concentration on or limitation to certain activities, this is the sense of the question, I believe. The matter differs from stage to stage, each of which varies with its own circumstances and needs. I believe the most important step we now have to take is to encourage and convince the private sector of the importance of investing in the developed fields now available.

[Question] I agree with you completely, for the experience of the advanced industrial countries with the private sector has been successful. On the other hand, it has brought fabulous glory to the investors. Proof of that is the fact that the "mother" Western companies, well entrenched in industries of different kinds, are owned by the private sector.

[Answer] Yes, this is true. But don't forget that this matter was not resolved simply by decree. On the contrary, it was the natural result of cultures and industrial resources inherited generation after generation. We are hoping to achieve this level of industry. I do not consider it impossible based on what I perceive to be the great aspirations of the two parties--the state's desire and its aspirations and the aspirations of the capitalists and their desire.

[Question] Do you believe that the exploitation and sale of the services made available to date are likely to produce financial and economic revenues for the country equivalent to the effort and money expended for this purpose?

[Answer] This, of course, is what we are striving for. From the beginning the Royal Commission was a source of financing for the national economy. This is on the increase. But an important point must not be forgotten, namely, huge development projects cannot be launched after a quick glance at the costs and comparison of them with the income and doing so in a short period of time. Moreover, if it were a real estate project, paper factory, or gaoline station, these are projects for industrial investment undertaken to meet the needs of this and the coming generations. The main preparations we are about to complete are an important element in the develoment activity. We find some countries that possess many resources and raw material are not successful in using and exploiting them because of the lack of the necessary infrastructure in the form of roads, electric power, and ports.

[question] You have been following the "iron" problem in the American market. How do you assess the situation?

[Answer] The result, in my opinon, was poor for a factory able to survive despite the difficulties. But we must export; otherwise our plants would become uneconomical. There is no doubt that a tax increase of some kind on exports will affect our standing in the market. I don't know exactly how much of an effect it would have on the export of petrochemicals to the American market, but SABIC must have solid information.

[Question] In light of the circumstances affecting these new petrochenical industries, how do you see their future and the returns from them as a new national economic source?

[Answer] Such industries exist and they have been very successfully put into operation. From the technical standpoint, they appear to be very important. Then there are international companies with us. We have no doubt that the future is favorable for this kind of industry. We are very hopeful, despite the difficult situation in international trade.

[Question] Before I say goodbye, I should like to ask the secretary general of the Royal Commission for Jubayl and Yanbu'; Just what is his administrative function?

[Answer] The function of the secretary general is basically to serve as a coordinator. He acts more as an adviser than as an executive. Coordinating work is usually very easy or extremely difficult, depending on the employer. He may find it easy to blame the parties he is coordinating, hold them responsible, and then relax, or he may insist on following up things that relate to his work but are the responsibility of others.

A coordinator cannot succeed without the cooperation of the other parties and agencies with which he is coordinating and his associates are cooperating. In the Royal Commission, the general secretariat is in the middle of the administrative structure or pyramid. It conducts studies assigned to it, does the necessary coordination, and gives advice and opinions to the board of directors and vice chairman of the board, the highest ranking executive of the commission, and the public directors in Jubayl and Yanbu'.

'Abdallah ibn Faysal Ibn Turki al-'Abdallah Al Sa'ud

The secretary general of the Royal Commission for Jubayl and Yanbu' was born in Ta'if in 1371 A.H. (1952). He attended the Institute of the Capital in Riyadh, schools along the coast, and port schools in Jiddah. He then went to Britain where after completing his secondary education he entered Nottingham University, specializing in engineering and production management. After finishing his studies in industrial engineering and production management, he worked in a British factory for a year, crowning his theoretical and academic studies with excellent practical experience. Upon returning home he joined the Royal Commission for Jubayl and Yanbu', then in the early stage of organization, to work as an engineer in the technical department. After that he served as coordinator of studies, director of the manpower study project, and coordinator for security and industrial safety in al-Jubyal and Yanbu', now regarded as one of the most important sections of the commission, will represent the progressive stance from now on as head of this section. Within a year he was appointed to the high position of deputy secretary general and 7 months later secretary general of the Royal Commission for Jubayl and Yanbu'.

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ELECTRICITY SHORTAGES DISCUSSED IN PEOPLE'S ASSEMBLY

Damascus AL-BA'TH in Arabic 15 Jun 86 p 7

[Article by 'Ali 'Abbud: "The People's Assembly Discusses the Electricity Shortage and Asks: Will the Electrical Crisis Terminate by the End of Next Year?"]

[Text] The country's current electrical crisis was debated in the People's Assembly for 2 days. The minister of electricity projected an end to the crisis by the end of next year but the assembly was apparently not satisfied with that statement, especially since the minister's statement was published in the media. Several of the delegates rephrased the question as follows: Will the electrical crisis actually end in 1987? The minister reiterated his statement of the previous day that the crisis will terminate next year after the completion of al-Suwaydiyah and al-Ba'th dam generating stations and the expansion of the Mahrada station.

We, in turn, question why the Ministry of Electricity is so sure that the crisis will dissipate, whether next year or in the years to follow!

We will attempt in the following report to draw a clear and factual picture of the electricity crisis by reviewing the statement of the minister of electricity, the report of the assembly's Utilities Committee, and the debates in the Assembly. In addition, we will review available data on energy projects planned for implementation between now and the middle 1990's. Our objective will be to answer the question currently on everybody's mind: Will the crisis really end by next year?

According to the ministry of electricity report, electricity production rose from 3,720 million kwh in 1980 to 7,589 million kwh in 1985. Annual production growth declined from an average of 19 percent in 1980 to only 10 percent in each of 1984 and 1985.

Aggregate figures in the report indicate that production in 1985 rose some 104 percent above 1980. The question now is whether enough projects were completed during those 5 years to account for that increase, which could have been at more than 150 percent had it not been for technical corrections that reduced average annual growth by more than 50 percent during the past 2 years.

The report estimated daily shortages last March at 140 megawatts, which amount to 14.2 percent of general consumption or 19.4 percent of ordinary consumption. This means that the shortage equals one-third of general consumption during daylight hours and one-fourth of general consumption at night, assuming that all major generating situations are operating.

The ministry's report says that the difference between electricity demand and available supply was covered by rationing programs implemented throughout the country as of the middle of last August. The shortage worsened in the second half of this past November because of the demand for heat, which increased in December. The crisis was aggravated as the water level in the Euphrates dropped last December and January. The General Authority for Electricity, according to the report, was then obliged to depend mainly on steam-driven generating sources which can contribute only 40 percent of maximum supply and 50 percent of daily demand.

The ministry's report summarizes that since energy is the cornerstone for economic and social development, it is imperative to find energy sources to cover the shortages in 1986, 1987, and 1988 and to diversify such sources. It is not possible to implement any energy project in 1986 except in the fourth quarter when one of the stations at al-Ba'th dam goes on stream. In 1987 it will be difficult to complete steam-driven stations in a short time unless they were gas generators which can be bought pre-assembled and only need simple civilian installation.

The expansion of the Mahrada generating station will be completed in 1988 by the addition of two steam-driven units. The Tishrin Widyan al-Rabi' will be inaugurated in 1989.

The Ministry of Electricity further states in its report that there is no scientific or economical way to store energy, which means that production should be carefully matched to consumption.

After the minister of electricity presented his ministry's report, members of the People's Assembly asked questions and made observations. They were of the opinion that the report did not give a complete picture of the electricity crisis and referred it on 15 March 1986 to the Utilities Committee for study before it was resubmitted to the Assembly for discussion in its current session. It was approved with recommendations 20 May.

The report concludes that the current rate accelerated electricity consumption is no longer in line with available public supply, especially since no new source of energy was constructed in the period 1983-85. In addition, production declined at existing stations because of equipment age and deterioration. This causes a decrease in available supply and consequently a shortage. The Utilities Committee added that the ministry has resorted to rationing because of shortages arising from decreased water resources at al-Thawrah station, non-implementation of previously planned sources of energy, wasteful consumption implicit in public networks in the absence of meters, increased consumption for space and water heating, and reluctance to take advantage of solar energy and the unavailability of equipment for its utilization.

The committee's report indicates that the ministry's plan for avoiding future shortages includes the completing al-Ba'th generating station with a capacity of 75 megawatts in the first half of 1987, completing al-Suwaydiyah station with a capacity of 150 megawatts in the second or third quarter of 1987, and expanding the Mahrada generating station to a capacity of 130 megawatts and pressing its first completed unit into service in the first quarter of 1988 with the second unit going on stream in the second quarter of the same year. The plan also includes expanding the capacity of the Banias generating station to 340 megawatts in two stages. If the go-ahead were given this June, the first stage would be completed in the third quarter and the second stage in the fourth quarter of 1988.

It is expected, according to the Utilities Committee report, that the Tishrin station be expanded in two stages, the first 200 megawatts in the first quarter of 1989 and the second 200 megawatts in the third quarter of the same year. Expansion of the Quteyna station by an additional 64 megawatts would have been completed in the second quarter of 1989 if the loan were paid last April. A coke-driven station with a capacity of 120 megawatts is expected to go on stream in the first half of 1990.

The ministry is currently studying the feasibility of two large stations, one in Latakia and the other in Hims or Damascus, to be put into service in 1991 or 1992.

The Ministry of Irrigation, on its part, is looking into the construction of Tishrin dam with a capacity of 400 megawatts, to be completed in 1992-93. The Ministry of Electricity, according to the Utilities Committee report, is also doing research on the country's first 800-megawatt nuclear plant, slated to be completed in 1994-95.

The report of the committee also included several recommendations which the People's Assembly discussed, augmented, and judged to be of value in meeting future electricity crises. These include the rationalizing electrical consumption, creating an oversight committee to insure the timely completion of energy projects, and impressing upon the Ministry of Electricity that generating stations must be kept in top condition with prompt routine and emergency maintenance in line with consumption demands. The ministry was also admonished to fight wasteful practices in public networks, utilize wind power, conduct feasibility studies on shale-driven generators, and mandate that all establishments with generators press them into service at peak capacity and relay the surplus, if any, to the public network, encourage the use of solar heaters, expedite the completion of coastal dams for irrigation and electrical generation, come down hard on wasteful consumption especially by public-sector organizations, make sure that current is available to these violators quickly and in an organized fashion, and minimize technical electricity losses especially over distribution networks. The Ministry of Electricity was asked to present to the Assembly every 6 months a progress report on the implementation of these recommendations and on the progress of work on and difficulties, if any, with planned power projects.

The recommendations of the Utilities Committee were the subject of lengthy discussions by members of the People's Assembly, who added recommendations of their own.

Comrade 'Abd-al-Qadir Qaddurah asked why gas cannot be used to generate energy and asserted that this could be done within 4 to 5 months. He said there were large quantities of useable gas that would cost 60 percent less than other hydrocarbon derivatives. He suggested that the government be asked to present a study on the degree of gas utilization and its timetable for accelerating that utilization, especially since the Ministry of Petroleum already has studies indicating such feasibility. Comrade Qaddurah added that some 70 unused megawatts are circulated on the public network at night and wondered if this could be used for irrigation.

In order to deal with the electricity crisis in the years to come, Mr Najm al-Din al-Salih pointed out the importance of adhering to timetables for generating stations. Mr Ibrahim Za'rur wondered: Are we, in government and in the Assembly, going to concede that we are helpless to resolve this electricity crisis? This is an important question because the citizen will ask us what we did to meet the crisis. He added that putting the networks to best use and improving maintenance and utilization of generating stations will not bring about tangible results and I am not convinced that this is the ideal solution for the electricity crisis. The report neither ends nor solves this problem.

Mr Yasin Suwayd followed a similar track by asking what caused the crisis in the first place. Then he added: When we know the reason we will be able to find a solution. Is the crisis caused by government negligence or worker derilictlon?

After members of the Assembly posed their questions and made their observations, the minister of electricity stated that the crisis would end next year if al-Suwaydiyah and al-Ba'th dam projects were completed and the Mahradah station were expanded. He added that 35 megawatts are presently being invested in the public network in al-Suwaydiyah fields in al-Hasakah where 700,000 kwhs are invested daily. A study is currently being made on the feasibility of fueling Hims station by gas from al-Suwaydiyah fields. He pointed out that an available quantity of gas cannot be utilized for the lack of generating stations, that the nation's planning organization has already been asked to finance the construction of such stations, and that feasibility studies are currently underway on the utilization of the gas fields at Dayr al-Zawr.

As to the utilization of excess energy at night, the minister said that the party committee which visited the eastern region to study the matter found there was surplus energy available between 11 pm and 7 am but that there was no way to put that to better use.

We find logic in the People's Assembly's proposition that the reports of the Ministry of Electricity and the Utilities Committee will not solve or end the crisis until the accompanying recommendations are implemented. The report, in a practical and general way, described the crisis, identified some causes, reviewed the ministry's projects, and emphasized their timely implementation.

An indication that the crisis will not be solved soon despite the minister of electricity's optimism is that the People's Assembly recommended the creation of a committee vested with wide powers to oversee the implementation of the ministry's projects and has asked the ministry to submit to it every 6 months a report on the implementation of the recommendations and on the progress of its energy construction plans as well as on any difficulties or problems that may be encountered.

Considering the solutions proposed, we can state quite objectively that the electricity crisis will be with us until the middle 1990's.

The question is one of simple calculation. If indicators put the average annual rate of electrical consumption growth at between 20 and 22 percent, and if maximum supply in 1985 was at 1,450 megawatts, then the annual increase in consumption can only be met by adding 300-400 megawatts to the supply annually.

None of the ministry's planned projects will be implemented this year with the exception of one 25 megawatt-unit at al-Ba'th dam. Plans are ambiguous for 1987 and call for 320 megawatts in 1988 and 400 megawatts in 1989 on completion of the Tishrin station.

It is fairly simple, then, to calculate that total energy capacity of the ministry's projects, if implemented by 1989, will not exceed 340 megawatts. Meanwhile, consumption at its present rate of growth will require a capacity increase of 1,200 to 1,600 megawatts. The energy produced as a result of those projects will merely meet the expected increase in demand, which means that we will still have a blackout crisis until the end of 1989.

On the other hand, projects for the 1989-95 period are expected to produce 2,970 megawatts to satisfy an increase in demand of between 1,800 and 2,400 megawatts. The relative excess production will be barely sufficient to meet the shortage accumulating from previous years.

A solution to the electricity crisis requires the concerted effort of all the agencies directly responsible for energy in the country. For instance, we have been saying for years, in studies, seminars, and conferences, that it is imperative to develop alternate sources of energy such as the sun, the wind, shale, and coke. What have we done so far to develop these sources?

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YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN 1985 REVIEWED

Ta'izz AL-JUMHURIYAH in Arabic 5, 6, 8, 10, 11 Jun 86

[Article: "Advanced Economic Development Procession in 1 Year"]

[5 Jun 86 p 4]

[Text] In this modern age, economic development represents the base for development in the other sectors because economic development reflects man's development itself in any society and represents at the same time the guarantee needed to achieve independent political development and the development of democracy and of its basic structures.

This is why it has become necessary for the Third World countries to develop their economies in order to maintain their political independence and in order that their will may not continue to be hostage to the blackmail of exploitative countries, especially in the area of food. Consequently, our country has been eager since the inception of the immortal 26 September revolution to work actively to achieve economic development, despite the meagerness of its resources and its lack of infrastructures.

In its development plans, the country has devoted major attention to the dimension of developing man, who is the means and end of development, in order to build a strong and complete national economy founded on the following three mainstays:

The agriculture, mining, and conversion industry sectors which have made long strides, especially during the past few years in which brother 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih, the leader president and the General People's Congress secretary general, has led the revolution's procession. These sectors have undergone major development and growth and some of them have achieved major accomplishments and growth rates exceeding what had been planned for them.

This development and growth have been the result of the big attention devoted to these sectors and of the special priority given them on the basis of the objectives and principles of the immortal 26 September revolution, of the national charter's contents, and of the political action programs which underline the importance of an economic and developmental structure founded on programmed scientific bases and plans aimed at achieving comprehensive development.

On the third anniversary of the reelection of Colonel 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih, the brother leader president and secretary general, we will review briefly the most significant accomplishments achieved by our country in the various agricultural, mining, and industrial sides of the economic sector in the period from May 1985 to May 1986.

First, Agricultural Development Efforts:

The agricultural sector is one of our country's most important economic sectors because it represents our national economy's backbone. On this basis, our political leadership has paid great attention to this sector by virtue of its being the base and mainstay of development in the other production sectors. Consequently, a big part of the development plans' appropriations have been channeled toward financing agricultural projects. Thanks to this approach, our country has witnessed great triumphs in the agricultural sector, the most significant being perhaps the reconstruction of Ma'rib Dam--this great gain as a result of which our country will witness big leaps and great accomplishments in the agricultural and economic spheres.

Added to this is the firm conviction among our people of the need for self-reliance and for the ideal utilization of the available capabilities and resources to boost the production capacity and to focus on agricultural production.

Our political leadership, embodied in Leader President Colonel 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih, has worked to strengthen and entrench the mainstays of this conviction, either through practical decrees and measures or through the president's direct meetings with the citizens and his constant followup and his instructions that attention be given to the agricultural sector. In one of last year's Ramadan evening meetings, we heard the president stress that when the leadership put its emphasis on agriculture and on achieving agricultural development, it did so out of its belief that agriculture is the backbone of development and the source of abundance and happiness because agricultural development means industrial development and social progress. As a result of this sound inclination of the leadership and of the broad popular support for focusing on the agricultural sector by virtue of its major importance to our people's lives and to the self-reliant economic structure underlined by the objectives and principles of the immortal 26 September revolution and by the national charter's contents, our country has witnessed--through the development plans--the implementation of numerous agricultural projects in the various parts of the republic. It suffices to point out here that the Second 5-Year Plan, which will end this year, has estimated the size of investments in the agricultural sector at 3,825,000,000 riyals.

The cultivated acreage is expected to increase by the end of this plan from 1,008.7 hectares to 10,046.4 hectares, in addition to 10,000 more hectares which will be made available by the first phase of the Ma'rib Dam. Within the framework of the political leadership's encouragement and support for the agricultural sector, the brother leader president and secretary general opened the Sixth National Fair for agricultural and industrial products on the 25th of last September on the occasion of our people's celebration of the 23d anniversary of the glorious 26 September revolution. The fair included products which represented the various production sectors, in addition to samples of agricultural products.

Upon inaugurating the fair, the brother leader president and secretary general said that the agricultural sector is one of the most important areas to which the government has devoted major attention in our development plans, adding: Good positive results have been achieved in the agricultural sphere. The crops we have seen in the fair--crops produced by our generous land--constantly motivate and urge us to adopt further measures to protect the Yemeni farmer, to encourage agriculture, and to offer facilities to the farmers through the Agricultural Bank or througn what will be called in the future, God willing, the Development Bank designed to offer the farmers facilities and to help them set up model farms that produce a positive yield, because with the introduction of modern machinery and irrigation canals, these model farms wll greatly reduce water consumption. We believe that the agricultural future augurs well.

The leadership's interest in this sector underlines our course which stems from the fact that agriculture is an ever-renewed wealth, the mainstay of economic building, and the firm base for food security.

This is why the brother leader president takes every opportunity to stress this tendency and why we heard him say last March in the wake of announcement of the outcome of the general population and housing census: The general census will be beneficial to our country, especially in the field of agricultural development, which is the mainstay of our national economy.

Our interest and our people's interest in agricultural development have been demonstrated in the arena through the response of all the people's masses, embodied in the agricultural associations and the General Federation of Local Councils for Cooperative Development. Agriculture has developed and grown. Our land promises great abundance and our markets enjoy the blessings of crops produced by our people.

All our masses should pay great attention to agriculture. The political leadership exerts efforts to mobilize all capabilities and resources, especially oil resources, to serve agricultural development.

In the same instructional address delivered on occasion of the announcement of the outcome of the public census and during the celebration inaugurating the oil refinery in Ma'rib, the brother leader president and secretary general reaffirmed this point, saying:

I promise you and promise our people's masses that the government and all the brothers working in the state agencies will exert efforts to employ this oil wealth to develop the national agriculture and industry and the services necessary for the people's masses. Oil, regardless of its volume, is not a lasting source of wealth. What we consider to be a lasting source of wealth is agriculture.

The leader president added: In the agricultural sphere, we have achieved positive results in recent years by introducing modern mechanization, by expanding the cultivable area, by restoring a number of farms, by eradicating a number of plant pests, and by providing improved seeds.

He also stressed that what is required is to exert further efforts to expand the cultivable area and to reclaim more and more land to achieve self-sufficiency.

The brother leader president and secretary general renews constantly and on every occasion his call urging the citizens to redouble their efforts in cultivating their land, in moving to achieve agricultural development, and in investing their money in agriculture, stressing that the state will provide the farmers with all the possible credit facilities at reduced interest rates through the Cooperative Agricultural Loan Bank and will support all efforts aimed at forming agricultural associations.

With its profound understanding, the wise leadership has comprehended the dimensions of the tendency toward agricultural development. The leader president declared that 1984 was the beginning of the march toward an agricultural revolution aimed at developing this important sector by virtue of its having been the broad sphere of work for the majority of our people for thousands of years.

Within the framework of this tendency, the brother leader president announced on 4 May 1985 the adoption of 4 March of every year as our country's Agriculture Day. On 4 March 1986, our country celebrated its first Agriculture Day and the brother president launched those celebrations by planting the first fruit tree on the armed forces farm near San'a' Airport, thus declaring the start of the official and popular celebration of this dear national occasion during which the political leadership honored those who innovated and excelled in agricultural production and awarded them medals and appreciation citations in acknowledgment of their important civilizational role in building the country and in pushing the march of agricultural development toward greater expansion and growth and greater self-sufficiency at the various levels, be they agricultural or industrial. For more than 10 days following that day, celebrations were held in the various areas and in all of the republic's governorates to plant fruit and forest trees in the model farms, in the public parks, and at the afforestation sites. Prominent state and government officials; members of the armed and security forces, of the local councils for cooperative development, and of the youth, athletic, and cultural clubs; school students; and a large number of citizens took part in the celebrations.

The seedling distribution centers belonging to the Ministry of Agriculture and Fish Resources which are found in many areas experienced a big demand from the citizens and the farmers for the seedlings supplied by the ministry for the season and more than 400,000 seedlings of fruit and ornamental trees were distributed on the occasion.

Within the framework of this tendency, the private sector has also responded strongly and contributed prominently by setting up large farms in various areas. These farms have also enjoyed the political leadership's attention through the brother leader president's visits to a number of private farms during his inspection tours to the republic's governorates.

The armed forces have also been among the first to participate in agricultural production and to contribute to enhancing the agricultural development process. These forces have set up numerous farms in a number of areas, the most significant being the San'a' International Airport Farm. On Agriculture Day, the brother leader president and secretary general unveiled the plaque signaling the opening of this farm. The farm will plant nearly 36,000 seedlings in the first phase and 6,000 trees in the second phase. It is equipped with the latest irrigation networks to rationalize water consumption, considering that water is one of the most important resources and mainstays for the achievement of agricultural development and growth.

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[Text] Within the framework of our people's commemoration of Agriculture Day, a celebration was held on 6 March 1986 at the Veterinary Center building in San'a' to honor the exemplary farmers who excelled in agricultural production and the agricultural cooperatives and organizations which achieved great successes in producing crops. At the ceremony, the brother minister of agriculture and fish resources distributed the appreciation citations awarded by the brother leader president and secretary general to 16 farmers and agricultural cooperatives and organizations.

The brother minister also distributed the appreciation citations awarded by the ministry to 113 farmers and agricultural cooperatives in appreciation of their interest in increasing agricultural production.

The honoring of farmers means the political leadership's and the state's appreciation for every worker who is creative in his field and his work. It also means motivating all the brother farmers to exert greater efforts.

Within the framework of these celebrations, the brother vice president and member of the Permanent Committee and the brother prime minister and member of the Permanent Committee had inaugurated on 4 March 1986 the first technical agricultural fair organized by the Ministry of Agriculture and Fish Resources at the Veterinary Center in San'a'. The fair displayed agricultural, livestock, and fish products reflecting the Ministry of Agriculture's effort to create an advanced agricultural development, to familiarize the public with living examples of the agricultural activity and of the various efforts exerted by the ministry to develop a form of agricultural wealth that achieves self-sufficiency in the various agricultural and livestock, and to familiarize the farmers with how to use modern equipment and machinery and the advanced methods of mechanized agriculture in agricultural activity.

The fair pointed out the projects actually completed, especially in the sphere of building new dams and restoring a number of old dams that will contribute effectively to organizing irrigation and to the organized utilization of rainwater.

The fair also highlighted the agricultural guidance services and veterinary prevention services offered by more than 170 guidance centers in the various parts of the republic.

On top of all of this, the agricultural sector achieved during the past year numerous accomplishments, of which the most significant are the following:

First, in the Sphere of Irrigation:

The most significant accomplishment achieved in the agricultural area is perhaps the completion of the reconstruction of the second phase of the historic Ma'rib Dam, which will help increase the cultivable acreage in the area through year-round cultivation and through increasing the irrigated acreage to 10,000 hectares in this phase and to 20,000 hectares in the future.

Construction of the dam body has been completed and work has begun to build the irrigation network and the other installations. The inauguration of this phase of reconstruction of the dam will be celebrated shortly.

During his inspection tour of the development projects in Ma'rib Governorate on 7 April 1986, the brother leader president and secretary general saw the flow of flood water into Ma'rib Dam--a flow heralding abundance from the generous land of the two paradises. The water level in the dam has risen to more than 15 meters.

In the irrigation sphere also, work is underway in the project to study the underground water and to drill wells for the purpose of supplying water for agriculture and of helping the farmers to drill artesian wells in the various parts of the republic. This is to be done by conducting a complete study on the underground water resources, by drilling artesian wells for agricultural and drinking purposes, and by supplying the farmers with water pumps and diesel engines. Implementation of the project was started at the beginning of 1986. Within the framework of this project, 33 artesian wells were drilled and 10 pumps were distributed last year to a number of areas in the republic.

In 1985, the project spent 18,025,000 riyals on its activities. Another project in the same sphere is the project to employ modern irrigation methods. This project seeks to reduce the water used for irrigation, especially in the areas suffering from a water shortage, and to introduce modern irrigation systems. The project has exerted efforts to train Yemeni technicians to plan, design, operate, and maintain modern irrigation systems. In 1985, this project spent 1,125,000 riyals on its activities.

Another important project in the sphere of irrigation is the project to study and develop San'a' basin. This project seeks to prepare a complete study on developing San'a' basin until the year 2006, to prepare a detailed study and blueprints for 14 dams, and to conduct a study on the sites of the big and small dams in the project area. In 1985, an estimate was made on the size of the underground water store, a hydrogeological map was drawn for the areas where water is present, and the future reserve water store for San'a' City was defined. The total sum spent on the project's activities in 1985 amounted to 5,341,000 riyals.

In the area of constructing small conversion dams which will help increase the irrigated acreage and to utilize rainwater to replenish the underground water store, a contract was concluded last year to build Shahik Dam in San'a' Governorate. This dam's cost amounts to 5.9 million riyals and its storage capacity amounts to 450,000 cubic meters. This dam will help irrigate the adjacent area and will contribute to raising the water level in San'a' basin.

A contract was also concluded to build Ghawlat al-Shaykh Dam at a cost of 3,312,000 riyals. A springhead was built at a cost of 1,613,000 riyals to supply Sirr al-Nu'man Dam with water. Arhab Dam and a water reservoir were built in Bayt al-'Abdi and a springhead was built for 'Amaqiyah Dam at a cost of o,514,000 riyals.

A sum of 15.85 million riyals was spent in 1985 to build eight small dams and four water reservoirs and to repair four reservoirs and build a breaker for Wadi Muhalli Dam.

The cornerstone was laid for 'Amaqiyah Dam in Sa'dah District. This dam has a capacity of 24,000 cubic meters of water and its cost amounts to 1.7 million riyals.

In the project to maintain the terraces, (watersheds, and carriers), terraces were built, afforestation sites were established, cultivable lands were reclaimed, and (watersheds and carriers) were built in the governorates of San'a', al-Jawf, and Ma'rib. Nearly 670 hectares of land have been prepared for cultivation. The total sum spent on the project in 1985 amounted to 389,000 riyals.

Second, Improving and Increasing Production of Crop Seeds:

A total of 1,000 tons of improved wheat, pearl millet, maize, barley, and corn seeds were produced and supplied to the citizens in 1985. The seeds were sifted and treated with chemicals and their productivity was tested. In 1986, farmers and contractors were selected to produce seeds and 830 tons were distributed. The project machinery harvested a total of 1,388 hectares.

Ten external and internal courses were organized to train the project workers in the areas of seed technology, mechanized agriculture, seed production and storage, and coffee cultivation with the aim of increasing coffee production and exports, considering that coffee is one of the crops for which our country was famous in the past. A total of 193,000 coffee seedlings were produced and technical assistance was given to the farmers. The total sum spent on the project amounted to 614,000 riyals.

As for the project for the production of potato seeds in Dhamar Governorate, a total of 1,300 tons of improved seeds were produced in 1985 and 2,500 tons of seeds have been produced this year.

In the area of developing fruit orchards, beehives, and date palms, a total of 755,000 varied fruit seedlings were produced in all of the republic's nurseries in 1985.

A total of 270,000 seedlings were imported from abroad for the 1985 and 1986 seasons. The total number of fruit seedlings imported by the private sector amounted to 696,000 varied fruit seedlings.

Four training courses were organized in the area of tropical and semi-tropical fruit trees and of bee breeding. The number of trainees involved was 140.

Third, in the Area of Plant Protection:

Agriculture cannot be developed unless plants are protected. This is why protecting the agricultural wealth from the most serious plant pests and diseases has received the attention of the Ministry of Agriculture and Fish Resources which inspected and examined in 1985 a total of 364,563 varied seedlings imported by way of San'a' Airport.

A survey on the endemic plant pests and diseases and a field survey on the cotton pests have been carried out and the ideas necessary for controlling these pests and diseases, as well as controlling pests and diseases in private and public parks and orchards, have been formulated. A total of 36 tests and 34 kinds of pesticides have also been carried out. The total sum spent on the project in 1985 amounted to 2,414,000 riyals.

Fourth, in the Area of Agricultural Guidance:

In 1985, construction of the guidance center in Ma'rib Governorate was completed and a guidance center was opened in Hajjah Governorate.

An 11-month training course was also organized and those passing the course, numbering 18 trainees, were distributed to the agricultural projects.

An agricultural-guidance symposium was held in cooperation with the Arab Agricultural Development Organization and was attended by 17 delegates from the Arab countries. A total of 464 guidance meetings and 3 field days were organized, 30 guidance fields were set up, and AL-WA'I AL-ZIRA'I [AGRICULTURAL AWARENESS] magazine was issued.

Three guidance centers were built in Sa'dah and three more in Hajjah Governorate.

Fifth, Poultry Production Farms:

1. Poultry production farm in al-Rawdah: This farm has provided training for 78 farmers, has offered services to 100 poultry farms, and has imported 2 million chicks.

2. Poultry training project in al-Hasbah: In 1985, this project organized 2 training courses which graduated 17 trainees. The project has distributed 80,000 egg-laying hens and has produced 2.3 million eggs.

Sixth, in the Area of Livestock Production:

1. The veterinary services project in San'a': In 1985, a total of 203,657 head of cattle were immunized against cattle plague and 88,305 goats and sheep were immunized against sheep smallpox. Moreover, a total of 34,238 head of sick livestock were treated.

A veterinary clinic was built in Sa'dah and other veterinary clinics for poultry were built in each of al-Jawf, Ma'rib, and al-Mahwit.

2. The project to develop livestock resources: This project seeks to develop livestock resources, to increase their productivity, and to encourage the private sector to invest in the development of livestock resources.

In 1985, the project produced 30 tons of milk in Rasabah and Yarim farms, prepared 60 hectares for permanent cultivation with pasture crops, cultivated 120 hectares, and increased its herd to 1,650 head of livestock.

Seventh, Agricultural Projects for Rural Development:

1. Southern heights project: This project seeks to raise the living standard of nearly 60,000 rural families by increasing agricultural production in Ta'izz and Ibb governorates. In 1985, the project drilled 15 artesian wells and built 14 drinking-water projects and 3 guidance complexes. The project also produced 200,000 fruit seedlings and 100,000 ornamental seedlings in its nurseries in Ibb and in Warzan, Ta'izz. The project also set up 36 guidance orchards in Ta'izz Governorate and 22 orchards in Ibb Governorate.

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[Text] Moreover, 51 tons of fodder were produced, 466 guidance fields were set up, and 67 field days were organized. In the area of immunization against communicable animal diseases, 43,000 head of livestock were immunized against cattle plague.

2. The project for complete rural development in Radda': The project produced 90,000 fruit seedlings and planted 30,000 forest trees in 1985. It also planted 8,000 apple and pear seedlings. It set up 133 guidance fields for vegetable and grain crops and 10 fields as guidance orchards. Moreover, seven drinking-water projects were implemented and 40 km of subsidiary roads were built in the project's work area. The project also opened illiteracy-eradication classes in the guidance centers as well as classes for training rural women on modern looms and home economics.

In the area of livestock resources, the project immunized 4,679 head of livestock against the cattle plague and treated 2,794 head for various diseases.

In 1986, work was begun to open 40 km of subsidiary roads in al-Bayda' District and to build seven complete drinking-water projects.

3. The project for rural development in Qa' al-Bawn: This project seeks to enhance both the plant and livestock aspects of agricultural production and

to improve the living conditions of the inhabitants of the project area. In 1985, the project set up 5 demonstration fields and 5 guidance orchards and planted 9,000 pomegranate seedlings.

4. The project for Wadi al-Jawf rural development: This project seeks to increase the cultivable acreage in the area from 2,200 hectares to 4,100 hectares and to improve agriculture in the area. In 1985, the project drilled 52 artesian wells for drinking purposes. The project also built al-Hazm canal to supply water to the thirsty areas and installed equipment to observe floods.

5. The project for rural development in al-Mahwit Governorate: In 1985, the project drilled an artesian well for al-Rajm nursery, supplied 4,000 orange grafts and 1,000 multiple-embryo mango seedlings, and conducted a study on the possibility of setting up a section for rural women and for home training. It also supplied small ploughs, harvesters, and seeders compatible with the area's conditions. The project pub Lahimah and al-Rajm nurseries into operation and made the preparations for the distribution of 13,500 fruit seedlings to the farmers.

6. The rural development project in Khawlan: The project seeks to improve the quality of agricultural production, to provide guidance services to the farmers, and to train cadres in the maintenance of rural roads.

Last year, the project produced 80,000 seedlings, installed modern irrigation means in its nursery, helped the farmers build 3 dirt dams, and established an observation station in the Sarwah area and a station to measure floods in the valleys. It also established two guidance centers and supplied a number of leading farmers with some production requirements, such as fertilizer, seeds, and pesticides.

7. The project for rural development in Sa'dah Governorate: The project seeks to enhance agricultural production, to improve the living standard of the governorate population, to study the natural resources, and to set up an agricultural research station. Last year, the project produced 50,000 pomegranate seedlings, 25,000 grapevine seedlings, and 2,500 fig seedlings. Immunization against animal diseases was carried out and agricultural and veterinary quarantines were instituted. The project also built two guidance centers and drilled three artesian wells.

In 1986, the project established two guidance centers in Saqi al-'Abdayn and al-Mahad. There is also a plan to set up veterinary guidance farms to boost the establishment of calf-fattening and meat production farms.

8. The central heights rural development project: The project seeks to improve agricultural production and to increase the income of the farmers in its work area which covers five subdistricts from Dhamar Governorate and five subdistricts from San'a' Governorate. Last year, the project drilled 10 water wells, conducted the first and second phase of the study on water resources, and planted 38 demonstration fields for the farmers.

9. The Hajjah Governorate rural development project: In 1985, the project produced 35,000 apple and coffee seedlings and 9,000 varied fruit seedlings and immunized 15,722 head of cattle against the cattle plague and 4,590 head of sheep against sheep smallpox. The project also treated 4,384 sheep, goats, and camels for various diseases and set up 3 guidance centers in Hard, Aslam, and Bani Qays.

10. The Agricultural Research and Development Authority: The authority has built an irrigation network for the experimental farm in Dhamar Governorate and conducted 130 experiments on grains, fruits, and vegetables in the experimental farms in each of Sardud, Zubayd, and 'Usayfirah in Ta'izz, Ibb, and Dhamar; 51 confirmation experiments on promising crops in the farmers fields in each of Tahamah, the southern heights, and the central heights; and 30 experiments in al-Bawn and Ma'rib areas.

The authority's land and water section conducted physical and chemical analyses on 1,919 soil samples and 515 water samples to determine their usability for agricultural purposes. A total of 100 fertilizer and plant samples were also analyzed. These samples were collected from 60 areas covering most of the republic's governorates.

11. The Tahamah development project: This project seeks to increase agricultural production, to improve the irrigation system so as to utilize 50 million cubic meters of flood water, to alleviate soil erosion in cultivable lands, to raise the health standard of 44,000 farmers by supplying them with sanitary drinking water, to study the water store, to measure the water level, to build a road network in order to facilitate the provision of agricultural services and the transportation of crops, and to train the farmers in agricultural technology.

The project has drilled numerous wells, built reservoirs, purchased agricultural machinery, completed linking electricity and water connections, and built sewers and numerous guidance centers. In the project to develop Tahamat Wadi Mawr, 20 wells were drilled, a conversion barrier was built, and 64 km of roads were paved last year.

The project has also provided guidance services, immunized 19,000 head of cattle against the cattle plague, and treated 998 animals.

In Wadi Sardud, the plan to produce more than 2,000 tons of grains, vegetables, and fruits was carried out.

12. The project to develop fish resources: This project seeks to increase fish production, to enhance its distribution in the various areas, and to introduce modern fishing methods.

In 1985, the project built fish markets in San'a' and a dock for the mooring of boats. A center to facilitate the unloading of fish was also built in the city of al-makha'. This center is one of the units of the fishing ports project which extends all along the Yemeni coastline and includes the units to facilitate the unloading of fish and the major fishing ports in al-Hudaydah and al-Khawkhah. The project costs amount to 53 million riyals.

13. The project to bolster agricultural development: This project seeks to build training establishments and to train agricultural guides and cadres. The project has trained a number of workers, has conducted a study on the republic's agroindustries and a study on the manpower in the Ministry of Agriculture and Fish Resources, and has helped with the training programs of other subsidiary agricultural projects.

In 1985, the project organized five seminars on livestock resources, three seminars on irrigation, two seminars on guidance, and six seminars on other agricultural aspects.

As for long- and short-term training courses, the project conducted 16 courses on livestock resources, 23 courses on irrigation, 3 courses on fish resources, 6 courses on planning, 16 courses on plant production, 15 courses on agricultural guidance and information, 7 courses on agricultural protection, 18 courses on agricultural production, and 8 courses on various agricultural aspects for a total of 1,269 trainees.

Within the framework of its activities to develop and enlighten rural women, the project conducted numerous courses for female rural agricultural guides, the latest of which graduated the first and second batches of female rural guides on 6 April 1986 at Wadi Ramma' and Zubayd project. A total of 26 female guides were graduated to familiarize rural women with the sound health, food, and agricultural principles and to contribute to the programs for the eradication of illiteracy among women.

[Part four missing]

[10 Jun 86 p 5]

[Text] Through the announcements made on that occasion by the brother minister of oil and mineral resources and by Ray Hunt, the head of Hunt Oil Company, it has become certain to us that our country has made rapid and advanced strides in the oil exploration and prospecting activity and that these strides have produced excellent results that confirm the presence of a big oil store with commercial-level quantities which make it possible to utilize this wealth and employ its revenues, as the brother leader president has stressed, in bolstering our people's intrinsic capabilities, in enhancing their financial resources, and in developing the country in a manner that helps all our people achieve their aspirations to create the desired agricultural and industrial renaissance, to secure the requirements for their new life, and to highlight our people's civilizational and historical role at the national, pan-Arab, Islamic, and human levels.

Brother Ahmad al-Muhani, the minister of oil and mineral resources, announced that the latest oil-prospecting activities have proven that the volume of the crude oil store in "Field A" of Ma'rib al-Jawf basin rose from the 200 million barrels last September and to 500 million barrels recently proven to be available. This is in addition to the accompanying gas. Meanwhile, exploration and drilling activities continue in this field and in other fields in Ma'rib al-Jawf basin. The exploratory survey activities and well-drilling activities have escalated since the beginning of the current year of 1986 and since the Yemen Hunt Company and the Yemen Exxon Company formed a joint-liability company called the Yemen Prospecting and Production Company.

On his part, Ray Hunt announced in the address he made during the ceremony that 29 wells have been drilled in "Field A" so far and that the company has recently intensified its exploratory drilling activities and added 2 new oil rigs to operate in "Field A" with the purpose of discovering in the near future new fields to be added to the fields already discovered.

Ray Hunt added that the YAR will become in a short period of no more than 2 years from the present day a sovereign state exporting oil to the world energy markets now that it has already begun to produce oil in commercial quantities. Moreover, work is currently underway in the project to construct oil export pipelines and the technical and engineering studies have been completed on building a crude oil export pipeline from Safir to al-Sulayf Port on the Red Sea. This pipeline will be nearly 400 km long, will have a diameter of 26 inches, and will pass through long stretches of mountainous terrain. The field survey activities for this project, begun at the start of last January, were completed in the final week of last March. The field survey team was able to complete its work in a much shorter time than originally estimated, thanks to the support and encouragement of the brother leader president and secretary general and the cooperation of the brother citizens in the areas located all along the pipe's survey route. A large number of brother Yemeni specialists working in the Ministry of Oil took part in the survey activities side by side with the foreign experts and technicians. The cornerstone for the project to build the export pipeline will be laid during our people's celebration of the 24th anniversary of the immortal 26 September revolution. The construction work and the laying of the pipeline will begin next November in accordance with the planned program. All parts of the project, including the collection network in the oilfield, the pumping and electric power plants, the communication network and the observation and protection towers, and other parts of the project, are to be completed by the end of 1987. It is likely that pumping crude oil to the export port will begin at the end of 1987 or the beginning of 1988. The efforts that have been exerted and continue to be exerted by the political leadership have not stopped at this point because numerous partnership agreements have been concluded with a number of specialized international firms for oil prospecting and production in various parts of the country. This has been done in continuation of the efforts exerted by our country to produce and utilize the oil wealth buried in our soil, in implementation of the instructions of our political leadership which is eager to develop our intrinsic resources and as a result of the economic policy adopted by our country to encourage investment. Last year, a number of laws approving the partnership agreements with the specialized companies were ratified. On 9 July 1985, brother Colonel 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih, the leader president and secretary general, ratified Law No 23 of 1985 which had been approved by the People's Constituent Assembly. This law approved the partnership agreement on oil production, concluded between our country and the U.S.-Yemen Hunt Company on 10 March 1984. The agreement provides for partnership in the production of offshore oil in an area of 13,000 square km. On 22 August 1985, the brother leader president and secretary general ratified another law which had been approved by the People's Constituent Assembly and issued under Law

No 24 of 1985. This law approved the partnership agteement on oil prospecting and production in the central plateau and its vicinity, concluded between our country and the Middle East Exxon Prospecting Company on 15 July 1985. The law sets the agreement area at 20,000 square km extending from Yarim to the south of Sa'dah. On 14 December 1985, brother Colonel 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih, the leader president and secretary general, received Mr (Macfair), vice president of the Exxon Company's board of directors, who explained to the brother president the outcome of the exploratory surveys in the company's work area.

On 20 March 1986, the brother leader president and secretary general ratified Law No 10 of 1986 which had been approved by the People's Constituent Assembly. This law approves the oil prospecting and production partnership agreement concluded between our country and the French Total Company on 12 September 1985. The agreement sets the partnership area at 9,047 square km located south of al-Khawkhah area and including dryland and offshore areas. These companies have begun the geophysical survey activities in their work area. There is also the British Petroleum Company. The law approving the agreement concluded with this company on 1 May 1984 has been ratified and this company is carrying on with its exploration and prospecting activities in an area of 21,800 square km in Tihamah.

As a result of the increasing activities prospecting for oil and mineral resources, brother Colonel 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih, the leader president and secretary general, issued on 8 August 1985 Republican Decree No 2 of 1985, which provided for the creation and organization of a ministry of oil and mineral resources with a specific jurisdiction and organizational structure.

This ministry has taken the practical steps to train its Yemeni cadres in the areas of surveying, drilling, refining, storage, shipping, and marketing. The ministry has done this by letting the right number of geologists and technicians take part in the field activities carried out in our country by the international oil firms. Moreover, the ministry has drawn up a short- and long-term program to send a large number of its employees for training abroad and, at the same time, for importing foreign expertise to help the ministry with its organization effort and to offer advisory services.

By virtue of oil's importance as a source of energy, as a base for several chemical industries--not just as a commodity that yields financial revenues to the producing country--and as a resource that will be employed to serve sound economic development, to enhance agricultural production, and to bolster man's ability to utilize and develop the other natural resources, the brother minister of oil and mineral resources has declared that the ministry's strategy is founded on underlining the need for coordination with the state agencies and for cooperation with the international organizations so as to channel the efforts, capabilities, and available financial resources toward primarily meeting the country's need for refined oil byproducts and toward using the gas accompanying oil and other kinds of gas for energy in the electricity sector, in the dement industry, and in the other industries.

[11 Jun 86 pp 5, 7]

[Text] The brother leader president and secretary general stressed that the new given facts produced by the outcome of the production of oil require the government to redouble its efforts to carry on with the development procession according to the priorities set by the plans and programs, especially with the agricultural development which is the mainstay of our national economy and to which are tied all efforts for the comprehensive renaissance for which the sons of our struggling people aspire--a renaissance that embodies the great principles and objectives for which the immortal September revolution, on whose path our reverent martyrs fell, was started and the enormous sacrifices made by our people so that they may live a free and honorable life in an advanced, prosperous, and strong homeland. These sincere and vigilant concepts which have been stressed by the leader of our developmental procession and renaissance underline the leader's eagerness to employ the revenues of our oil wealth to serve and bolster the procession of agricultural and economic development which is emphasized by the principles and objectives of the immortal 26 September revolution and by the contents of the national charter.

We should not neglect to point out here that during the third year of the second presidential term of the brother president, the state has continued with the same enthusiasm and serious effort the activities to survey and prospect for the other mineral resources in various parts of our country with the aim of developing the national economy's production base and of establishing a high degree of balance between the structure of income from production and its structure from spending. Last year, the work was continued to complete the geological surveys and research aimed at studying the possibility of exploiting the natural resources in the areas of al-Hamurah in Ta'izz, Radda', al-Bayda', Naham, and Sa'dah.

Efforts are currently underway to complete the preliminary studies to evaluate the industrial and construction raw materials in Wadi Maqsab, Shabam, Hajjah, San'a', and the eastern province and also to complete the activities to assess the lead, zinc, and silver deposits in the eastern and northeastern provinces and the lead deposits in the Naham area. Moreover, the work continues to implement the underground thermal energy project in Jabal al-Lasi area in Dhamar Governorate. The preliminary results have proven that the energy which will be generated by the project is estimated to amount from 50 to 100 megawatts. This is in addition to a continuation of the efforts to evaluate the raw industrial and construction materials, such as marble, gypsum, and other raw materials for glass and ceramics, within the framework of a specific program that covers all parts of the republic.

As for al-Hamurah area project, efforts have continued to complete the studies to assess the copper, lead, and other raw materials in the area in preparation for offering the project in the near future for bidding by the international firms to participate in the mining operation in accordance with the rules of competitive international bidding that include the terms for investment financing, operations, and the volume of the investment required for the project and its relevant facilities and the terms for distribution of the production revenues.

The preliminary economic feasibility studies on the production and exportation of copper from al-Hamurah mine confirm that the volume of the raw copper, nickel, zircon, and titanium amounts to 8 million tons.

The achievement of these accomplishments in this vital sphere is due to the political leadership's loyalty and faithfulness to the objectives of the immortal 26 September revolution and to achieving the Yemeni people's aspirations of building the new, happy, impregnable, dignified, and prosperous Yemen. The achievements are also due to the climate of freedom, democracy, security, and stability enjoyed by our country.

In the address he delivered on occasion of the inauguration of the Ma'rib oil refinery, brother Colonel 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih, the leader president and secretary general, stressed that the objective of prospecting for and producing oil and of other objectives and accomplishments could not have been achieved if it had not been for the security and stability prevalent in our country and for the strength of the firm national unity that has fortified the people and the revolution, that has given them the strength to sacrifice and advance, and that has shattered all the attempts to sabotage and obstruct our national procession of sincere work and constant growth.

Third, Conversion Industries Sector:

The conversion industries sector plays a prominent fundamental role in increasing the volume of the gross domestic product and the growth rate and in boosting the strong and integrated national economy. The national charter and the political action program emphasize that this economy must be built in accordance with programmed scientific bases and mainstays. This is why our political leadership has devoted to this sector as much attention as it has devoted to the agricultural and mining sectors with the aim of achieving effective integration between agricultural growth and industrial and mining development and of creating productive national industries beneficial to all members of our Yemeni society.

Though the volume of total investments in industrial projects has been growing constantly and had amounted in 1984 to 671 million riyals distributed over 77 projects, these investments doubled in 1985. This is demonstrated by the industrial projects achieved last year when the state focused on the full operation of the existing industrial capacities and on increasing their production volume, regardless of whether they are part of the public and joint sector or of the private sector, by simplifying the official procedures for supplying the production requirements and the spare parts needed for operation, by offering incentives in accordance with the law, by enhancing the skills and production capabilities of the employees with the various available means of training, by creating a firm relationship between the training institutions and the production establishments to serve this purpose, and by studying the possibility of requiring the major industrial establishments to train their workers and trainees through special programs designed for one or more establishments or through using the official training institutions, with the beneficiary establishments contributing a part of the training expenses.

The state has also been eager to strengthen the technical agencies in the supervisory and financing authorities concerned with industrial projects so as to enable these authorities to perform their supervisory tasks soundly and to study the sector's projects vigilantly, making use in this regard of the expertise of all the international and regional organizations concerned and of the technical aid these organizations offer in these areas.

The state has, in addition to focusing on the policy of enabling local production to replace the imports, conducted a study on a number of export industries in order to bolster gradually the role of exports with the aim of reducing the deficit in the trade balance with the outside world, taking into consideration the current condition of the world markets and focusing on the neighboring markets and on the possibility of the future development of these industries. The state conducted this study at the same time in which it gave special priority to the investment areas that serve future development and that contribute to strengthening the intricate relationship with the other sectors, especially with the agricultural and mining sectors. It has proceeded in this regard on the basis of giving priority to the projects that rely on local raw materials. Last year, the agencies concerned studied a long list of various industrial projects and then offered the feasible projects to the local investors and advertised them at the first conference of Yemeni investors, which was held in San'a', the capital, in May 1985 with the aim of urging and encouraging both resident and expatriate national capital and of guiding it to invest in spheres beneficial to this capital financially and beneficial to the national economy and to bolstering its production base.

The Yemeni investors conference, considered a strong boost to bolstering the growth and development of the conversion industries sector, produced fruitful results, considering that it demonstrated the readiness of the Yemeni investors to form 12 joint-stock industrial firms whose projects rely fundamentally on the country's natural resources, including a project to produce sand and clay bricks, a project to process marble, a project to put out concrete products, a project to cultivate and process fodder, and a project to fatten calves. This is in addition to three other industrial projects whose capital has already been subscribed to and whose implementation has begun, namely:

1. The project to produce and process hollow and flat glass with a capital of 40 million riyals.

2. The gypsum project in Ra's Mak with a capital of 50 million riyals.

3. The project to produce ceramic products with a capital of 50 million riyals.

Amidst our people's celebration of the 23d anniversary of the immortal 26 September revolution, brother Colonel 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih, the leader president and secretary general, the brother vice president and prime minister, the deputy prime ministers, and the minister of economy inaugurated and laid the cornerstone for 26 various industrial establishments belonging to the public, joint, and private sectors and costing 1,922,285,000 riyals, including 16 establishments whose inauguration signaled the start of their operation.

The total cost of these 16 establishments amounted to 750,035,000 riyals. The subscribed capital of the 10 establishments for which the cornerstone was laid amounted to 1,172,250,000 riyals.

The products of these factories vary. They include eight factories that process and produce various foodstuffs, such as fat, oils, butter, flour, dairy products, juices, concentrated beverages, macaroni, vermicelli, and other foodstuffs which now meet a large part of the market's needs. The cost of building these eight factories amounted to 564,913,000 riyals. Meanwhile, the cornerstone has been laid down for six similar factories with a subscribed capital of 342,250,000 riyals.

Four factories for the production of cigarettes, chemicals, perfumes, cosmetics, and detergents have been opened. The total cost of building these factories amounts to 127,943,000 riyals. The cornerstone has been laid down for a cosmetics and perfumes factory with a capital of 20 million riyals.

The factories opened include two factories that produce house utensils and furniture and that have cost a total of 32,179,000 riyals. They also include a tannery and a shoe factory that have cost a total of 25 million riyals.

The factories for which the cornerstone was laid include al-Mafraq cement factory, which is owned by the Public Cement Production and Marketing Establishment and whose total construction costs have been estimated at 775 million riyals, a paper mill with a subscribed capital of 25 million riyals and a factory for the production of electric cables and wires with a total cost of 10 million riyals.

On the basis of the general strategy adopted by the state to encourage the conversion industries that rely totally on local raw materials, the Ministry of Economy and Industry issued last year final licenses to 86 industrial establishments belonging to the private sector and having a total subscribed capital of 1,065,128,406 riyals. These include a factory for food products with a capital of 376 million riyals, 8 textile and leather plants with a capital of 123,135,975 riyals, 5 factories for paper products with a capital of 135,069,837 riyals, 2 factories for wood products with a capital of 21,086,509 riyals, 13 factories for chemical and plastic products with a capital of 135,594,038 riyals, 11 factories for metal and workshop products with a capital of 73,529,526 riyals, 18 factories for the production of construction materials with a subscribed capital of 84,289,576 riyals, and 13 factories for animal and plant products with a subscribed capital of 147,495,169 riyals.

These accomplishments confirm that our country was able last year and in the preceding years to take long strides in the three economic sectors of agriculture, mining, and industry despite the international economic changes and the other factors that represent a major challenge to our country and to its limited resources and capabilities. All this could not be achieved if it were not for our people's determination to overcome the reality of backwardness left behind by the defunct imamate regime and their determination to crystallize the objectives and principles of the immortal revolution and the contents of the national charter in an actual living reality.

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CSO: 4404/401

INDIA

DELHI SEES PROLIFERATION OF HINDU ORGANIZATIONS

Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA in English 4 Aug 86 p9

[Text]

NEW DELHI, August 3 (UNI).

THERE has been a phenomenal rise in the number and strength of Hindu organisations in the capital.

Even though most of them sprang up some five years ago following the conversion of several Harijans into Islam in Tamil Nadu, the unending terrorism in Punjab has contributed much to their growth.

Their leaders say there is no looking back now. "I agree that every religion has its place in India," said the Hindu Manch President, Mr. K. Narendra. "But Hindu youngmen have started realising that they should not behave like sheep anymore. We mean business."

The Hindu Manch, along with the Shiv Sena, is one of the fastest growing organisations in the capital, chiefly due to the aggressive and militant postures it adopts.

Several Manch and Sena workers are believed to have been involved in the recent violence in the capital that claimed six lives.

Mr. Narendra, who owns well-known "Pratap Daily" as well as the "Vir Arjun," said the Manch believes in non-violence, but admitted that some of its workers might have indulged in violence.

Besides the Manch and the Sena the other prominent Hindu organisations here include the Indraprastha Vishwa Hindu Parishad, the Bajrang Dal (the young wing of the parishad), the Valmiki Sena (formed a fortnight ago) and the Arya Vir Dal.

The Manch was formed by some 20 people five years ago.

ADDED POPULARITY

"We did slide down in the months following the Meenakshipuram conversions," Mr. Narendra said. "But in the last eight to ten months, we have really grown."

"You may say that 20 per cent of those in some of these organisations are extremists," added the Parishad general-secretary, who quit government service five years ago to join the organisation that today has branches all over the country and abroad.

While the Parishad is said to have some 25,000 members, Mr. Narendra claimed that the Manch enjoyed a strength of 10,000.

Most of the members of the Hindu organisations come from west Delhi and the areas surrounding Chandni Chowk, which are also considered strongholds of the Bharatiya Janata Party.

The parishad functions from temples and its members came from all walks of life. They include the urban poor, the general-secretary said.

Most of the die-hard workers of both the Manch and the Sena are said to wield the trident, a symbol of Hindu militancy. Those who indulged in violence in the walled city last week too carried tridents.

When four Manch activists were rounded up by the police at Patel Nagar in west Delhi during the recent violence, hundreds of their supporters took to the streets in a noisy protest and wrested their release.

Mr. Narendra, whose family migrated from Pakistan during the partition, said once Hindus were organised, "most of the ills in the country will vanish."

He added that though the Manch also had branches in Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Rajasthan and Haryana, it was active mainly in Delhi.

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CSO: 4600/1049

NON-INTUC TRADE UNIONS AGAINST COMPUTERIZATION

Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA in English 4 Aug 86 p 5

[Text]



BOMBAY, August 3.

NON-INTUC trade unions today decided to launch a joint struggle against the government's policy of encouraging automation and computerisation in all sectors.

In a resolution passed at the end of a conference against automation and computerisation the unions called upon the Centre to include the right to employment among the fundamental rights.

Inaugurating the conference here, Mr. George Fernandes, president of the Hind Mazdoor Kisan Panchayat (HMKP), said that automation and computerisation amounted to an onslaught on the working class.

The move appeared to be an attempt on the part of the Rajiv Gandhi government to integrate the Indian economy even more closely with the "capitalist countries", he said.

The number of persons employed in the private sector had fallen from 75.5 lakhs in 1982 to 73 lakhs in 1984, although the five-year plan had estimated that employment would increase by two lakhs in this sector every year, Mr. Fernandes said.

In the public sector, while employment had risen by four per cent between 1970 and 1980, in subsequent years it fell to 2.5 per cent because of automation, Mr. Fernandes said.

SOCIAL FALL-OUT

Mr. P. P. Sanzgiri, general secretary of the Maharashtra CITU, said that unemployment had grave social consequences. Unemployed youth were being used by divisive forces who engineered communal riots, according to him.

Mr. G. V. Chitnis, general secretary, Maharashtra AITUC, said that his union was not against automation as such, as long as it did not displace labour.

When modern machinery was introduced the employers should guarantee that the jobs of the workers will be protected, he added.

Mr. Sharad Rao, general secretary of the HMKP, said that the introduction of mechanical sweepers in the Bombay municipal corporation had affected employment potential.

Mr. R. G. Karnik, of the State Government Employees Federation, pledged his federation's support to the fight against automation.

Dr. Datta Samant, president of Kamgar Aghadi, presided. Others who spoke included Mr. Suryakant Vadhavkar (Hind Mazdoor Sabha), Mr. Anant Karambelkar (Bharatiya Mazdoor Sangh), and Mrs. Pushpa Mehta (United Trade Union Congress).

/9274
CSO: 4600/1049

TRADE VOLUME WITH CHINA TO REACH 400 MILLION DOLLARS

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 22 Jul 86 p 17

[Text] On the basis of an informal commercial, industrial, scientific, and technical agreement signed yesterday between Iran and China, the volume of commercial exchanges between the two countries is anticipated to be 400 million dollars, and 200 million dollars have been allocated for industrial, scientific, and technical development and cooperative projects.

The second session of the Joint Economic Commission of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the People's Republic of China ended yesterday with the signing of an informal commercial, industrial, and scientific agreement at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing.

The first meeting began last Thursday in Peking with the participation of a high-level Iranian delegation headed by Hamid Mirzadeh, Deputy Prime Minister for Executive Affairs. It ended yesterday (Monday) after five days of negotiations and talks.

Zhang Jingfu, senior member on the State Council and of the Chinese Economic Commission [as published], gave a talk at the final session of these meetings. He stressed the successful nature of the meetings, and said: The second session of the Joint China-Iran Economic Commission was held with cooperation from both sides and it achieved results of interest to both parties. He discussed the good commercial and economic relations that exist between the two countries, and said that mutual scientific and technical cooperation brought about the changes in these relations. He gave assurances that the scientific relations and cooperation between the two countries will expand in the future.

Zhang Jingfu concluded with congratulations on the success of these meetings and thanked Mirzadeh and his delegation. Mirzadeh thank Zhang Jingfu and the people and the government of China for hosting the second meeting of the Joint Economic Commission, which was held in a warm and sincere atmosphere. He said: The political and economic Relations between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the People's Republic of China, in addition to showing the continuation of the long history of solidarity between the two countries, shows the attainment of Third World goals to gain release from superpower domination and achieve national self-sufficiency.

Elsewhere in his talk, Deputy Prime Minister for Executive Affairs stressed the plot by world imperialism to reduce oil prices. Because of the resources and talents existing in China and Iran, not only is this plot incapable of damaging the expanding relations between the two countries, but this in itself will mark the onset of new changes in relations between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the People's Republic of China. Based on this informal agreement, Iran and China will cooperate in the areas of commerce, industry, agriculture, science and technology.

In this agreement the volume of commercial exchanges between the two countries is expected to be 400 million dollars, and 200 million dollars have also been allocated for industrial, scientific, and technical cooperative and development projects.

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CSO: 4640/451

IRAN

FOREIGN EXCHANGE FROM NON-OIL EXPORTS REPORTEDLY INCREASED

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 23 Jul 86 p 17

[Text] Ahvaz—KEYHAN Correspondent—Despite the striking decrease in foreign exchange to be used for production by the Ministry of Industry, production by this ministry's industrial units has increased significantly, and in the current year the foreign exchange for non-oil export goods has increased 70 percent over last year.

Engineer Shafe'i, Minister of Industry, who had traveled to Ahvaz to inspect and study industrial units, to open an industrial complex in the liberated city of Faw, and to participate a seminar to study the technical service needs at the fronts of the imposed war, announced this matter to KEYHAN's correspondent and also answered his other questions.

Shafe'i discussed the reasons for holding this seminar and for his visit to the city of Faw and several industrial units in Ahvaz. He said: The aim of this trip and these inspections is to assess the accomplishments and activities of the brothers who have been sent from the ministry to the war fronts. At the same time, God willing, we will prepare ourselves to render much greater aid to the combatants with the planning that has been done at the seminar.

He added: Various units at the liberated city of Faw are being constructed and put into operation, among which may be mentioned the refrigeration units.

He then discussed this ministry's production and its self-sufficiency, especially with the recent plot to reduce oil prices. He said:

In the past the Ministry of Industry consumed the greater part of the country's foreign exchange, so that in 1361 [21 Mar 1982 – 20 Mar 1983] more than four billion dollars of the country's foreign exchange was spent to produce various products in this ministry. He added: Fortunately, with the new policies, last year the government reduced this figure to below one billion dollars, which shows the government's striking success in achieving self-sufficiency and independence for the country.

Continuing his remarks, Engineer Shafe'i compared the reduced foreign exchange for production in the years 1363 [21 Mar 1984 – 20 Mar 1985] and 1364 [21 Mar 1985 – 20 Mar 1986] with that of 1361 [21 Mar 1982 – 20 Mar 1983], in view of the increased production in this ministry. He said: In this regard, in view of the reciprocal relations which have been established and the level of consumption, our foreign exchange has been reduced from four billion dollars to one billion, but even so our production has increased.

In another part of this interview he said: The policy of the Ministry of Industry to procure foreign exchange for the use of industrial and production units and to reduce dependence on foreign sources is first to encourage exports of products so that the production units themselves will find a place in world markets in a coordinated and non-centralized way and market their products.

He said: Last year, in view of the policies and planning of the government in the Ministry of Industry, the country's foreign exchange allocated for export reached about 500 million dollars, which is a significant increase over the previous year. In the current year also foreign exchange from non-oil products showed an increase of 70 percent.

Continuing his talk, the Minister of Industry discussed the use of various commercial and international methods. He said:

In this regard, through the use of methods such as the procurement of raw materials and the establishment of production facilities within the country, we will be able to take great strides in developing our international relations. In the same regard, with cooperation which has taken place with the country's customs authorities, we hope to be able to provide the necessary assistance in this matter to the various industrial production units by temporarily not collecting commercial taxes and customs from such industries.

At the conclusion of the interview, Shafe'i discussed the inspection which has been made of several industrial units in Khuzestan, including the Farsit Factory. He said: God willing, with planning that has been done concerning cement products and cement itself, within two years we will achieve full self-sufficiency, especially in view of the fact that currently 40 million dollars in foreign exchange are spent annually for domestic cement production. We are making efforts to take the load for this product from national and oil foreign exchange. By increasing cement production units, in addition to meeting the country's needs, we will even be able to add this product to the country's list of exports.

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'NEW' MUSLIM LEAGUE EXAMINED

Karachi JANG in Urdu 11, 12 Jul 86

[Article by Irshad Ahmad Haqqani: "Muslim League--Challenge of Reorganization"]

[11 Jul 86 p3]

[Text] After the elections held under a non-party system and the establishment of provincial and national assemblies as well as the Upper House, Mohammad Khan Junejo was appointed prime minister of our country. He asked and got an unanimous vote of confidence from the House even though his candidate for House speakership had lost badly only 2 days (on 22 March) earlier. Mr Junejo thus started his work after getting support from the whole House. However, he was soon to find that each of the 237 members of the House were individuals and it was not realistic to depend on them for support on any legislative or political issue. Members who supported the government decided to form a group--OPG--to support Mr Junejo. Members who refused to join this new group were called IPG. This divided the Houses into majority and minority groups and any hope of their working together became extinct. A few months later it was felt that the OPG was not strong enough to depend on for control of the House. Thus, the idea of forming a government party began to take shape. There was discussion over the form and name of this party. OPG members were not ready to join any party with a name like the Muslim League. The reasons for this hesitancy were historical, philosophical, practical, and ideological. The final analysis of this party formation indicates that many confused people can be convinced to join a party if it is led by the prime minister. Pir Sahib Pagara was asked to leave the leadership of the party. It was not an easy job, but Pir Sahib decided to relinquish his seat to the prime minister after considering all the pros and cons.

The new Muslim League party was formally established in a hotel in Islamabad. A draft of its manifesto was also presented at that time and the new president was given the authority to approve new members. The very next day the constitution of the party was formally accepted after some changes. They decided to establish youth, scholar, and lawyer wings within the party. The important office of secretary general was also filled by an old Muslim Leaguer, Iqbal Ahmad Khan. Thus, all the ceremonies of a party, including registration, were taken care of.

A look at this procedure shows us that the resurrection (it cannot be called reorganization since all parties were declared defunct since 16 October 1979) of the Muslim League did not follow the traditional pattern involved in establishing a party.

As said earlier, the Muslim League party did not form a government after its establishment. Instead, the present government created a political party. It was created in a strange way. The secretary general of the original Muslim League was never told of this new creation. Many veteran leaders of the original Muslim League were either not informed or could not be convinced to join this new party. A few days ago a meeting of the real Muslim League party (Pagara Group) was held under the chairpersonship of its vice president. This meeting was attended by such established leaders as Makhdoomzada Husan Mehmood, S.M. Zaffar, and Ahmad Sayed Kirmani. It shows that the important leaders of the Muslim League are not satisfied with this so-called reorganization.

So, Pakistan's Muslim League party has been established and all the necessary steps have been taken to organize it. Its manifesto is being called very progressive and revolutionary. All the members of the new Muslim League are claiming that a very important era in the party established by Quaid-e Azam has started. There is talk about putting new life into the party and making it a very visible and active political group during the remaining period of Mr Junejo's prime ministership. They claim they will revolutionize the nation's ideological, economic, and social life.

Reorganization of Mr Junejo's Muslim League is a welcome development despite its "uniqueness" and the radical approach taken in the process. They are, after all, talking about a political party and getting grassroots support for it. Claims to make it the real successor of Quaid-e Azam's party are also being make. Only time will tell us how true these promises will be, but we welcome these promises.

[12 Jul 86 p 3]

[Text] These claims show that some of our leaders are presenting Quaid-e Azam as their idol and are willing to follow his ideology. Later, we will be able to ask these leaders how much success they had in fulfilling their promises. We will be able to compare their actions with those taken by Quaid-e Azam's party. We should welcome any effort by the Muslim League to organize itself. The major reason for our political failure for the last 38 or 39 years has been the inability of the Muslim League to stay up to par. Every supporter of political action would welcome this serious effort by this party.

The record of Mr Junejo, the president of the new Muslim League, for the last 15 months may not have been exemplary, but neither is it very disappointing. We have to accept the fact that Mr Junejo's National Assembly played an important role in having martial law lifted within 8 or 9 months of its imposition. Of course, the external pressure also helped. He did not declare any emergency rule since he took over. He has obtained approval to form political parties and ignored the mandate forbidding all kind of political activities until 1990. All these actions are praiseworthy. Political opponents were allowed to function without fear of persecution. Mr Junejo, however, was not very democratic when the question of the speakership arose and he declared a presidential ordinance on 13 May. Now they are talking about curbing the political activities of unregistered political parties even though these parties have promised to remain peaceful. Two examples of this trend are the murder of student leader Iqbal Ahmad Hisbani and the 5 July demonstrations. The former incident could have created a very violent situation in Sindh, but with a strong will and strict discipline they managed to control the situation. Similarly, there was no violence or disorder during the 5 July demonstrations. These examples show that the government does not need to impose any restrictions on political activities. If the new Muslim League party believes itself to be the real successor of Quaid-e Azam, it should borrow some pages from the great leader's life and philosophy. It should not try to curb any kind of political freedom.

Government resources and authority should not be used in the effort to reorganize the Muslim League. They are trying to establish the youth wing of this party and we have heard of some unsavory efforts in this context. One strange proposal was that card holders of this wing would become exempt from arrests by the police. This is a very strange decision and would make imposition of the law inequitable. The Muslim League has the right to organize itself in any group, but it should do so properly and not abuse government power. If such unacceptable and undemocratic approaches are taken, this party will not be able to stay strong when the government changes.

The new manifesto of the party contains some commendable elements, but it is easy to make beautiful promises and raise promising slogans. Anyone can write an attractive manifesto in 2 or 3 days simply by improving upon the earlier manifestos of this party. The real thing is to put these promises into practice. There are some positive aspects of Mr Junejo's two budgets. There were some new elements implemented in last year's budget and there are some good additions in this year's budget. The Muslim League manifesto promises to make Pakistan an Islamic welfare state, eradicate rural poverty, provide equal opportunity to all classes, remove special privileges, provide health, education, and accommodations to all, and establish a stable government. These promises are not easy to fulfill and require hard work, thought, and revolutionary measures. It will require sacrifices and rising above personal and group interests. Strict adherence to the ideals mentioned in the manifesto will be required.

Which of the manifestos presented by the Muslim League did not make fancy promises? But were those fancy principles ever adhered to? Other governments have also made big promises, but does the present Pakistan show that any of these promises were implemented during the last 40 years? Were there any steps taken to remove social and economic inequities? The Muslim League leadership is mocking previous governments for making false promises and declares that it will implement all its plans. This is really a good thing and a noble gesture. We should like to refer to a British proverb: "You can enjoy the taste of the pudding only after eating it." The present budget does not appear to be helping the poor or removing social or economic inequities; it is designed to do exactly the opposite!

Mr Junejo's party should not depend on its top leadership if it wants to play an important and long-term role in the country's politics as majority party and later as the opposition party. Instead, it should try to fulfill the promises it has made. Power can be used like Alladin's lamp to form a party. The real test will come when the power is used and how it is used. The second test will be how this party functions when it losses power. Will the Muslim League be able to stand these tests of time? At present it is known as the party of the privileged and of rulers united by their love of power. The leadership of this party has to prove that this image is wrong. Will they succeed in it? Only time will tell how deserving this new Muslim League party is in claiming to be the real successor of Quaid-e Azam's party.

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PAKISTAN

CORRUPTION BLAMED FOR COUNTRY'S PROBLEMS

Karachi JANG in Urdu 8 Jul 86 p 3

[Editorial: "When Will This Cheating End?"]

[Text] Sardarzada Mohammad Ali Shah, member of the National Assembly from Jhang and chairman of the Public Accounts Committee (PAC), has started an investigation of 25 major cases of corruption. Billions of rupees from the national treasury were stolen in these acts. Addressing a press conference in Quetta last Sunday, he said that his committee was investigating corruption in the following departments or ministries: food, information, WAPDA, the Capital Development Authority, railways, the Public Works Department, and communications, He expects to present a report to the National Assembly within a month. He explained that this committee will make recommendations to stop irregularities in government offices. The National Assembly has the right to act upon these recommendations.

Prime Minister Junejo's government is concentrating its efforts on several important issues and ending corruption in its bureaucracy is one of them. The establishment of PAC is part of this effort. It is our misfortune that people charged with the protection of our national resources are busy looting and distributing that loot among themselves. Dr Mehbubul Haq, federal minister of planning and development, also expressed concern over this trend a few days ago. Dr Haq mentioned that over 20 billion rupees are devoured illegally by the bureaucracy. He added that this trend of looting the poor from both sides has been going on for several years.

Corrupt practices in government offices are so common that no department is considered free of them. What is more, even the revered occupations of education and medicine have not been spared! The situation in the private sector is even worse. Smuggling is rampant in the name of commerce! According to some important industrialists and businessmen, merchandise worth over 55 billion rupees is smuggled into this country every year. Illegal business has become an established organization. We should also explain how people are abusing the incentives provided by the government to increase exports. Billions of rupees go to the safes of opportunists in the form of government rebates. Merchandise worth millions of rupees is imported illegally each day with the help of corrupt government officials. To make things worse, if an honest official tries to stop it, he is strongly opposed. A large amount of money reserved for national development is devoured by corrupt officials. All this has become so common that no one ever feels embarrassed. Instead they are proud of it!

We can understand the prevalence of such corruption under the autocratic governments, but it is sad to see that a government elected by the people has also fallen to this evil. The most disturbing aspect of this practice is the fact that the poor people have to pay the price in the form of higher prices, unemployment, and debts. No law can help them. A person talking about law and order is ridiculed and called cowardly and stupid.

In our opinion, the major reason for this situation is the wrong conception of government by our leaders. Our observations show that people who reach the avenues of power by promising to look after the welfare of the poor forget the poor the day they sit in the chair of power. Their whole attention is focused on prolonging their stay in the office. There is no real democracy in our country, so these leaders are not worried about the public wrath. This could be the reason why anyone who comes to power in this country spends all his energy looting its coffers. Officers and leaders at the lower echelon emulate their corrupt bosses. Any new development project means a lot of money for bureaucrats and businessmen at all levels; it has nothing to do with helping the poor. The situation has deteriorated so much that even the major portion of foreign loans obtained with great difficulty falls prey to various corrupt deals. As a result, the country is falling fast into foreign debt.

Prime Minister Junejo has taken a wise step in establishing PAC at this time; however, as indicated by the committee chairman, the recommendations made by the committee will be implemented by the National Assembly. Regardless of how a sickness is diagnosed, the patient's health cannot improve without strict adherence to the recommended treatment. Mr Junejo should make sure that the National Assembly follows the recommendations made by PAC thoroughly in order to stop the reckless plunder of our nation's wealth. His government is the people's government and is fully responsible for the welfare of our countrymen. We are sure that if the government succeeds in curbing corruption, the suffering people will assure stability to this government.

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JOURNALISTS ADVISED TO FOCUS ON REAL PROBLEMS

Karachi JANG in Urdu 8 Jul 86 p 3, 8

[Article by Farooq Piracha: "The Truth is...."]

[Excerpt] Recently, or since Benazir Bhutto returned to Pakistan, the editorial pages of JANG have printed letters and articles about her. Benazir is being criticized and opposed even in articles that have nothing to do with her. Everyone appears to be competing in this effort to oppose her. We do not know the role of JANG editors in this tirade. Should we inquire, we assuredly would be told that JANG is the people's newspaper and its pages are open for anyone to express his opinion. Does it mean that there is not even one person among hundreds of millions who supports Benazir? For the last few months, not a letter or an article was printed in support of Benazir, who drew millions of supporters to her rallies. Is Benazir so unpopular that everyone hates her? If it is not so, then why are newspapers filled with statements against her made by the president and the ministers? Is there no other opposition leader worthy of our attention? Why do all international press representatives always ask the same question of our prominent leaders? They ask: What will Benazir do now? What is her present position?

The former prime minister Bhutto was once asked by his associates why he did not take any action against certain newspapers that printed derogatory stories about him. Mr Bhutto said that their idle banter only strengthened his position. He added that he wanted the newspapers to take his character apart. Mr Bhutto meant that people did not trust the news media and anyone being roasted by them draws sympathy from the people.

Benazir is experiencing exactly that now. Many self-styled journalists are working full time taking her apart. Newspapers, including JANG, print whatever they write.

During the last few years the number of these self-styled journalists, who have no right to be called journalists, has increased rapidly. Someone is forcing them to become journalists. These people appear to be paying the price of being journalists. It makes us believe that we have everything we want and rivers of milk and honey are flowing in our country. None of these journalists writes about the scarcity of electricity, gas, and water. They do not write about their telephones not working. Everyone is harping on the same tune. Our law enforcement agencies would become active if we talked about the lack of law and order. Are the dacoits in Sindh taken care of? Were the terrorists in Sarhad ever punished? The truth is that we have sworn not to talk about the things we should talk about. We have bartered our conscience for a car and a home.

Those who always praise the government are not its friends; they are its enemies. We have a catastrophe of historic proportions here. Legislative assemblies elected without any participation by political parties have become "owners" of a political party! Not a single critic or a columnist dared to say that these assembly members have betrayed the voters by joining a party after being elected by them as independent candidates.

When U.S. Congressman Stephen Solaraz critizes us, our newspapers and assemblies begin to scream in protest that he is interfering in our internal affairs. However, when the U.S. ambassador praises our government, we print his statements under big banners and write editorials in his praise. Similarly, pro-Benazir reports published in foreign newspapers are not reproduced here. These newspapers are researched for articles that show our opposition in bad colors.

It is said that people who participate in the rallies welcoming Benazir are paid 100 rupees per day. They are talking about millions and billions of rupees here. No journalist is willing to write why the government with all its money fails to attract people to meetings addressed by its ministers. It just is not wise to go to such extremes in opposing a person that our relations with friendly nations are jeopardized.

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